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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the American and West German 
reaction to the Soviet note of March 10,  195 2 .  In this so-
called Stalin Note the Soviet d ictator proposed the 
reuni fication of Germany on terms of neutra lity and acceptance 
of the Oder and Neisse rivers as the German-Polish border. By 
launching his proposal Sta lin sought to prevent the 
integration of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the 
Western alliance system. 
The paper starts out sketching the emergence of the 
United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers after World 
War I I .  I t  also analyzes the impact the . Cold War had on 
Europe . After this introductory section the author discusses 
American-West German relations during the time between the 
founding of the FRG and spring 1 95 2 ,  when the Stalin Note was 
presented to the Western ambassadors in Moscow. 
During the first three years of the Bonn government , • 
American policy toward Germany gradually shifted away from the 
objective of controlling the defeated enemy . Instead , the 
Truman Admini stration increasingly pursued a policy of 
cautious cooperation in order to contain Soviet expansionism. 
Although this change in Washington ' s  course was accelerated 
by the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 , the occupation 
iv 
of Germany lasted until 1955, the year in which west Germany 
received sovereignty and j oined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organ ization . 
After 1949, i t  was West German Chancellor Adenauer ' s  
foremost goal to restore full independence to the German 
government through close cooperation with the Western Al lies , 
especia lly the United States . Adenauer was prepared to 
postpone the reunification of his country for the time being. 
Hoping to create a strong power basis for the FRG in the West 
European alliance, he expected to gain the necessary strength 
for successful negotiations with Moscow about Germany ' s  unity. 
To a large extent Bonn ' s  policy harmonized with that of the 
Truman Administration. 
Prior to the creation of two German states , the Soviet 
Union had followed a rather aggressive course in its policy 
toward Germany which cl imaxed with the Berlin Blockade of 
1948 . Being confronted with the failure of its strategy and 
facing a tremendous We stern armament program after the 
invasion of South Korea , the Kremlin changed its strategy. 
During the second half of 1951 and spring 1952, Moscow 
di spatched several initiatives for German reunification o f  
which the Stalin Note was the most conciliatory one. 
The United States rej ected Moscow ' s proposal of March , 
1952 because Washington did not want to cancel its defense 
plans for Western Europe in exchange for a new power 
constellation on that continent which Washington considered 
v 
fragile and dangerous to American security interests . The 
author of this paper concludes that American opposition to the 
Soviet plan was the maj or Western obstacle with respect to 
s incere four-power talks on German unity in 195 2 .  French , 
British and West German concurrence with America ' s  attitude 
considerably faci l i tated this policy . 
The author,  however , questions the thesis o f  some 
historians that Adenauer ' s  concurrence with Washington ' s  
course was essential to the United State s '  refusal o f  the 
Stalin Note. He holds that a possible west German di sagreement 
concerning Washington ' s  course would not have resulted in 
serious four-power talks . Adenauer ' s  political lever was too 
weak as to press successfully for a constructive Western 
approach to Moscow ' s  initiative. Bonn had only the chance to 
threaten a suspension of further talks on the FRG ' s  
integration into the Western a l liance system unt i l  the Soviet 
plan had been thoroughly probed--a move that would have caused 
severe frictions among the We stern Allies and Adenauer .  Such 
a strategy would have j eopardized if not destroyed the basis 
for continued cooperation between the Western powers and the 
Federal Repub lic without resulting in Germany ' s  reunification. 
vii 
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Introduction 
The East-West conflict that emerged during World War I I  
rendered Germany a divided country for an inde finite time . For 
fourty years the Germanies were separated by an iron curta in . 
Still today they are integrated into military alliances 
directed against one another. The question whether the Stalin 
Note of 195 2 was a sincere proposal of a united, neutral 
Germany or a mere diplomatic trap raised a persistent di spute 
among po liticians , political observers , and hi storians . The 
key to this problem, however ,  lies in the state and party 
archives in Moscow which remain closed to historical research. 
Some historians have pointed out that in 1952 the 
Western occupation powers and We st German Chance llor Konrad 
Adenauer missed a chance for a thorough examination of the 
Kreml in ' s  proposa l .  These scholars hold that by rejecting 
negotiations with the Soviets the Allies and Adenauer also 
missed an opportunity for Germany's democrati c  reunification . 
• 
The recent mass exodus from the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and the powerful demonstrations demanding freedom and 
democracy in that state anew indicate the importance of the 
decisions made in 1 95 2 .  Could a l l  this have been avoided had 
the western Allies agreed to the Soviet initiative for a four-
power conference in that year ? 
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This thesis focuses on the policy of the Truman 
Administration and the Adenauer government toward Moscow ' s  
March 195 2 proposal. Washington and Bonn's perception of the 
Soviet note and their reaction to it will be the center of the 
discussion . It goes without saying that the United States as 
the Western superpower was the dominant factor in German­
American relations at this time. One might raise the question , 
however , whether Washington could have successfully pursued 
its policy of integrating one part of Germany--the Federal 
Repub lic of Germany (FRG)--into the western alliance system 
i f  it had been opposed by the FRG ' s government. In other 
word s :  did Chancellor Adenauer possess the lever to force the 
United States and its allies to deal more constructively with 
the question of German unity ? 
An introductory chapter of this paper will analyze the 
emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as world 
powers in the early postwar era. I will then briefly discuss 
the U . S .  foreign policy in Europe from the beginning of the 
Cold War to the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 . 
American-West German relations during the first three 
years of the existence of the Bonn government are to be 
elucidated in the succeeding part of the paper. The 
predominant feature of these relations was not German unity 
but Washington ' s  interest in rearming the Federal Republic and 
including it into the Western defense system. The thesis seeks 
to show the American diplomatic efforts by which Washington 
3 
tried to achieve this objective . Finally this section focuses 
on how its allies ,  as well as Adenauer and the West German 
opposition, reacted to this policy . 
Chapter Four will shed some light on the Soviet foreign 
policy toward Germany in the years 1949-1952. I shall sketch 
the change in the Kremlin ' s  attitude from a hard-line course 
to a more conciliatory approach toward the German question 
which finally resulted in its proposal of March 1952 . 
Washington ' s  reaction to the Stalin Note will be 
discussed in the major chapter of this thes i s .  In addition to 
the points mentioned above, I intend to focus on the question 
whether the policy makers at the State Department were 
prepared to consider Germany ' s  reunification a valuable 
alternative to the integration o f  the FRG with the Wes t .  A 
brief analysis of some important newspaper and magazine 
articles will reveal whether the Truman Admini stration would 
have found the necessary dome stic 
implementation of such an alternative. 
support for the 
In addition, the paper will present Adenauer ' s  maneuvers 
during the exchange of notes . His adherence to his Westpolitik 
and his fear of a four-power agreement at the expense of 
Germany determined his policy toward the Kremli n ' s proposal. 
Adenaue r ' s course was to a large extent congruent with that 
of the Truman Administration , but it met with persistent 
resistance by the strongest West German oppo sition party , the 
Social Democrats (SPD) . The SPD' s harsh critic ism of the 
4 
Allies ' reply to the Soviet note and their attempts to force 
Adenauer to take up a stronger stand on German unity will be 
discussed in the final part of chapter five. 
After the Western powers had rej ected Moscow's plan in 
195 2 ,  both German states were integrated into oppo sing 
military alliances led by the superpowers . The FRG and the 
GDR were granted sovereignty. A brief discussion o f  this 
development that sealed the division of Germany to the present 
time will precede the conclus ion . 
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Chapter I 
American Engagement in Global Politics After World War II 
When the Second World War ended with the defeat of 
Germany and Japan the global political order of the 1930s was 
completely destroyed. The Axis Powers had lost the war , and 
with i t ,  their dominant positions in Europe and the Far East . 
Yet the results did not only affect the defeated aggressor 
countrie s .  The former great powers , France and Great Britain, 
though on the victorious side , faced a steady decline of their 
global might due to their economic problems and the 
intens ified crisis of colonialism. 
The Soviet Union and the United States turned out to be 
the real winners and emerged as world powers which filled the 
power vacuum caused by the collapse of Germany and Japan. 1 The 
new U . S .  administration under President Truman soon realized 
that former President Rooseve lt ' s  plan of a lasting global 
peace order , based on a genera 1 understanding with the 
U . S . S . R . , was a mere i l lusion. The Potsdam Conference in mid-
1 9 4 5  provided the last comprehensive agreement between East 
and We s t .  This compromise became possible because the 
1 George F .  Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Po licy, 
( Princeton, N . J . : Princeton University Press , 1 9 5 4 . ) ,  pp. 6 6-
6 9 .  
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conference left many important questions unsettled and 
preserved the status quo in Europe . The post-Potsdam era 
brought an end to the "attempted accommodation on the part o f  
the United State s . 112 American and Soviet goals in Europe and 
Asia clashed more openly than ever since the Russian Civi l War 
in the 1 9 2 0 s .  
The Cold War meant for the United States that i t  had not 
only to manage the occupation of the defeated nations but to 
engage itself in foreign regions in order to counter what the 
Truman Administration considered a Soviet threat to American 
intere sts . After 194 6 ,  American policy makers regarded Moscow 
"not as an estranged a l ly but as a potential enemy , whose 
vital interests could not be recognized without endangering 
those of the United States . " 3 
During this reorientation in American foreign policy , 
Washington implemented a new policy toward Germany , which was 
still divided into four occupation zones . Frictions with the 
Soviets over reparations , raw materials and food supplies 
caused the United States to cut off shipments from its zone 
into the Soviet zone. The U . S .  government began the 
• 
reconstruction of West Germany as a democrati c ,  capitalist 
2 Wolfram F .  Hanriede r ,  West German Foreign Policy 1949-
1 9 6 3 :  International Pressure and Domestic Re sponse , (Stanford, 
Cal i f . :  Stanford University Press ,  196 7 . ) , p. 3 5 .  
3 John L .  Gaddi s ,  The United States and the Origins o f  
the Cold War 1941- 1947 , (New York , London: Columbia University 
Pres s ,  19 7 2 )  , p. 2 8 4 .  
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state "as the only alternative to a Russian-dominated Reich . .. 4 
One year later , Washington decided to suppor t Greece and 
Turkey militarily in order to defeat communist rebels in these 
countr ies. The strategy of taking on a firm position against 
communist expansionism was based on the Tr uman Doctr ine which 
usher ed in the era of containment. I t  marked the shift from 
the nee-isolationistic mood--which had prevailed among the 
war -tir ed Americans in the first two post-war years--to a 
growing "r ealistic anticommunism" of the American gover nment. 5 
At about the same time, it became obvious that the Soviet 
Union was to integrate its occupation zone in Germany into its 
Eastern spher e of influence. 
By 1 9 4 8 , the United States, Great Britain and France 
permitted the Western zones of Germany to participate in the 
Marshall Plan. Named after the U. S. Secr etary of State, Geor ge 
C. Marshall, this progr am provided extensive financial aid 
for the West European countries in order to r ebuild their war -
torn economies. Washington used its resour ces for the 
r econstruction of Western Europe not so much for the 
traditional objective of r eviving world tr ade but "for the 
more urgent purpose of alleviating social and economic 
4 Gaddis, p. 330 . 
5 Hans w. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: .... A 
Special Relationship ? .... {Cambr idge, Mass. : Harvard University 
Press, 1 9 8 0 . ) , p. 1 6 2 .  
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conditions which might breed corrununism. " 6 
Also in 1 9 48, two major events intensi fied the anti-
Soviet feelings , especially in Europe: the corrununist coup in 
Czechoslovakia of March-Apr il and the Berlin Blockade in June . 
These dramatic moves by Stalin alarmed the Western democracies 
about Soviet aggression. Fear o f  the Soviet Union among the 
West German population was especially great because of the 
stil l-prevai ling Naz i tradition o f  anticorrununism and the 
frontier position o f  the We stern zones . That was why the 
American government in 1 9 48 was able to push successfully for 
the merger of the three Western zones into a democratic West 
German state . The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany 
on May 2 3, 1 9 4 9 , and its continued economic reconstruction was 
to prevent the West Germans from coming under corrununist 
contro l . 7 
However , pressure by the United States for a separate 
(Western) state first met with persistent resistance from the 
West German politicians of a l l  parties who were anxious to 
preserve the " Reichseinheit" [unity of the German state ] . 8 
The Western occupation powers and the German representatives 
6 Gadd i s ,  p .  3 1 7 .  
7 Andreas Hil lgruber, Europa in der Weltpolitik der 
Nachkriegszeit ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 3 ) , 2nd suppl .  ed.  Oldenbourg­
Grundriss der Geschichte, ed . Jochen Bleicken, Lothar Gall, 
Hermann Jakobs, Johannes Kuni sch , vol . 18.  (Munich, Vienna : 
R .  Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981 ) ,  pp. 49-52 . 
8 Ibid . , p .  5 2 .  
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settled this problem through a compromise. The agreement based 
the new provisional state on a so called ' basic law ' 
[Grundge setz] instead of founding it on a formal constitution. 
This 'temporary constitution' which was adopted not by 
re ferendum but only by the Landerparlamente [ state s '  
parliament s ]  of the West German states , was to underline the 
provisional character of the FRG and thus keep the door open 
for reunification with the Soviet occupied territory o f  
Germany . 
One has to keep in mind , however ,  that during the 
immediate postwar era American policy toward Germany had only 
gradually changed. For various reasons, it had increasingly 
turned away from treating Germany as a defeated enemy toward 
paving the way for limited cooperation. The di sruption of the 
war a l liance with the U . S .  S .  R .  and the emergence o f  the 
Soviet-American conflict obviously were important reasons . The 
East-West conflict obscured economic and humanitarian 
considerations of Washington which, already a short time after 
the German surrende r ,  had caused an initial modification o f  
the U. S .  occupation policy . The change in the Oval Office from 
Roosevelt to Truman also had a considerable impact on the U . S .  
policy toward Germany . Truman relied more than his predecessor 
on the advice of the State Department and was "more readi ly 
influenced by the moderate views concerning the treatment of 
10 
Germany which prevailed there. 119 
9 Manfred Jonas , The United States and Germany: A 
Diplomatic History, ( Ithaca: Cornell University Pre s s ,  1984) , 
pp. 2 77- 2 78 .  
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Chapter I I  
The Evolution of Closer American-German Relations 
and the Solidifi cation of the Division of Germany 
1 .  U . S .  Policy and 
the Impact of the Korean war 
While the founding of the Federal Repub lic o f  Germany in 
1 9 4 9  indicated a further liberalization o f  Allied control , it 
did not mean for the Al lies that Germany could be trusted yet . 
The memories of the cruel war that Germany had unleashed were 
still too vivid to accept the "new Germany" as an equal 
partner in the community o f  the Western nations . Although 
Konrad Adenauer, the first West German Chancellor, had helped 
to dra ft a democratic constitution and established a moderate 
pro-Western government , the German people were still the ones 
who had cheered Hitler in the 1 930s and followed him into 
total war in the 1 9 40s . The "gift of democracy , "  which the 
• 
Allies had brought to West Germany was , therefore, considered 
to be fragile,  and the revival of Nazism and Prussian 
militarism was a factor the Western Allies took into account 
when they decided on questions regarding Germany . "The Germans 
were , in ef feet, on political probation , "  as Wolfram F .  
1 2  
Hanrieder holds . 1 0  The western powers continued their control 
of the political and economic development in Germany after the 
Federal Republic was established. 
On April 8 ,  1 9 4 9 ,  the Western Allies therefore signed an 
Occupation Statute for the FRG that was to reserve supreme 
authority to the We stern powers represented by High 
Commiss ioner s .  Though replacing the military government in 
West Germany , the Occupation Statute clearly reflected Allied 
caution by limiting the powers of the new state. It prescribed 
continued Allied supervision of "di sarmament and 
demi litarization, including related fields o f  scientific 
research, prohibitions on industry , and civil aviation. " The 
three powers reserved "the right, acting under instruction o f  
their Government s ,  to resume i n  whole or in part, the exercise 
of full authority if they [ considered] that to do so [was ] 
essential to security or to preserve democratic government in 
Germany or in pursuance o f  the international obligations of 
their Government s . 11 1 1  Since the Occupation Statute provided 
the legal basis for a return to military government by the 
1 0  Wol fram F. Hanriede r ,  
Federal Republic o f  Germany , 
Review , 1 2  (May , 1989 ) : p .  315.  
"The Foreign Policies o f  the 
1 9 4 9- 1 989 , "  German Studies 
1 1  Department of State , "Oc cupation Statute Defining the 
Powers To Be Retained by the Occupation Author itie s ,  Signed 
by the Three Western Foreign Minister s ,  Apri l 8 ,  1 9 4 9 , "  in: 
Documents On Germany, 1 9 4  4-1983 , 4th rev. ed . ( Washington , 
D . C . : United States Department o f  State , Office o f  the 
Historian, Bureau o f  Public Affairs , 1985 ) , pp. 213- 2 1 4 .  
(hereafter quoted as Documents On Germany) . 
13 
Western Allies, the FRG was still a protectorate in every 
respect. No decision could be made by the Federal Government 
that was against the wi l l  o f  the Western Allie s--espec ially 
the United State s .  
By the second half o f  1 9 49, most o f  Western Europe was 
at least militarily dependent on Washington as wel l .  The 
national security of the countries that had signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty was based to a large extent on the U . S .  
monopoly o f  the atomic bomb , since the conventional Allied 
forces in Western Europe were considerably inferior to the 
Russian military power in the Ea st. The NATO countries o f  
Europe could only muster l e s s  than eighteen divisions, some 
o f  which were i l l  equipped and involved in occupation 
performances against thirty divis ions under Soviet command . 12 
The communist coup in Cz echoslovakia and the Berlin 
Blockade of 1 9 48 had exposed " the shocking military weakness 
of Western Europe and the unpreparedness of the United 
States, " as Secretary of Stat e ,  Dean Acheson, later wrote. The 
impression o f  relative security now was undermined. It 
collapsed when Rus sia succeeded in exploding her first atomic 
bomb and when the Korean War broke out. 13 
As late as spring 1 9 4 9 ,  George F .  Kennan, as director o f  
the Policy Planning Staff o f  the State Department, had 
1 2  Dean Acheson, The Struggle For A Free Europe , (New 
York: Norton, 1971. ) ,  p .  8 2 .  
13 Ibid . 
14 
proposed in his " Plan A" a slow retreat of U . S .  troops from 
Europe and a neutralization of Germany . By the end of the year 
Kennan lost support for his plan and was replaced by Paul 
Nitze. 1 4  At about the same time Pentagon strategists realized 
that the defense of Europe would hardly be possible without 
military help from Germany . 
A document by the National Security Counc il (NSC-68) , in 
spring 1950, outlined the goals of Washington ' s  foreign policy 
concerning the Cold War by cal ling for the conclusion of 
" s eparate arrangements with Japan , Western Germany , and 
Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these 
countries in support of the free world. 11 1 5  On May 5 ,  the Joint 
Chiefs finally broke the tabu of German rearmament by arguing 
in NSC- 7 1  that they were " firmly of the opinion that, from 
the military point of view, the appropriate and early arming 
of Germany i s  o f  fundamental importance to the defense of 
Western Europe against the USSR. 11 1 6  
However , State Department officials opposed the opinion 
of the Pentagon for week s .  It was due to the North Korean 
1 4  Hans R .  Velten , 
Rearmament , 1950-195 5 , "  
University , 1985) , p .  28.  
"The United States and West German 
( M . A .  thesis , Eastern I llinois 
l 5 Department of State , Document NSC-6 8, in: Foreign 
Relations of the United States ,  1950, vol . 1 (Washington , 
D . C . : U . S .  Government Printing Office , 1984 ) , p .  2 7 5 .  
(hereafter quoted a s  FRUS ) . 
687 .  
l 6  Document NSC-71 [Extract ] , i n :  FRUS 1950 , vol. 4 ,  p .  
1 5  
attack in mid-June that they dropped their objection. Dean 
Acheson explained the State Department ' s  shift of policy by 
pointing out that his 
conversion to German participation in 
European defense was quick. The idea that 
Germany' s place in the defense of Europe 
would be worked out by a process of 
evolution was outmoded. Korea had speeded 
up evolution. I f  there was to be any 
defense at a l l ,  it had to be based on a 
forward strategy. Germany ' s  role must not 
be secondary but primary--not only through 
mi litary formations, but throfgh emotional 
and political invo lvement . l 
It was up to President Truman to approve NSC- 7 1  and thus 
make German rearmament a key issue of U . S .  foreign policy . The 
remi litarization of Germany was a difficult problem for the 
President. On June 1 6, 1950, in a memorandum to Acheson he had 
cal led NCS- 7 1  "decidedly militaristic . "  In a second memorandum 
on this issue that day he also had recalled that the 100, 000-
man army permitted Germany in the 1920s "was used for the 
basis of training of the greatest war machine that ever came 
forth in European history . 11 18 Yet, on July 3 1, 1950, he 
approved a plan by Acheson that Germans might be enlisted in 
a European army . German soldier s ,  however , would not be 
subject to the orders of Bonn but were to follow the decisions 
reached by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
1 7  h Ac eson, p .  1 3 2 .  
l8 Memoranda by Truman to Acheson, 1 6  June 1950, in FRUS 
19 5 0 1 VO 1 .  4 1 p .  6 8 8 f .  
1 6  
Organization (NATO) . 1 9  
President Truman agreed to this proposal because he was 
convinced of the importance o f  the FRG for the defense o f  
Europe : 
Without Germany , the defense of Europe 
was a rear-guard action on the shores o f  
the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there 
could be a defense in depth, power ful 
enough to offer e f fective resistance to 
aggression from the East. 20 
Truman ' s  approval marked a new point in the post-war 
relations between the United States and Germany . Now 
Washington was willing to use the West German military against 
the U . S . S . R . in case o f  war . At the same time , however , the 
U . S .  government sought to keep West Germany under control 
because it did not yet consider the democratic development in 
the Federal Repub lic a reliable one . Yet, the German threat 
seemed to decrease in the eyes of the Truman Administration , 
while the Soviet danger was considered to grow. One might say 
there was an inverse correlation between the U . S .  perception 
of the Soviet threat and U . S .  caution against Germany . As 
historian Frank Ninkovich points out, " from the aloof global 
ideological viewpdint, the United States could a f ford to 
l 9  Memorandum by Acheson on conversation with Truma n ,  
July 3 1 ,  1950 , in:  PRUS 1 950, vo l .  4 ,  p. 703 . 
20 Harry s .  Truman , Memoirs , vo l .  2 ,  Years of Trial and 
Hope, (Garden City , N . Y . : Doubleday & Company , Inc. 1 955) , p.  
253 . 
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subordinate the German problem to the Soviet threat . 11 2 1  
With the decision to use the industrial and the military 
potential of the FRG for the defense of Western Europe , the 
Truman Administration encountered two new prob lems , the first 
being that the government had to overcome the strong 
isolationist opposition against its plans for a lasting 
military engagement in Europe because the stationing of strong 
American forces in Europe was the only possible way to get the 
Europeans '  acceptance of German rearmament. Secondly, a plan 
had to be worked out on how to include West Germany in the 
still embryonic defense organization o f  Europe which the We st 
European al lies would find acceptable . 
It was foreseeable that the decision for a lasting 
involvement of the United States in the defense of Europe 
would meet with persistent opposition in the Senate . The 
controversy about the Mil itary Assi stance Program in 1 9 4 9  had 
already been very strongly attacked by some legislators . 
According to Dean Acheson, the Truman opponents--most o f  whom 
were Republicans--suffered from a "bitter frustration" over 
the unexpected loss o f  the 1 9 4 8  presidential e lections. The 
success o f  the Chinese communists and the breakthrough of 
Soviet nuclear scientists in 1 9 4 9 , combined with the Truman 
Administration ' s  advocacy o f  political and military 
2l Frank A. Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The 
Trans formation of the German Question Since 19 4 5 ,  (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers , 1 9 8 8 ) , p. 8 4 .  
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involvement in Europe and economic aid in underdeveloped 
countries "produced in the pressure cooker of this frustration 
a veritable witches' brew . " 2 2  
This i s  not the place to determine whether Acheson' s 
analysis was correct, but the fact was that--at least since 
1 9 50--the Truman Administration and a considerable number of 
influential Senators were divided over a central issue of U . S .  
foreign policy . The di spute emerged over the question whether 
the United States should remain involved in global politics 
or protect itself by isolation. Senator Robert Taft and former 
President Herbert Hoover headed the nee-isolationist 
opposition . They advocated the withdrawal of American forces 
from abroad to some i s land outposts in Europe and Asia, United 
States control of the seas as we l l  as an immense buildup of 
the air force and navy to that end, and reliance on atomic 
weapons for the defense o f  United States territory. 
Consequently, America should leave the defense of Europe to 
the Europeans. 2 3  
After an intense public debate between the neo-
isolationists and supporters of the Truman Administration in 
the winter 1 9 5 0 -5 1 ,  the opposition was finally defeated. But 
2 2  Acheson , p .  9 7 .  
2 3  Herbert Hoover, "Statement Before the Senate 
Cornrni ttees on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services, 
February 2 7 ,  1 9 5 1 , "  in:  Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon The 
American Road, 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 5 ,  ( Stanford , Cali f . : Stanford 
University Press, 1 95 5 ) , pp. 2 3- 3 1 ;  see also Acheson, p. 1 4 8 .  
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the end of bipartisanship in foreign policy narrowed the room 
for the U.S. presence in Europe, thus making strong European 
defense forces--including Germans--even more needed ,  from a 
strategic point of view. 
On the other hand, however ,  continued nee-isolationist 
opposition against Truman actually strengthened his position . 
In negotiations with the West Europeans , Dean Acheson could 
counter their demands for large scale stationing of American 
troops and financial support. By threatening that the Truman 
Administration would be forced to cancel its engagement in 
Europe, Acheson also was able to put pressure on French and 
British objections against German rearmament. The neo­
i solationist oppos ition , therefore, was both a handicap and 
a tool for U.S. foreign policy in the early 1 950s. 
The decision to rearm West Germany was backed by some 
foreign po licy experts and Washington ' s  high ranking officials 
abroad. Retired General Lucius D. Clay and High Commi ssioner 
John Mccloy, as well as the U. S. ambassadors in London and 
Pari s ,  urged a substantial participation of Germany in the 
European defense system. 2 4  
The Pentagon proposed a "one package" decision that was 
to be agreed upon by the Western Al lies . According to thi s 
proposal the question o f  a united command for Europe and 
increased American mil itary forces on the continent as wel l  
2 4  Acheson, p .  1 3 1 .  
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as an armed German element were to be linked together in one 
package. 2 5  
Dean Acheson argued against the one package dec ision . He 
thought that it was a mistake because it would paralyze All ied 
defense e f forts for Europe due to British and French 
opposition to German rearmament. The Secretary of State wanted 
the united command to be set up as a first step. Once it was 
established, Acheson thought, the need for armed German forces 
would soon become evident to the military staffs and their 
respective government s . 2 6  
The State Department, however, agreed on the "one package 
decision, " for it was " the necessary price for the Pentagon 
acceptance of a united command . 11 2 7  Acheson informed the 
President, who con firmed the Pentagon proposa l .  
Resistance against these U . S .  defense plans for Europe 
was as persi stent abroad as it was within the United State s .  
European obj ections, however, targeted another issue . As 
already mentioned ,  the governments of Western Europe--among 
them France and Britain especially--generally appreciated the 
American engagement in Europe. This was only partly due to the 
Soviet threat since Germany was still considered another 
potential danger to peace. The fear o f  a new eruption o f  
2 5  Ibid. I p. 135 . 
26 . Ibid . I p .  133 . 
2 7  . Ibid . I p. 135 . 
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German aggression was greatest among the French people, who 
had suffered three German invasions within seventy years. In 
1950, the West Europeans, therefore, welcomed the United 
States not only as a protector against Russia but also against 
Germany. 
In Washington, there was little sympathy for those 
objections to a common defense strategy that would include 
West German military. The immediate global perspective of 
American foreign policy was one reason for the relatively easy 
acceptance of German rearmament by Truman. The fact that 
United States territory had never been invaded nor bombed by 
German military during the two World Wars was, without a 
doubt, another reason. It was, therefore, practically correct, 
yet psychologically unwise, when Dean Acheson stated, "the 
French attitude that Germany could never contribute to the 
common defense was all wrong. "28 
In conference after conference U. S. diplomacy tried to 
overcome the objections of France and, to a lesser extent, 
Great Britain, who sought to prevent--or at least delay--any 
steps toward the rearming of West Germany. The key problem was 
• 
French mistrust against her eastern neighbor. In order to 
improve Franco-German relations, Washington supported the 
Schuman Plan which was to regulate the French and the West 
German coal and steel production under a united 
28 Ibid. , p. 124. 
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administration. 29 The project was to create a climate of 
confidence by a joint authority over these industries, which 
were the basis of both countries' armament. 
However, France's attitude toward the rearmament of west 
Germany remained unchanged when the three Western foreign 
ministers met in New York from September 1 2  - 1 9, 1 950. No 
agreement on concrete steps toward a European defense system 
to include the FRG could be achieved. The communique issued 
at the end of the conference expressly denied the possibility 
of the "re-creation of a German national army, " for it "would 
not serve the best interests of Germany or Europe. "30 
During their New York meetings, the Western foreign 
ministers were only able to agree on a general statement 
proclaiming that they had "taken note . • .  of sentiments recently 
expressed in Germany and elsewhere in favor of German 
participation in an integrated force for the defense of 
European freedom. " Furthermore, they pointed out that the 
question of a German defense contribution was "at present the 
subject of study and exchange of views1131 --a diplomatic 
euphemism for the diverging positions in regard to this 
problem. 
29 . Ibid. , pp. 1 1 6-11 7. 
30 "Communique by the Western Foreign Ministers Outlining 
Steps for Liberalization of Relations With the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Issued at New York and Washington, 
September 1 9, 1950," in: Documents On Germany, p. 342. 
31 Ibid. , p. 343. 
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Nonetheless, shocked by the outbreak of the Korean War, 
the Western Allies permitted the Federal Republic to 
strengthen its police force in order to counter respective 
East German police uni ts. They also agreed upon a 
liberalization of the Occupation Statute. 32 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman left New York with 
the impression that France would no longer be able to veto 
West German integration into the West European defense system 
without finding itself in an isolated position. The Pleven 
Plan, approved by the French National Assembly on October 24, 
1950, was a direct reaction of the French government to this 
concern. 33 
Named after the French Minister President Ren6 Pleven, 
the proposal projected the creation of a unified European army 
which would include small German units with auxiliary tasks. 
There would be an international general staff but no or only 
minimal German influence upon it. The Pl even Plan was to 
counter U. S. intentions aimed at the creation of ten German 
divisions under the central Allied command, in which German 
officers would be allowed to participate. 34 By drafting the 
Pleven Plan the French government tried to steer the seemingly 
unpreventable development in a direction which would provide 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gatzke, p. 183. 
34 Hanrieder, p. 40. 
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as much French control over the German military as was 
possible. 
In Washington, Acheson observed that the Pleven Plan had 
caused "consternation and dismay" because of the second-class 
status accorded to Germany. The Secretary of State was 
convinced that the West German government under Adenauer would 
not accept the French proposal. Acheson wrote in his memoirs, 
"to me the plan was hopeless, 
Marshall and concurred by the 
a view confirmed by General 
President, and protracted 
discussion of it dangerous. "35 However, realizing that the 
Pleven Plan was the price for French acceptance of armed 
Germans, Washington tried to make the best of it. The United 
States argued for the provision of a less discriminatory 
status for the FRG while assuring France that American forces 
would support her in case of a German attack. 
Another major obstacle on the way to the Pleven Plan when 
it officially became known as the European Defense Community 
(EDC) remained in the unresolved status of the Saar territory. 
Since France had been admitted to the occupation regime of 
Germany, she had tried to separate the Saar from her eastern 
neighbor and to attach it--at least economically--to France. 
The reason for this policy could easily be found in the 
industrial importance of the small territory. With the Saar's 
coal and steel production incorporated in her national 
35 Acheson, p. 143. 
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economy, France would be able to equal the West-German metal­
industry productivity; without the Saar, the Federal Republic 
would retain the higher output of coal and steel. 
The unsettled question of the future status of the Saar 
repeatedly harmed the relations between Bonn and Paris and 
often blocked the talks on the Schuman Plan and the EDC 
treaty. As Wolfram Hanrieder points out, the "disagreement 
over the Saar threatened the entire treaty structure that was 
to rearm the 
sovereignty. 1136 
Federal Republic and restore German 
Washington was interested in a quick agreement on the 
creation of the EDC including West German rearmament and 
therefore observed these quarrels with growing impatience. In 
1952, when Robert Schuman again raised objections after more 
than a year of negotiations, Acheson imposed a deadline. He 
told Schuman that "unless he could make progress on the 
European defense treaty, we would withdraw our support from 
it. It was now or never with that idea. 1137 The deadlock soon 
was broken, a general agreement achieved, and the EDC treaty 
was signed in May 1952. 
It was only due to constant diplomatic activities and 
pressure by the United States that Germany was to be 
integrated in a European defense organization. Dean Acheson 
36 Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p. 
62. 
37 Acheson, p. 177. 
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described how intensely Washington had worked for this goal 
on all levels: 
Ever since the past midyear [i. e. 1951] 
our Government had brought pressure on 
the French and British to get on with the 
German program theoretically agreed at 
Brussels in December 1950. General 
Eisenhower had hammered away at European 
governments through Chiefs of Staff and 
defense ministers, especially for the 
European Army; John Mccloy had put all 
his great energy into pressure on the 
Chancellor and the High Commissioners to 
move the contractual arrangements; 
Harriman had done the same to bring all 
military programs, including the German, 
within the limits of economic and 
financial feasibility; and I had harried 
the foreign ministers, sometimes to the 
point of revolt. 38 
The intentions for integrating West Germany into the EDC 
and the corresponding restoration of most of its sovereignty 
had always been a means to an end in U. S. foreign policy. 
Concern for America's security, desire for economic gain, and 
maintenance of free enterprise were the important factors in 
Washington's policy toward Europe and Germany. 39 Unlike 1919, 
the United State had confidence in the German leadership that 
had emerged after world War II and the result was an 
extraordinarily ci9ose cooperation in the decade following 
1949. 40 
Without a doubt, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer played a key 
38 Ibid. , p. 174 f. 
39 Gatzke, p. 162. 
40 Jonas, p. 287. 
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role in American-West German relations of this time. Already 
by 1949 it became clear that Adenauer was the only reliable 
addressee for Washington's policy in Germany. His chief 
opponent and leader of the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) , Kurt Schumacher, never succeeded in establishing a 
functioning relationship with the American government. This 
was partly due to Schumacher's nationalistic, impatient and 
sometimes authoritarian behavior, and partly because the 
Americans failed to differentiate between 'pinks' and 
'reds. 141 Dean Acheson, for example, described him as 
"abrasive, " "harshly nationalistic and aggressive. "42 
Adenauer, on the other hand, impressed the Secretary of 
State with "the imagination and wisdom of his approach. " The 
two almost instantly developed a "warm friendship. "43 This was 
facilitated because Adenauer's foreign policy--especially his 
decisive anti-communism and his plausible advocacy for a West 
European integration--was congruent with the containment 
strategy of the Truman Administration. The facts that 
Washington soon viewed the German Chancellor as a trustworthy 
partner and that there was no immediate alternative to him 
provided Adenauer with a political monopoly. He adroitly used 
this to strengthen his position in the domestic politics of 
41 Michael Balfour·, West Germany: A Contemporary History, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 198 2. ) ,  p. 153. 
42 Acheson, p. 94. 
43 Ibid. , p. 93 f. 
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Germany and in his relations to the Allies, as well. 44 
America's intention of integrating West Germany into the 
West had been obvious at least since 1948 . 45 According to U.S. 
plans, the FRG was to become part of Western Europe in order 
to make it a willing and strong supporter of a free-world 
structure. The direction was clear: Germany should not be kept 
"in limbo outside, as had been the case after the war of 1914-
18 , relegated to manoeuvering between the Soviet Union and the 
Allies, " as Dean Acheson pointed out.46 The U. S. government, 
therefore, was willing to accept the fact that "the Germans 
wanted restoration of their sovereignty1147 and prepared to 
meet most of the West Germans' interests for the price of 
sharing the burden of the European defense. 
The reunification of Germany was not a primary objective 
of American foreign policy between 1949-1952. In fact, it was 
considered an element of disturbance that threatened to block 
or delay the Western integration of the FRG. As the Acheson 
statement above implied, a West German state on the side of 
the Western World was far more desirable for Washington than 
a united Germany whose political direction was unclear and 
might end up in the Eastern Bloc. If any reunification was to 
44 Klaus Schoenthal, "Die reifende Allianz Bonn­
Washington, " Aussenpolitik 21 (1970) : p. 214. 
45 Velten, p. 25. 
46 Acheson, p. 91. 
47 Truman, p. 253. 
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take place at all it had to be on U. S. terms, which meant the 
establishing of a democratic pro-Western government free to 
join the Western alliance system. It was obvious that the 
U. S. S. R. would not accept those demands since they would 
deprive the Soviets from their "war booty" - East Germany. 48 
Yet, the success of the policy of West German integration 
depended to a large extent on the cooperation of the FRG 
government. To win the support of Adenauer and of the majority 
of the West Germans, the United States had to display at least 
a pro-forma commitment to German unity. The Kremlin leaders 
had reacted to the founding of the Federal Republic by 
presenting a harsh note to the Western Allies in October 1949 
accusing Washington and London of pursuing a "policy of 
splitting Germany" since 1946. 49 
Washington could not ignore those accusations, for large 
parts of the West German population--especially refugees from 
the East German territories--felt very strongly about German 
unity. In 1950, at their London Conference, the Western 
Allies, therefore, countered with a first proposal for 
reunification of the two Germanies. They based it on the 
principle of "a freely-elected all-German government" as well 
48 Waldemar Besson, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: 
Erfahrungen und Masstabe, (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 
1970), p. 118. 
49 "Note From the Soviet Union to the United States 
Protesting the 'Formation of a Separate Government for the 
Western Zones of Germany, ' October 1, 1949, " in: Documents On 
Germany, p. 276. 
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as comprehensive civil liberties. 50 The issue o f  German 
reunification was also mentioned in the Allied . / co mmuniq ue 
r eleased after the New York Conference the same year. In this 
do cument the three foreign minister s blamed Moscow for the 
continued division which would last "so long as the So viet 
Union co ntinues to ignore proposals for democratic all-Ger man 
elections, and to stage controlled elections . . .  "51 
In 195 0, the call for all-Ger man elections was twice 
r enewed in East-West diplomatic corr espondence in two letter s 
from Mccloy to the Chair man o f  the Soviet Control Commission. 
Both letters were published, the first "in view o f  the vital 
inter est o f  the Ger man peo ple in the unificatio n o f  their 
co untr y 1152 and the latter "on acco unt o f  the great public 
inter est shown in the subject matter o f  this co mmunication. 1153 
The unity o f  Germany had degener ated into a matter o f  
50 "Declar atio n by the Western Foreign Ministers 
Proposing German Reunification Through Establishment o f  a 
Freely Elected, All-Ger man Go vernment, Issu ed at Lo ndo n, May 
14, 1950, " in: Documents On Germany, p. 314 . 
51 " Co mmuniq ue by the western For eign Ministers Outlining 
Steps for Liberalizatio n o f  Relations With the Federal 
Republic o f  Germany, Issued at New York and Washington, 
September 19 ,. 1 9  5 0, " in: Documents On Germany, p. 3 4 2. 
52 "L etter From the United States Commandant in Berlin 
to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission Proposing 
Four-Po wer Nego tiatio n o f  an All-German Electoral Law, May 25, 
1950, " in: Documents On Germany, p. 319. 
5 3 "Letter from the American High Co mmissioner to the 
Chairman o f  the Soviet Control Commission Supporting the 
Renewed West German Call for Free All-Ger man Elections, 
October 10, 1950, " in: Documents On Germany, p. 345. 
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propagan da. 
Between the fall of 1949 and the sprin g of 1 95 2 ,  the 
United States tr ied to make sure that the German federal 
govern ment woul d not l eave the path of Western in tegration for 
the sake of reun ification. On December 14, 1950, for exampl e, 
the High Commission ers met with Adenauer . Dur in g  the 
discussions, Mccloy warned the Chancel l or that the Soviets 
woul d start a new offen sive on the Ger man question . They would 
attempt to separate Germany from the West an d dislodge her 
fr om her secure position vis-a-vis the East "by holding out 
the bait of German unity. "54 But Mcc l oy did not have to wor r y  
about Adenauer ' s  attitude on German unity, because it was 
iden tical with the U.S. position. "Our foremost aim, " wrote 
the Chan cel l or in his autobiography, "was to unite Germany on 
a basis of l aw an d l iberty an d to l ead her into a European 
system. "55 
In con clusion, one must agree that U . S. policy toward 
Ger many between fall 1949 an d ear l y  1952 was an essential par t 
of Washington's global strategy of con tain men t. As George F • 
• 
Kennan in the mid-1950 s observed, Germany was one of the four 
major regions of in dustr ial power in the wor l d  besides Nor th 
America. The other three were Great Britain, Japan, and the 
54 Konrad Adenauer , Memoirs 1945-1953 , (Chicago: Henry 
Regn ery Co. , 1969) , p. 309. 
55 . Ibid. I p. 190. 
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Soviet Union. The Un ited States had developed a deep 
friendship with Great Br itain that had grown out of the 
ex perience of two World Wars. In addition , a friendship with 
Japan was gradually developing. That left, accor din g to 
Kenn an , the r elationship between Germany and Russia " at the 
heart of our secur ity pr oblem, in the physical sense. " The 
Amer ican government had to pr even t " the gather ing together of 
the military- industr ial potential of the en tire Eurasian land 
mass un der a sin gle power threatening to the interest of the 
insular an d maritime portions of the globe. 11 56 This was the 
U. S. progr am for con tain in g commun ism in Europe. Therefore the 
FRG was to be boun d  to the West an d r ear med. Without the 
trauma of the Korean war, the development of this policy would 
not have taken place so quickly. 
It was to the advan tage of Washingt on that the West 
German government un der Adenauer shared most of the Amer ican 
viewpoints an d was willing and able to cooper ate. The United 
States r ewar ded the Chancellor by r estorin g  parts of West 
German sovereign ty. 
Between 1949 an d 1952 the settlemen t of the German 
question was postponed de facto, sin ce the Kremlin could not 
accept Washington an d B onn ' s  maximum demands for un ification. 
Also, the Un ited States and the Federal Republic saw too many 
r isks involved in any compromise solution. T he issue of German 
56 Kennan, p. 65. 
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unity, therefore, ser ved mainly for purposes of propaganda 
during this time. 57 
The next part of the paper seeks to shed some light on 
the most important steps the Bonn government took toward the 
FRG's integr ation with the West. I will attempt to answer the 
q uestion why Chancellor Adenauer, while coo per ating with the 
Americans, seemingly did not only accept but push for the 
perpetuated division of his country between fall 1949 and 
spring 1 952. 
2 .  Chancellor Adenauer ' s  Di plomatic Struggl e 
For West German Sovereignty 
A gener al introduction to American-West German relations 
from 1949 to spring 1 952 has been sketched above. It is 
necessary, however, to recall that the Feder al Republic at its 
star ting point was "Amer ica' s client state. 11 58 The Adenauer 
57 Hermann Gr aml, "Die Legende von der verpassten 
Gelegenheit: Zur sowjetische N otenkampagne des Jahr es 1952, " 
Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 29 (No. 2, 1981) : p. 
314. 
58 This term is used b y  Manfred Jonas, p. 286. · It 
under lines the limited independence of the FRG gover nment. 
"Amer ica's client state" also correctly implies, that the 
other two occupation powers for West Ger many, France and Great 
Br itain, on the long r un were unable to pursue their own 
occupation policy and were r estricted on attempts to delay or 
slightly alter the American policy. 
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government's actions were limited by such circumstances as the 
de-facto division of Germany and the variou s restrictions of 
the Occupation Statute in regard of foreign policy, trade, 
military and industrial production. 59 As mentioned before, the 
Allies had furthermore reserved supreme au thority over West 
Germany. 
Adenauer' s foremost goal, therefore, was to use every 
possible chance to broaden his political margins and 
eventually terminate the state of occupation in order to gain 
West German sovereignty.60 To do so, he first had to gain the 
confidence of the Western powers, especially that of the 
United States. 61 The West German Chancellor himself stated in 
looking back to the beginning of his first term: 
We had to do our part to create conditions 
that would enable the Allied powers to 
apply the [Occupation] Statut e with 
generosity and restraint. It was the only 
way for ��e German people to regain full 
freedom. 
Adenauer was "a typical provincial, n 6 3 for he had no 
experience in foreign affairs and spoke no foreign language 
when he took office in September of 1949. Nevertheless, the 
5 9  Schoenthal, p. 215 . 
60 See J onas, p. 28 7 f. ; see also Balfour, p. 172. 
61 Gatzke, p. 1 79. 
62 Adenauer, p. 183 . 
63 Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era, (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1966) , p. 29. 
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fir s t  German pos t- war Chancel lor s oon proved to be re markabl y 
s uccess ful in dealing with the All ied High C ommiss ioners. His 
fir s t  major concer n was the e conomic recon s truction of the 
FRG. In his discuss ions with the High Commiss ioners he raised 
the pr oblem of continue d dis mantling of industr ial e quipment 
for reparations and pointe d at the catas trophic res ults which 
the Allie s '  har s h  re paration policy had caused dur ing the 
We imar Republic era. Also, the Allies could not ignore the 
fact that the continue d dismantling of Ger man indus try 
countered the re covery of West Germany' s e conomy par t of which 
was financed from Mars hall Plan funds . 64 
In the Peter sberg Agreement of November 22, 1949, --which 
was to incr e ase the cooper ation between the FRG and the 
We stern Al l ie s --the U nited S tate s ,  Great Britain and Fr ance 
made maj or concess ions to the Chancellor on this que s tion. In 
e xchange , however,  We s t  Ger many had to joi n the Council of 
Europe (as an associate member) , the In ternational Ruhr 
Author ity and the Military Se curity Boara. 6 5  
While the FRG members hip in the Ruhr Authority and the 
Military Se curity Board could be interpreted as We s t  Ger many' s 
merely s ymbolic acceptance of the occupation policy, the 
joining of the Council of Europe was of greater s ignificance . 
64 Bes s on, p. 8 2. 
65 "Pr otocol of Agreements Between the Al lie d (We s tern) 
High Commiss ioners and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Nove mber 22, 1949 (Pe ters berg Protocol) , in: 
Docume nts On Ge rmany, pp. 310 -31 3. 
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It was Adenauer' s unmistakable firs t s tep toward his goal of 
ass ociating the Federal Republic with the West. At the s ame 
time, this decision caus ed a widening of the political gap 
between East and west Germany. 
Germany, therefore, had to pay a p olitical price for the 
reduction of the dismantling of its indus tries . Since the FRG 
paid for its closer West European ties with l oosened ties to 
East Germany, it is misleading--at leas t in regard to German 
unity--to describe the West German conces s ions as having been 
"mainly for s how. 11 66 Such a s t atement neg lects the fact that 
any step toward the Federal Republic' s integ ration into the 
Wes t reduced the chances for Germany' s reunification in this 
period. 
Adenauer emphas ized in his memoirs only the positive 
s ides of the agreement with respect to his goal of 
s overeig nty. He s tated that "for the firs t time s ince the 
collapse, we were officially recog nized as equal and for the 
firs t time we re- entered the international s phere. 1167 
On May 7, 195 0 ,  the Chancellor received a letter from 
Robert Schuman, in which the French Foreign Minister proposed 
• 
the creation of a Franco-German board to s upervis e the coal 
and s teel production of both countries . This new organization 
would be open for other European countries to join. Adenauer 
66 Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer, 18 76- 1967, (Chicago: 
Cowles Book Co. , 1971) , p. 15 4. 
67 Adenauer, p. 221. 
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almost instantly signaled his general conse nt to the ide a, 
late r known as the Schuman Plan. Discussions to e stablish the 
details were to begin soon, and on May 9, the plan was made 
public. 68 
For Adenauer, the Schuman Plan provi de d several 
advantage s. It was going " to e ase conside rabl y the problem of 
the Saar Conve ntions [ by which France was trying to se parate 
the Saar from Germany] and the que stion of the e ntry of the 
Federal Republic into the Council of Europe when these were 
discusse d  in the Bundestag. " It would also create the 
foundation for a lasting Franco-German de te nte which was 
Adenaue r' s explicit obje ctive.69 
The Chancel l or was now in a position to present the f irst 
fruit his western oriente d policy had born. He was able to 
secure support in the B undestag for his policy and to 
stabilize his course . It was, at be st, wishful thinking, 
however, whe n Adenauer state d that the e conomically and 
politically stronger the FRG became , the bette r the situation 
of Berlin and the German East would be come. 7 0  The u prising on 
June 1 7 ,  1 953 in the GDR, and its suppre ssion by the 
communists, the construction of the Berlin wall and the Berl in 
68 Hans Pete r  Schwarz, Die Ara Adenauer - De r Au fstieg 
1 8 7 6- 1 952, 2nd e d. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt GmbH, 
1 98 6) f PP• 7 1 0-7 1 2. 
69 Adenaue r, pp. 259, 232. 
7 0  Schwarz, p. 71 5. 
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cris is later, would pr ove how wrong he was in this res pect. 
The S chuman Plan opened up a new dimens ion for the clos e 
cooper ation of the FRG with the Wes t, namely economic 
integration. It s oon became the mos t important pillar of the 
inter-European cooper ation and, for the time being, another 
s tep away fr om German unity--a fact that was later criticiz ed 
by the SPD. 71 
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, had a 
s trong impact on FRG politics , too. The North-Korean attack 
had been frightening for the West German population because 
the political s ituation in Germany was s imilar to the one in 
K orea. Both countr ies were divided into two s tates , of which 
each was incorporated into one s uperpower's s pher e of 
influence. Also, the German Democr atic Repu blic had built up 
its own military for ce s imilar to the one North Korea had. 
Adenauer was " firmly convinced that S talin was planning the 
s ame pr ocedure for Wes t Germany as had been used in Korea. 11 72 
He also s aw the danger that the Wes t German will to resist a 
threatened attack fr om the Eas t might weaken if the conviction 
were to become widespread that defending the FRG territory had 
no chance of s ucces s .  
71 Carlo S chmid, " Germany and Europe: The German S ocial 
Democratic Program, " Foreign Affairs 30 (October -July, 1951-
1952): p. 540. 
72 Adenauer, p. 273. 
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Adenauer's first move was to ask the Western Al l ies for 
the permission to establish a federal police force which could 
also carry out some mil itary tasks i n  order to counter the 
respective East German police troops. His second step was to 
propose that France, Britain and the United States change the 
character of their relations with the FRG . According to 
Adenauer's idea, the state of war was to be terminated; the 
goal of the occupation to be switched from one that kept West­
Germany in check to one that provided mil itary security for 
it; and the Occupation Statute to be replaced by a mutual 
system of treaties. These proposal s were formulated in the 
August memoranda the Chancellor sent to the New Y ork 
Conference of the Western Allies in September 1950. 7 3  
The resul ts of the New York Conference regarding G ermany 
have been previously discussed. Although the foreign ministers 
made concessions on the question of a federal police force, 
France (and in the beginning, also Britain) opposed American 
proposals for the integration of the Federal Republic i nto a 
Western defense system. As mentioned above, France reacted to 
the New York Conference by presenti ng the Pl even Plan on 
October 24. 
Adenauer' s  first reaction to the French proposal was 
negative. He opposed the discriminati on against West G erman 
troops as well as the link of the Pleven Plan to a final 
7 3  Schwarz, pp. 7 63-7 64. 
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agreement on the Schuman Plan because it would de la y the 
urge ntly neede d creation of a n  e ffe ctive defe nse force in 
Western Europe . 7 4  
At the same time , Adenauer a lso saw several othe r threats 
to his we ste rn policy (Westpoli tik) e mer ging: the re ne we d  
efforts of the neo-isola tionist opposition in the Unite d 
States in the winter 1950-51; the switch of the B ritish La bour 
gove rnment back to a more ne gative a ttitude toward a German 
de fe nse contribution due to upcoming na tiona l e le ctions; the 
strong a nti-Ge rman re sentments a mong officials a t  the Quai 
d' Orse y, who sought a gene ral unde rstandin g  with the Sovie t 
Union in order to counter a future Germa n  thre a t; a nd finally, 
ne w Sovie t initia tives calling for a four-power settlement of 
the Ge rman que stion base d on the Potsdam Agreement and a n  
"All-Ge rma n Constitutional Council on the basis of bala nce d 
re pre sentation of Western a nd Eastern Germany. "75 
Ade nauer rea cte d to these developments unfavorable for 
the FRG by a pproaching the United States t o  push for a more 
moderate provision for Germany in the ne gotiations of the 
Pleven Plan. He also e mploye d all his influence on the U. S. 
gove rnment to make sure tha t no East-We st dia logue on Germany 
7 4  . Ibid. , p. 8 31. 
75 Schwarz, pp. 8 3 2-8 3 6; "State ment Issue d by the Foreign 
Ministers of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania ,  a nd B ulgaria , and the 
Alba nian Minister in Moscow, Prague, October 21, 1950, " in: 
Docume nts On Germany, p. 3 46. ; 
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was started without his consent and that i ntegration of the 
FRG would progress. 76 
The year 1951 brought some su ccess for Adenauer. On March 
6, the Occupation Statute was revised. Germany was permitted 
to set u p  a foreign ministry and establish r egular diplomatic 
relations. Adenauer now became his own foreign minister . 
On April 18 , 1951, the Schu man Plan discussions resulted 
in the fou nding of the European Coal and Steel Cornmuni ty 
(ECSC). The FRG also joined the Council of Europe as a fu ll 
member ( on May 2) , and, on July 9, the Western Allies declar ed 
the state of war with West Germany terminated. 
Despite these improvements of the F ederal Republic' s 
political position and the fact that all attempts for a four 
power conference failed on June 22, Adenauer remained 
su spicious about a possible inclusion of Germany in a global 
package deal with the U. S. S. R. Again the United States was his 
main addressee to express his concerns. In a conversation with 
Dean Acheson on November 2 1, 1951, Adenauer was assured by the 
Secretary of State that none of the Western Allies had any 
plans to make Germany the object of an East-West 
understanding. 77 winston Chu rchill affirmed this attitude in 
December when Adenauer visited London for the first time. 78 
76 Schwarz, p. 8 44. 
77 Adenauer , p. 401. 
78 Schwar z ,  p. 8 96. 
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In February of 1 95 2, after the Unite d State s had put 
con siderable pre s sure on France, a general bre ak through in the 
ne gotiati ons of the European Defen se Commun ity and on the 
que stion of German sovereignty was achie ved. From then on , 
discussion s  on the EDC an d the relate d  treatie s with Germany 
could enter the last stage settling matte r s  of details. 
Adenauer counted on an e arly signing an d ratification of the 
EDC treaty an d the Con tractual Agreements which were to 
provide a new basis for the re lation s between the We stern 
Allies an d the FRG. 
In summary, Adenauer's overall political objective s 
between the fall 1 949 and March of 1 952 were to gain We st 
German sovere ignty and to secure the Fe deral Republic again st 
a possible Sovie t attack. To achie ve the se goals, he 
cooperated with the We stern Allie s on several occasion s. For 
the same re ason he sought the political, militar y, an d 
e con omic in tegration of the FRG in to Western Europe . To that 
end, he aimed at a fun damental and lasting re conciliation with 
France. At the same time he attache d utmost importance to 
str on g West Ger man-Amer ican relation s for reason s  of militar y 
security an d for the termination of the Occupation Statute. 
Cooperation between Washin gton and Bonn was facilitated by the 
fact that Adenauer's political objective s by an d large 
harmonized with those of the United State s. 
Although the Chan cellor had obtained some limited Allie d 
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concessions by early 1952, h e  had not gained sovereignty for 
West Germany. By February of that year, however, this seemed 
to be onl y a brief matter of time. Integration was on its way 
and had already resulted in substantial agreements on the 
political and the economic level. An agreement on military 
cooperation seemed to be close and the general situation more 
secure than in 1950. Also, the Western Al lies graduall y  ceased 
treating West Germany as an occupied country. Instead they 
increasingl y viewed the Federal Republ ic as a partner in 
international affairs--alth ough often as one of minor 
political weight. 
Since 1949, Adenauer's vision for G erman reunification 
was to attach the G erman E ast to the FRG and Western Europe. 
Since h e  knew that this was impossible under the given 
circumstances, h e  was willing to postpone the question of 
G erman unity until the Soviet U nion would make the concessions 
the West demanded. In this respect as wel l ,  his policy 
h armonized with that of Washington. 
3. The Social Democratic Oppo sition to Adenauer's Policy 
The bitter antagonism between the Ch ancellor and his 
strongest opponent, SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher, dominated 
the first years of West German domestic politics. Sch umacher 
was deeply disappointed, wh en the first federal el ections 
44 
resulted in a conservative coalition government under 
Adenauer, having thought that the SPD- -as the movement of the 
active anti-Nazis--was the only legitimate party to lead 
Germany after World War II. 
Without hesitation, however, the SPD assumed the 
opposition role in the new parliament. On September 21, 1949, 
Schumacher drew a clear line between the government and the 
Social Democratic alternative in his first speech before the 
deputies. Although Schumacher' s reply to Adenauer' s program 
mainly dealt with economic and social issues, the opposition 
leader had already outlined what would soon become the major 
point on the Social Democratic agenda: German unity. He stated 
that the SPD would not even consider the division of Germany 
acceptable for the time being: 
Al though many people may consider the 
present situation of Germany's division 
as being relatively acceptable for the 
time being, we Social Democrats cannot do 
so. The question of German unity 
overshadows every other political question 
that concerns Germany. This question will 
remain on the agenda. We cannot consider 
anyone a friend of the German people whose 
actual policy denies and bJ.,ofk s  German 
unity on a democratic basis. 
At the 4th party congress in Hamburg in May 195 0, 
Schumacher again formulated the Social Democrats' attitude 
79 Kurt Schu macher, "Die Aufgabe der Opposition, " 
Deutscher Bundestag, 6 .  Sitzung, 21 .9. 1 949, in: Kurt 
Schumacher, Reden und Schriften, ed. Arno Scholz and Walther 
G. Oschilewski (Berlin-Grunewald: Arani-Verlag-GmbH, 1 96 2) , 
p. 1 73. (hereafter quoted as Reden und Schriften) . 
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toward German reun i fication. H e  warned the Allies not to seek 
political profit from the division of his c ountry . The whole 
of Germany had never ceased to exist as a state , he pointed 
out . Unity, therefore, would mean the inclusion of the Soviet 
occupation zone , Ber lin,  the territories east of the Oder and 
Neisse Rivers and the Saar into the West German territory. The 
SPD chairman also viewed the division o f  Germany not only as 
a mere German problem but as a task for democracy in Europe 
and the world . B O  
Only a few months after the beginning of West Germany ' s  
parliamentary life , Schumacher blamed the Chancellor for 
fol lowing an erroneous strategy in dealing with the western 
occupation powers ,  thereby damaging German national interest s .  
The bottom line o f  these accusations was that Adenauer , 
according to Schumacher , gave up too much too easily in the 
agreements with the We stern Allies and gained too little in 
return from them. 
The first clash between the Chancellor and the opposition 
leader came when the Petersberg Agreement was discussed in the 
federal parliament. On 2 4 - 2 5  November 1 9 4 9  during an all-night 
long debate , Schumacher har shly pointed at Adenauer ' s  
unfitness to represent German national interes t s .  He called 
him " the Chancellor o f  the Allies , "  because Adenauer had 
B O  Kurt Schumacher , "Deutschland und Europa , "  
Parteitag der SPD , Hamburg, 2 2 . 5 . 1 9 5 0 ,  i n :  Reden 
4 .  
und 
Schr iften , p .  2 2 1  f .  
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agreed to join the Internat ional Ruhr Authority. B l  
The strong Soc ial Democratic resistanc e  to t h e  Ruh r  
Authority was due to t h e  fact that t h e  United States h ad 
s ucc essfully frustrated SPD attempts for socialization of t h e  
Ruhr indust ries b y  setting up th is occupation body.8 2  Th e SPD 
also c riticized Adenauer for failing t o  achieve the 
terminat ion of indust rial dismantling in the FRG. 8 3  
The SPD policy also deviated from Adenauer' s course in 
respec t t o  th e FRG's West ern integration. Wh ile the Soc ial 
Democ rat s' 1925 Heidelberg platform had already c alled for t h e  
c reation of the 'United States of Europe' 8 4, the party under 
Sch umacher had a perc eption of European integration t h at was 
different from that of t h e  government. On November 15 , 1949, 
Schumacher stated in the Bundestag ,  
Th e idea of the united states of E urope 
is in it s c omprehensiveness an idea of 
great tradition. But it is t h e  t radition 
of libert y and reconciliation of peoples 
and not t h e  t radition of t h e  European 
8 1  Adenauer, p .  227: Lew is J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: 
A Study in Personality and P olitic al Beh avior, (St anford, 
C alif. : Stanford University P ress, 1965), p. 227. 
8 2  Edinger, p. 163. 
0 3  Schumacher Reden und Schrift en, p. 233. 
8 4  Waldemar Ritter, Kurt Schumach er: Eine Untersuch ung 
seiner politischen Konzeption und seiner Gesellschafts- und 
Staatsauffassung, (Hannover: Verlag ,T. H. W. Diet z Nachf. G mbH. , 
1964) , p. 114. 
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heavy-metal in dustry. 8 5  
The SPD policy, therefore, aimed at the creatio n of a 
united Europe on the basis of "democratic socialism. "8 6  
Al though the Schuman Plan was first met with a moderate SPD 
reaction, it was l ater rejected by the party. Schumacher 
viewed its concept as coun terproductive to the German workers' 
interests. In his eyes, the agreement of France, West Germany, 
Italy and the Benel ux coun tries was based on a catholic cartel 
of capital ists since it l eft out the protestan t, more socially 
oriented countries of Scandin avia an d Great Britain. The SPD's 
rejection, however, was not un disputed within the party ranks. 
Some influential members, among them the Lord Mayors of Berl in 
and Hamburg--Ernst Reuter and Wilhelm Kaisen--,urged a more 
cooperative policy and supported a German membership in the 
European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) and the Council of 
Europe as well. 8 7  
The cause, however, for the most intense discussions 
among German s in the years from 1 949 to 1955 was the question 
of rearmament. On this issue, the SPD decisively opposed the 
8 5  Kurt Schumacher, " In ternationale Zusam menarbei t durch 
moralische, politische und wirtschaftl iche Sel bstbehauptung , "  
Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Sitzung, 15. 11. 1949, in: Reden und 
Schriften, p. 3 44. 
8 6  Ulrich Buczyl owski, Kurt Schumacher und die deutsche 
Frage: Sicherheitspolitik und strategische Offensivkon zeption 
vom August 1950 bis September 1951, ( Stuttgart-Degerloch: 
Seewal d Verlag, 1973 . ) ,  p .  64. 
8 7  Edinger, p. 135. 
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policy of the Adenauer government . After the Berlin Blockade , 
Schumacher had advocated military neutrality for Germany to 
ease an East-West agreement on the German question. According 
to Schumacher ' s  vision, a neutral Germany should nonthe less 
be politically tied to the West . B B  
The SPD even refused to di scuss the issue of West German 
rearmament when it came up in late 1 9 4 9 .  The party 
categorical ly rejected the idea of a new German mi litary unti l 
June 1 9 S o . B 9  During this time, the Social Democrats put major 
emphasis on the importance of a successful social policy which 
by fighting unemployment and housing shortages would be the 
best means to prevent communism from taking over the FRG. 
The outbreak o f  the Korean War did not change the SPD 
attitude overnight. In his statement s Schumacher underlined 
the fact that the strategic s i tuations o f  Korea and Germany 
were less a like than many people believed . Korea was an 
unoccupied country , while a Soviet attack on Germany would 
meet the Western Allies ' forces and thereby unleash World War 
I I I ,  which Stalin knew he could not win . 9 0  
Yet ,  i n  the months fol lowing the North Korean aggression , 
the SPD changed its attitude on German rearmament . This was 
B B  Buczylowski,  p.  1 6 9 .  
B 9  Gordon D .  Drummond , The German Social Democrats in 
Opposition 1 94 9- 1 9 6 0 : The Case Against Rearmament , (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Pre s s ,  1 9B 2) , pp. 3 9-4 1 .  
9 o Ibid . , p .  4 2 .  
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due t o  the Social Democrat s '  growing belief that i n  the long 
run the Soviet Union was seeking military superiority over the 
West. The Schumacher party now was prepared t o  support the 
creation of an FRG defense . The SPD ' s  precond ition , however , 
was that the Western Al lies would treat the Federal Repub lic 
as an equal partner and tie their fate to that of West 
Germany . To that end , the SPD chairman cal len for the massive 
buildup of Allied troops at West Germany ' s  eastern border. 
This strategic measure was to prevent the FRG territory from 
becoming the maj or battlefield of a third world war . 
Schumacher harshly attacked Allied plans which would make 
Germany the maneuver area for the defense o f  the other We st 
European countries . He said to the Bundestag deputies on 
November 8 ,  1 9 5 0 ,  that only i f  the Western mil itary forces 
were strong enough to carry the war to eastern soil after a 
Soviet attack would the FRG make a military contribution . 9 1  
According to Schumacher , however ,  the Western Allies were 
still far from treating West Germany as a partner. He b lamed 
the Western Allies for their "maintaining o f  the legal basis 
of the occupation" as stated in the New York Communique'. This 
was a "reference to the spirit of the capitulation , "  he 
declared , which made military cooperation impossible for 
9 1  Kurt Schumache r ,  "Militarische Verteidigung nur auf 
der Grundlage der Geme insarnkei t , "  Deutscher Bundestag, 9 8 .  
Sitzung, 8 . 1 1 . 1 9 5 0 ,  i n :  Reden und Schriften , pp . 4 6 1 ,  4 6 4 .  
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Germans .  9 2  Schumacher then warned the deputies not to use the 
fear of the East to push for rearmament under the given 
circumstanc e s .  He expl icitly said , 
One must not employ the fear 
a s  a propaganda tool 
m i l i t a r i z a t � �n u n d e r  
c ircumstanc e s .  
o f  the East 
for the 
t o d a y ' s  
During a conference with SPD officials in March o f  1 9 5 1 ,  
Schumacher repeated his call for absolute commitment by the 
Western countries to the defense of Germany . He also commented 
on the Pleven Plan, vehemently criticiz ing its provisions for 
a united command which would discriminate against the We st 
German s .  Furthermore , the SPD chairman complained about the 
insufficient size of German combat units and their armament 
with light weapons only as outlined in the proposa l .  The 
Adenauer government accepted the Pleven Plan as a starting 
point for further talks on a European Defense Community. For 
Schumacher, the French proposal was no basis for negotiations 
at a l l . 9 4  
Howeve r ,  Schumacher was anxious t o  separate himself and 
the SPD from the pacifist "ohne mich" ( "without me " )  movement 
which rej ected any German rearmament under any circumstance s .  
9 2  . Ibid . , p .  4 5 7 .  
9 3  Ibid . , p .  4 5 9 .  
9 4  Kurt Schumacher, " Gesel lschaftsurnbau - eine nationale 
Aufgabe , "  Gemeinsame Sitzung des Parteivorstandes , des 
Parteiausschusses , der Kontrollkommi ssion und der SPD­
Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 3 1 . 3 . 1 9 5 1 ,  in:  Reden und Schriften , 
p .  2 5 7  f .  
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Repeated ly, he stated that German Social Democrats would not 
refuse to defend liberty, but that it would have to b e  on 
terms of equa lity . 9 5  The SPD advocated the FRG ' s  accession to 
NATO. Schumacher opposed the idea of a European army because 
he feared that it would block Germany ' s  way into the Atlantic 
security system and would bring about French domination over 
Western Europe . 9 6  
In order t o  prevent �denauer from accepting German 
membership in the European Defense Community under the given 
conditions , the SPD called for new federa.l e lections hoping 
to gain a new, Social Democratic government. Schumacher ' s  
party a lso appealed to the federal constitutional court 
claiming that a decision on rearmament would require a 
constitutional amendment and , therefore, would need a two-
thirds majority in the Bundestag. Both attempts failed. 
By the end of 1 9 5 1 ,  Schumacher increasingly employed the 
argument of German reunification in the dispute over 
rearmament. He argued that a decision in favor of a European 
Defense Community would prevent the sett lement o f  the German 
question. According to historian Gordon D .  Drummond, the SPD 
• 
leader switched his tactics because he rea lized that the 
Western Allies would not meet his demand for a strong forward-
based force in Germany . By introducing the argument o f  Germany 
9 5  Ibid . , p .  2 5 7 .  
9 6  . Ritter , p .  1 4 8 .  
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unity into the discussions Schumacher sought to strengthen his 
opposition to the Adenauer course. 9 7  
In the first half of 1 9 5 1 ,  however , the attitudes o f  the 
Chancellor and the SPD chairman on reunification were 
congruent in at least one respect. Both politicians demanded 
free e lections a s  the fi rst step to German unity . They 
strongly opposed the idea o f  a constitutional as sembly with 
equal representation from East and West Germany as proposed 
in the Prague declaration of the East bloc countries. 9 8  
Schumacher explained that the Prague Proposals were not 
acceptable because one coercively balloted East German vote 
would be of equal po litical weight as two and a ha l f  freely 
given votes in the We s t . 9 9  Yet, Schumacher supported the idea 
of a four-power agreement on Germany while Adenauer , at the 
same time , did everything to prevent i t .  It was evident to 
the SPD that German reun ification could only be gained when 
the Western Al lies were able to achieve a new division of 
97 Drummond , p.  6 5 ;  Asked whether rearmament according 
to SPD plans would not have the same effect on reunification 
as the Adenauer course , Schumacher stated that the Adenauer 
policy would rob the Federal Repub lic o f  its attractive power 
in the East . 
9 8  John A.  Maxwe l l ,  Social Democracy in a Divided 
Germany: Kurt Schumacher and the German Question 1 9 4 5- 1 9 5 2 ,  
( Ph . D .  dis sertation, West Virginia University) , p .  3 7 7 .  
9 9  Schumacher ,  Reden und Schriften, p .  4 7 3 .  
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spheres of influence i n  negotiations with the U . S . S . R . 1 0 0  
Schumacher also said that i t  would b e  necessary for the 
Western Allies to consult the West German government in such 
negotiation s .  
Schumacher pointed out that until four-power talks on 
German unity started, the West and especially the FRG would 
continue "to attract" the population of East Germany and the 
Soviet satellite states by the psychological impact of the 
free and social FRG system. 1 0 1  In an unpubli shed article that 
Schumacher wrote in the summer of 1 9  5 1  for an American 
magazine he stated that 
the implications of armament efforts and 
social conditions [ in the East Bloc] 
constitute the most powerful propaganda 
weapon �he Western ?emof�fcies could ever 
use against communism. 
Schumacher ' s  opposition against Adenauer , however , 
remained without great success . Al though the SPD scored a 
higher percentage of votes in some state elections and caused 
the Chancellor considerable trouble in the Bundestag, the 
Social Democrats never actually constituted a serious threat 
to Adenauer ' s  course . To a large extent, this was due to the 
1 0 0  Kurt Schumache r ,  "Wie kann die Ostzone befrei t werden 
? "  Diskussion mit der FDJ im Sendesaal des RIAS , Berl i n ,  
7 . 8 . 1 9 5 1 ,  i n :  Reden und Schriften , p .  5 2 1 .  
1 0 1  Kurt Schumacher, "Deutschland im Wirbel 
weltpolitischer Auseinandersetzungen , "  Unvero ffentlichtes 
Manuskript, Sommer 1 9 5 1 .  i n :  Reden und Schriften , p .  4 0 4 .  
l 0 2  Ibid . , p .  4 1 1 .  
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uncompromising attitude o f  the SPD leadership. Since the 
Social Democrats had no maj ority in the federal parliament, 
they needed support from other parties in order to oust 
Adenauer .  Yet they failed to gain such support because they 
insisted on their maximum demands as a basis for any 
cooperation. 
Schumacher ' s  hardening attitude in national affairs and 
ideological differences also prevented him and his party from 
establishing a cooperative atmosphere with the Western Allies , 
thereby strengthening the position of Adenauer . 
Despite his harsh criticism o f  the Western Allies , 
Schumacher was a deci s ively Western oriented politician . 
During his entire political l i fe he opposed Soviet communism. 
Even as a prisoner i n  Hitler ' s  concentration camps he had 
refused to collaborate with the communists in an anti-fascist 
fron t . 1 0 3  
Schumacher opposed Adenauer ' s  course o f  politica l ,  
economic , and military integration into Western Europe on 
three grounds , the first being that he viewed integration as 
being planned to deny West German equality . Second ly , 
Schumacher thought that association with the We st would 
hinder--if not prevent--the reunification of Germany . Thirdly 
the SPD leader argued that Adenaue r ' s policy would block the 
development of democratic socialism in Germany and Europe . 
l 0 3  Schumacher ,  Reden und Schriften, p .  5 2 2 .  
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The central difference between him and Adenauer was that 
the Chancel lor was prepared to make concessions in order to 
gain sovereignty and national security for the FRG. 
Schumache r ,  on the other hand , took the American interest in 
Germany for granted because he knew that the Truman 
Admini stration would not leave west Germany to the Russian s .  
Counting o n  this American attitude , he c laimed that the FRG 
government had a strong bargaining position. That i s  why he 
demanded sovereignty and equal treatment for West Germany 
before he was prepared to make concessions . 
5 6  
Chapter I I I  
Stal i n ' s  Note of March 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2  
1 .  Soviet Policy Toward Germanv 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 5 2  
Postwar Soviet foreign policy toward Germany had two 
major objective s :  one , to prevent the defeated enemy from 
regaining a strength dangerous to the U . S . S . R . and : two , to 
secure a high amount of German reparations in order to 
facilitate the reconstruction of the war torn Russian economy . 
To a large extent this policy was the result o f  the experience 
from two wars against the Germans .  The terrible losses of l i fe 
and material that the Third Reich had inflicted upon the 
u . s . s . R .  "was indelibly imprinted in the Soviet memory , " 1 0 4  
and had caused the strong desire for national security and 
reparations among Soviet politicians . 
In order to make sure that Germany would never attack the 
Soviet Union again , the U . S . S . R .  sought to control the 
• 
entirety of Germany which--according to scholar Alvin z .  
Rubinstein--constituted "the ultimate prize in the Cold 
1 0 4  Ann L .  Phi l lips , Soviet Policy Toward East Germany 
Reconsidered : The Postwar Decade , (New York, Westport , 
Connecticut ,  London: Greenwood Press ,  1 9 8 6 ) , p .  1 3 .  
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War . 11 1 0 5  The Ruhr area was the industrial backbone of Germany 
and, therefore, a key element in Soviet reparation claims and 
security interest s .  
The coal and steel production of this region, however , 
was first under British administration and later subject to 
the International (Western) Ruhr Authority . The conflict over 
reparations between the Western Al lies and the u . s . s . R .  had 
terminated their cooperation in the occupation of Germany in 
1 9 4 6  and thereby blocked a l l  chances for the Kreml in to 
receive reparations from the Ruhr. 
In December of 1 9 4 7 ,  the Soviet government attempted to 
overcome the split within the former war a lliance and to 
restore a united German administration in order to secure 
Soviet interests in the Ruhr industry . 1 0 6  This attempt failed . 
In 1 9 4 8 ,  the East-west relations further deteriorated because 
of the communist coup d ' etat in Czechos lovakia and the 
beginning of the Berlin blockade by Soviet force s .  
By interrupting the traffic lines to the free sectors o f  
Berlin , the U . S . S . R .  tried t o  undermine the steps taken by the 
Western Al lies toward the formation o f  a West German 
1 0 5  Alvin z .  Rubinstein , The Foreign Po licy of the Soviet 
Union , 3rd ed . (New York : Random House , 1 9 7 2 ) , p .  2 1 0 .  
1 0 6  Walter Osten, "Die Deutschlandpoli tik der Sowj etunion 
in den Jahren 1 9 5 2 / 5 3 , "  Osteuropa 1 4  (January , 1 9 6 4 ) : p .  2 .  
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government . 1 07 Stalin knew that the establi shment o f  a 
separate West German state would further reduce Soviet chances 
for a decisive influence over the whole of Germany . 
The Berlin airlift, however ,  substituted the vital supply 
lines for the enclave c ity and thus renoered the Soviet 
strategy unsuccessful : Berlin ' s  population survived a harsh 
winter; the 1 9 4 8  currency reform in the Western occupation 
zones and Western sectors of Berlin was not revoked; the 
number of Western politicians advocating a policy of dealing 
with the u . s . S . R. from a position of strength had grown , and 
on May 2 3 ,  1 9 4 9 , the FRG was founded. Thus in spring of 1 9 4 9  
it was evident that the "militant phase of the Soviet policy" 
set forth in 1 9 4 7  had stimulated a trend heavily adverse to 
Soviet interests . 1 0 8  
I n  reaction to its failure to win in fluence over the 
entirety of Germany and the emergence of a West German state , 
the u . s . s . R . consolidated its position in East Germany . On 
October 7 ,  1 9 4 9 , the German Democratic Repub lic (GDR) was 
founded and a provisional government established. The Soviet 
Military Administration that had governed the Eastern zone 
since the end of the war was replaced by a Soviet Control 
Commission. It was charged with " exercising control over the 
1 0 7  Marshall D .  Shulmann , 
Reappra ised , (Cambridge , Mas s . : 
1 9 6 3 ) , p .  7 2 .  
l 0 8  Ibid . , p .  2 9 .  
Stalin ' s  Foreign 
Harvard University 
Policy 
Press , 
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fulfil lment of the Potsdam and other j oint decisions o f  the 
Four Powers in respect to Germany . " 1 0 9 
Until 1 9 4 9 ,  domestic politica l developments within the 
Soviet zone of occupation had been rather moderate, i . e .  the 
socialization of the economy and political oppression were not 
yet advanced to their later extent. The founding of the GDR 
marked the beginning of East Germany ' s  adaptation to the 
Soviet System. 1 1 0  
After a West German government was e lected , Moscow again 
accused the Western powers of splitting Germany. In the Soviet 
note protesting the "Formation of a Separate Government for 
the We stern Zones of Germany" on October 1 as wel l  as in the 
statement regarding the formal establishment of the GDR 
government that same month , the Kremlin blamed the Western 
Allies for violating the Potsdam Agreement. l l l  The U . S . S . R .  ' s  
leadership argued that France , Great Britain and the United 
1 0  9 "Statement by the Chief of the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany on the Establi shment of a 
Provisional Government o f  the German Democratic Republic , "  
October 1 0 ,  1 9 4 9 ,  i n :  Documents On Germany ,  p .  3 0 8 .  
1 1 0  Herman Weber. Die DOR, 1 9 45-1 9 8 6 ,  Oldenbourg 
Grundriss der Geschichte, ed.  Jochen Ble icke n ,  Lothar Ga l l ,  
Hermann Jakob s ,  vol . 2 0 .  (Munich : R .  Oldenbourg Verlag , 1 9 8 8 ) , 
p .  2 4 .  
1 1 1  "Note From the Soviet Union to the United States 
Protesting the 'Formation o f  a Separate Government for the 
Western Zones of Occupation , ' i n :  Documents On German� , p .  2 7 4 ;  
" Statement by the Chief o f  the Soviet Military Administration 
in Germany on the Establishment of a Provisional Government 
of the German Democratic Republic , October 1 0 ,  1 9 4 9 , "  i n :  
Documents On Germany, p .  3 0 7 .  
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States acted contrary to their obligation "to consider Germany 
as one whole and to contribute towards its trans formation into 
a democratic and peace-loving state , and also to the 
obligation to conclude a peace treaty with Germany . " 1 1 2  
The notes did not achieve any signi ficant result and 
Moscow could do little except continue the consolidation o f  
its own sphere o f  influenc e .  On June 6 ,  1 9 5 0 ,  the GDR Deputy 
Minister-President Walter Ulbricht and the Polish government 
published a statement agreeing to establish the Oder-Neisse 
line as the unalterable final border line between Poland and 
Germany . 1 1 3  
The west German parliament protested. It proclaimed the 
Warsaw declaration null and void in respect to international 
law because , it argued, the East German regime had no right 
to act in the name of the German people . 1 1 4  Despite this 
prote st , the GDR and the Polish government confirmed this 
settlement i n  a bilateral treaty on July 6 of the same 
1 1 2  "Statement by the Chief of the Soviet Military 
Administration" i n :  Documents On Germany ,  p .  3 0 7 .  
l 1 3  East German-Polish Declaration i n  Warsaw, June 6 ,  
1 9 5 0 ,  i n :  Dokumentation zur Deut schlandfrage :  Von der 
Atlantik-Charta 1 9 4 1  bis zur Genfer Aussenministerkonferenz 
1 95 9 ,  vol . 1 Chronik der Ereignisse,  ed . Heinrich von Siegler 
( n . p . , n . d . ) ,  p .  1 0 0 ,  (hereafter quoted as Dokumentation zur 
Deutschland frage ) . 
1 1 4  Statement of the Bundestag with the exception o f  the 
Conununist Parliamentary Group, in:  Dokumentation zur 
Deutschland frage , p .  1 0 0 .  
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year . 1 1 5  
The East German-Polish settlement o f  the border question 
was an essential step toward consolidation of the Soviet 
sphere of influence since it reduced the risk of a dangerous 
conflict among two maj or sate l lite states .  Furthermore , the 
communist statesmen asserted that they were creat ing a peace 
order "on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement . " 1 1 6  I n  order to 
uphold its claim to the territories east of Oder and Nei s s e ,  
the West German government had to criticize this Soviet-
orchestrated peace progres s ,  thereby opening a flank for 
communist and pacifist accusations . 
The months fol lowing the outbreak o f  the Korean war i n  
1 9 5 0  brought upon a change in the Soviet policy toward 
Germany . Since the Soviet Empire was in a stage o f  
consolidation, it might be doubted whether the conflict in the 
Far East was meant as an aggressive move against the entire 
capitalist world. It seems more likely that the government in 
Moscow had underestimated the possible consequences of the 
North Korean invasion. According to Anthony T .  Bouscaren , the 
Kremlin had underestimated the risk involved in the attack 
• 
a fter January o f  1 9 5 0 ,  when Dean Acheson declared that the 
United States did not consider Korea or Formosa to be within 
1 1 5  "Agreement Between Poland and the German Democratic 
Republic on Demarcation o f  the Polish-German Frontier , Signed 
at Zgorzelec (Gorlitz} July 6 ,  1 9 5 0 , "  i n :  Documents On 
Germany, pp. 3 1 9-3 2 1 .  
1 1 6  Ibid . , p .  3 1 9 .  
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its Pacific security line . 1 1 7  This view i s  supported by Ann 
L .  Phi l l ips . l l 8  
Besides Soviet expectations o f  a "quick, sel f-contained 
success in Korea , "  historian Shulman detects two other maj or 
reasons for this war : One, the " impelling floodtide of the 
Chinese revolutionary impulse" and the need to check American 
moves toward establishing a mili tary outpost in Japan. 1 1 9  
In Europe , the Soviet and East German propaganda 
accompanied the Korean conflict during the first weeks . 
Threatening that West Germany might expect to share the fate 
o f  South Korea , Moscow and East Berlin hoped to raise a crisis 
atmosphere in Europe and then take advantage of i t . 1 2 0  
Yet the reaction of the West European governments was the 
opposite of what the u . s . s . R .  had hoped for . The massive 
military efforts in the United States and Western Europe 
combined with the prospect o f  West Germany ' s  rearmament 
a larmed the Soviet leadership . 1 2 1 Stali n ,  therefore, decided 
1 1 7 Antony T .  Bouscaren, Soviet Foreign Po licy: A Pattern 
of Persistence , ( n . p . : Fordham University Pres s ,  1 9 6 2 ) , p .  
1 3 8 .  
1 1 8  This scholar holds that "the Korean gambit can more 
justly be attributed to the failure o f  the United States to 
make known its strategic interests in the area than to 
Stalin ' s  recklessne s s .  I t  was not until after Sta lin ' s  death 
that the Soviet Union attempted to project her power 
worldwide . "  Phi l l ips , p .  1 1 7 .  
1 1 9  Shulman, p .  1 4 0 .  
1 2 0  Ibid . , p .  1 4 7 .  
1 2 1  . Ibid . ,  p .  1 4 9 .  
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to take a more conciliatory approach i n  h i s  German policy. 
On October 2 1 ,  1 9 5 0 ,  the foreign ministers of the East 
European countries ( except Yugoslavia ) issued a declaration 
demanding that the Western Allies cancel a l l  plans for the 
remilitarization of Germany . Cal ling indirectly for a four-
power conference , they also asked for an 
undelayed conclusion of a peace treaty 
with Germany together with creation of a 
unified state in accordance with the 
Potsdam Agreement, so that occupation 
forces of a l l  countries can be withdrawn 
from Germany within �.zear of s ignature 
of the peace treaty . I 
Finally (as mentioned in chapter I I )  , foreign ministers 
from the Eastern Bloc proposed the establishment of an "All-
German Constitutional Council"  with equal participation by 
East and West German representative s .  Th i s  body was to be 
charged with the preparation of an a ll-German government and 
consulted by the occupation powers on questions regarding the 
peace treaty . 1 23 
East German Minister-President Otto Grotewohl repeated 
the proposal in a letter to Chancellor Adenauer dated November 
3 0 ,  1 9 5 0 . In his so-called "Deutsche an einen Tisch" 
initiative ( " Germans at one table" ) Grotewohl adopted a l l  
1 2 2  " " St atement Is sued by the Foreign Ministers of the 
Soviet Unio n ,  the German Democratic Republic , Poland , 
Czechoslovaki a ,  Hungary , Rumani a ,  and Bulgaria , and the 
Albanian Minister in Moscow, Prague , October 2 1 , 1 9 5 0 , "  
[ Extract] in : Documents On Germany ,  p .  3 4 6 .  
1 2 3  Ibid . , p .  3 4 6 .  
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features of the Prague declaration in regard t o  the all-German 
constitutional council . In order to make his plan more 
appealing to the German publ i c ,  he referred to the division 
of Germany as " a  state of national emergency " and outlined 
concrete steps toward reunification. Like the Prague 
declaration the proposal a l so insi sted on equal representation 
of East and West Germany in the constitutional council and 
gave minor priority to fre e ,  all-German e lections . 1 2 4 with the 
East German effort " the Eastern initiative [ for German unity] 
adroitly maneuvered on two tracks . " 1 2 5 
Chancellor Adenauer answered the Grotewohl letter through 
a statement on January 1 5 ,  1 9 5 1 ,  denying that the East German 
government was legitimized to advocate reunification because 
it had " renounced the German territories east o f  Oder and 
Neisse . "  In addition , Adenauer demanded democratic liberties 
and civ i l  rights for "the Germans living in the Soviet zone" 
as wel l  as the dissolving of the East German military peopl e ' s  
police a s  essential preconditions for free a l l-German 
election s . 1 2 6  In the Bundestag the Chance llor repeated these 
demands in a policy statement on March 9 ,  1 9 5 1 . 1 2 7  
1 2 4  Letter from Grotewohl to Adenauer , November 3 0 ,  1 9 5 0 ,  
i n :  Dokurnentation zur Deutschland frage , p .  1 0 5 .  
1 2 5  Be sson, p .  1 2 0 .  
1 2 6  Statement by Adenauer , January 1 5 ,  1 9 5 1 , i n :  
Dokurnentation zur Deutschland frage , p .  1 0 6 .  
1 2 7  Policy Statement by Adenauer , March 9 ,  1 9 5 1 ,  in : 
Dokumentation zur Deut schland frage , pp. 1 0 7- 1 0 9 .  
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S ince the extension o f  the FRG ' s  Western-type democracy 
to East Germany would have terminated the ru l e  o f  the 
communist government in the GDR, the regime in East Berlin did 
not accept Adenauer ' s  demand s .  Thus the Grotewohl initiative 
failed . 
In the first ha l f  of 1 9 5 1 ,  however , the occupation powers 
were still exchanging notes on the matters o f  a four-power 
conference on Germany and the Prague proposals.  Meanwhile , the 
U . S . S . R .  had explicitly cal led for such a meeting. The 
diplomatic e f forts surrounding this i ssue dragged on unt i l  
March 1 ,  1 9 5 1 ,  when the Soviet government accepted the Western 
proposal for a preparatory conference o f  the four deputy 
foreign ministers to begin the same month in Pari s .  
The talks in the French capital did not result , as 
planned, in a schedule for the four-power conference because 
France , Great Britain and the United States on the one side , 
and the Soviet Union on the other side could not agree upon 
an agenda for that meeting. More than half a year a fter the 
Prague proposal s ,  the first Soviet diplomatic initiative on 
the German question since the formation o f  two German states 
ended without any achievement . 
Until March of 1 9 5 2  there was no further direct 
diplomatic attempt by Moscow to stop West Germany ' s  
integration into the Western a l liance system by offering 
reun i ficatio n .  But there were continued activities on the part 
of the East German government. On September 1 5 ,  1 9 5 1 ,  
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Grotewohl submitted a new proposal to Bonn. Now , equal 
representation of East and West Germany was no longer a 
precondition for unity. In addition, East Berlin explicitly 
accepted the call for free election s . 1 2 8 
When the Eastern side moved somewhat closer to the 
Western position , the Adenauer government raised its 
requirements for negotiations demanding international control 
of the election s . 1 2 9  The Western powers concurred with the 
Chancellor on this course . Upon their reques t ,  the United 
Nations (U . N . ) decided to appoint an international commission 
that was charged "to carry out simultaneous investigation" in 
all parts of Germany " i n  order to determine whether existing 
conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free 
elections throughout these areas . . .  " 1 3 0  The Grotewohl regime , 
however , rejected the commission because the investigation 
threatened the basis of the communist rule in East Germany . 1 3 1  
Final ly , both side s ,  West Germany and the GDR, elaborated 
drafts of an a l l-German electoral law which were adopted by 
• 
1 2 8  Besson, p .  1 2 1 .  
1 2 9  Ibid. 
1 3 0  "Resolution 5 1 0  (VI) of the United Nations General 
Assembly Appointing a Commission To Investigate the 
Possibility of Holding Free Elections in Germany , December 2 0 ,  
1 9 5 1 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany ,  p .  3 5 6  f .  
1 3 1  Besson, p .  1 22 .  
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the respective parliaments i n  January and February, 1 9 5 2 . 1 3 2  
Yet , the inter-German initiatives , diplomatic steps and 
legislative efforts from late 1 9 5 1  to early 1 9 5 2  did not 
overcome the deadlock on the German question. 
Summariz ing the U . S . S . R . ' s  German policy in the period 
discussed , one can distinguish three maj or phase s :  an 
aggressive one which ended in 1 9 4 9 ;  a transitional stage with 
major emphasis on power consolidation unti l mid- 1 9 5 0 ; and a 
conc i liatory phase starting a few weeks after the Korean war . 
Since 1 9 4 7 ,  the Soviet leadership had steered an 
aggressive course in its policy toward Germany and Western 
Europe . In 1 9 4 9 ,  the Kremlin realized that the West European 
reaction (backed by the United States) to its harsh measures 
were adverse to Moscow ' s  intere s t s .  This perception resulted 
in the li fting of the Berlin blockade , an event which marked 
the end of this predominantly aggressive cour s e .  
A transitional stage in Moscow ' s  German policy followed 
the Berlin blockade. The consolidation o f  the East German 
communist regime was the prevailing element throughout the 
remainder of 1 9 4 9  and unt i l  it drew to a close after the 
outbreak of the Korean war .  
1 3 2  Draft o f  an a ll-German e lectoral law as adopted by 
the Volkskarnmer ,  i n :  Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage , pp . 
1 2 6 - 1 3 3 ;  Draft of an a ll-German electoral law as adopted by 
the Bunde stag, i n :  Dokumen tation zur Deutschland frage , pp. 
1 3 3 - 1 3 6 .  
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I n  the second half o f  1 9 5 0 ,  the Soviet leaders decided 
to start a more conciliatory policy aimed at the prevention 
of the FRG ' s  integration into Western Europe . This came in the 
face o f  two adverse development s :  A tremendous armament 
program o f  the United States and the probability of West 
Germany ' s  inclusion into the We stern military system--largely 
the results of the North Korean aggression. 
During the time discus sed , the Soviet and East German 
initiatives failed for two reasons : At first , the FRG 
government did not accept an equal representation of Moscow ' s  
puppet government in preparatory talks for reunification. 
Then , the GDR dropped this demand but rej ected the UN 
commi ssion ' s  investigation of the preconditions for free 
elections i n  Germany. Neither East nor West was willing to 
give the other side an advantage o r  to risk the stability of 
its own regime in Germany. 
Between 1 9 4 9  and early 1 9 5 2 ,  the changes in global 
politics were a major factor influencing Soviet foreign policy 
toward Germany . Some scholars also argue that the Soviet 
leadership was divided over the path that the U . S . S . R. was to 
take in its foreign policy1 3 3  and that there was an "ebb and 
flow o f  influence of the two approaches in interaction with 
the changing policies of the We stern powers . " 1 3 4  
1 3 3  Shulman, p .  1 1 0 ;  see also Phi llips , p .  3 2  and Osten, 
p. 4 .  
1 3 4  Phillips , p .  3 2 .  
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Marsha l l  D.  Shulman detects two Soviet modes o f  behavior 
that were rooted in two d i f ferent political outlook s .  One was 
" restrained , indirect , optimistic about the way history seems 
to be going . "  This viewpoint was opposed within the Kremlin 
leadership by communi sts whose attitude on foreign policy was 
"defensively militant,  anticipating imminent attack" by the 
Western countries. 1 3 5 
Ann L .  Phi l lips thinks a group headed by Marshall Andrei 
Zhdanov was responsible for the promotion o f  a confrontation 
course in order to prevent the consolidation o f  a West 
European alliance from being completed. This group, according 
to Phi l lips , also advocated a quick " sovietization" of the 
territories under communist contro l . 1 3 6  In the case o f  
Germany , this meant a policy o f  continued national division. 
Another group led by Soviet secret police chief Lawrenti 
Beria appeared to have favored a German policy which would 
secure Moscow ' s  influence in Europe without confrontation 
" through a renewal of the Rapa l lo Politik , " 1 3 7  named for the 
Treaty o f  Rapallo ( 1 9 2 2 ) , which had created a c loser 
relationship between the u . s . S . R. and Germany a fter World War 
I . "  
1 3 5  Shulman, p .  1 1 0 .  
1 3 6  Phi l lips , p .  3 2 .  
1 3 7  Ibid. 
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Analyz ing the Soviet foreign policy toward Germany 
between 1 9 4 9  and early 1 9 5 2 ,  from the perspective o f  these 
scholars ' analyses , one must agree that by 1 9 5 2  the advocates 
of confrontation had lost their dominant position to the 
moderate group of Kremlin leaders. This was due to the fac t ,  
that the U . S . S . R . ' s  aggressive policy had not achieved its 
goals regarding Germany but caused a harsh antagonistic 
reaction by the Western countries . 
2 .  Moscow ' s  Proposal to Create a United 
and Neutra li zed Germany 
At the beginning o f  1 9 5 2 ,  the international situation 
further developed to the d i sadvantage of the Kremlin. A mere 
seven years after the Soviet Union had defeated the 
devastating invasion of Naz i  Germany , it faced the probable 
re-emergence of German armed forces. To make things worse 
these forces would be a l lied with Moscow ' s  "great antagonist , "  
the United States. 1 3 8  
One has to keep i n  mind , that in 1 9 5 2 , America was still 
the superior power in respect to nuclear arms . Furthermore , 
i n  February of that year , the NATO Counc i l  had decided to 
admit Turkey and Greece into the al liance , to create a NATO 
1 3 8  Besson, p .  1 2 5 .  
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command for the Near Eas t ,  and t o  raise one hundred divisions 
in We stern Europe by 1 9 5 4 .  The Kremlin leaders perceived a l l  
these developments as menacing t o  the Soviet Union and , 
there fore , sought to stop them. 1 3 9  
The Soviet note o f  March 1 0  proposing the creation o f  a 
united and neutral Germany was the diplomatic means to that 
end. The document which Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko presented to the ambassadors of the Western powers 
called for a peace conference based on an attached draft o f  
a peace treaty with Germany . Poland , Czechos lovaki a ,  Belgium, 
Holland " and other governments which partic ipated with their 
a rmed forces in the war against Germany" were to be 
participants of this conference in addition to the four 
powers . 1 4 0  
I n  the March note , the Soviet government proposed the 
fol lowing peace order for Germany : 
One ,  Germany would be reunited within " the borders 
established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference o f  the 
Great Powers ; "  
• 
1 3 9  Ro lf Steininge r ,  Eine vertane Chance : Die Stalin-Note 
vom 1 0 .  Marz 1 9 5 2  und die W1edervere1n1gung: Eine Studie auf 
der Grundlage unverOffentlichter bri tischer und amerikanischer 
Akten , "  (Berlin , Bonn: Verlag J . H . W.  Dietz Nachf. GrnbH . , 
1 9 8 5 ) , p .  1 3  f .  
1 4 0  "Note From the Soviet Union t o  the United States 
Transmitting a Soviet Draft o f  a Peace Treaty With Germany , 
March 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  in:  Documents On Germany, pp . 3 6 1 - 3 6 4 .  
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Two , the occupation powers were to withdraw a l l  their 
armed forces one year after the peace treaty entered into 
forc e ,  liquidating a l l  foreign mil itary bases on the German 
territory ; 
Three, Germany would have to oblige itself "not to enter 
into any kind of coalition or military a l liance directed 
against any power which took part with its armed forces in the 
war against Germany ; "  
Four , the peace treaty was to permit Germany "to have its 
own national armed forces ( land , air , and sea) which are 
necessary for the defense of the country ; "  
Five , there would be no limitations imposed on Germany ' s  
peaceful economy , international trade , navigation and access 
to the world market s ;  
Six , general democratic r ights such as " freedom o f  
speech,  pres s ,  religious persuasion, political conviction and 
assembly" were to be guaranteed in Germany as well a s  " free 
activity of democratic parties and organizations • • .  with the 
right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs , to 
conduct meetings and assembly , to enjoy freedom of press and 
publication . "  The Soviet plan would not a l low the existence 
of parties in Germany which were " inimical to democracy and 
to the maintenance of peace ; " 
Seven, the peace treaty was to guarantee " a l l  former 
members of the German army , including officers and genera ls , 
a l l  former Naz i s ,  excluding those who are serving court 
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sentences for commission o f  crimes " civil and political rights 
"equal to all other German citizens ; " 1 4 l  
This Soviet note contained completely new terms for 
German unity . For the first time the u . s . S . R .  offered the 
reunification of Germany on the basis o f  neutra lity. Whi l e  
Moscow, prior to March of 1 95 2 , always had insi sted o n  the 
complete demi litarization of Germany , it now was prepared to 
concede a national army and a defense industry to the former 
enemy . 
Another remarkable switch in the Soviet attitude was the 
explicit provision of equal civi l and politica l rights for a l l  
former members of the Wehrmacht and a l l  former Naz i s  excepting 
only those who were serving prison terms . This proposal 
sharply contrasted with the strict denazification policy the 
U . S . S . R .  had pursued since the end of the war . 
The accurate observer could also notice that the Kremlin 
repeated its call for an all-German government without 
demanding equal representation o f  the East German communist 
regime in this government or a preparatory constitutional 
counc i l .  On the other hand , however , the Soviet note neglected 
any provision for free elections which had been a Western key 
issue in earlier note exchanges . Instead it combined the 
Kremlin proposals with an attractive sounding general offer 
of democratic and economic freedom for united Germany and its 
1 4 1  Ibid . , p. 3 6 3  f .  
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citizen s .  
Although the Stalin Note was presented t o  the We stern 
Al lie s ,  there could be little doubt that the German pub lic was 
another ma j or addressee--especially the popu lation of the FRG 
which would be able to put pressure on the Adenauer 
government . The prospect o f  Germany ' s  reunification , the 
provisions for a German national army , and the de facto 
rehabi litation of almost a l l  former Naz is and high ranking 
Wehrmacht officers were very appealing to Germans with strong 
national sentiments like the old elites o f  the Third Reich . 
This was to activate the anti-Western resentments among the 
German people .  
Furthermore, the Soviet concession of absolute economic 
freedom was o f  great attraction for leading west German 
entrepreneurs and managers s ince it raised new hopes for 
German access to the East European marke t . 1 4 2  The guarantee 
of democratic rights at the same time was to dispe l 
traditional German fears o f  a communist expansion into the 
Federal Republic . 
The detection of elements in the March note that were to 
please the Germans ,  however ,  did not settle the question 
whether Stalin through this document s incerely offered 
1 4 2  Hermann Graml , "Nationalstaat oder Westdeutscher 
Teilstaa t :  Die sowj etischen Noten vom Jahre 1 9 5 2  und die 
offentliche Meinung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland , "  
Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitge schichte 2 5  (No. 4 ,  1 9 7 7 ) : p .  8 5 6  
f .  
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Germany ' s  reunification on democratic terms in exchange for 
its neutrality . Hermann Graml tries to give a quick answer to 
this problem. He argues that already the March note (which was 
only the first of a series o f  notes) indicated that the 
U . S . S . R. was not really prepared to sacrifice its control over 
East Germany . Graml bases his conclusion on three features of 
the Soviet document: The demand to return to the four-power 
control of Germany as agreed upon in Potsdam; the neglect of 
a statement on the question of free all-German elections and 
the indirect demand to recognize the Oder-Ne isse line as 
Polish-German border. 1 4 3  
Graml points out that these note features were "not 
acceptable even as a basis or starting point o f  negotiations" 
for the Western powers and the FRG government. Since Moscow 
knew thi s ,  Graml concludes ,  the note was no initiative for a 
conference but a "tactical propaganda maneuver" to blame the 
West for the continued division of Germany . 1 4 4  
I n  a re latively new study Rolf Steininger counters thi s 
v iewpoint , arguing that Moscow was prepared to give up its 
control over East Germany for the price o f  a weaker We stern 
alliance . 1 4 5  He points out that " nobody could expect the 
Soviets to show their cards in a public exchange o f  notes . "  
1 4 3  Gram l ,  "Die Legende , "  p .  3 1 6 .  
1 4 4  Ibid. 
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Many aspects of the Kremlin offer were unsatis factory and , 
therefore , had to be verified in negotiations . 1 4 6  Agreeing to 
this j udgement ,  Wilfried Loth goes even one step further 
stating that " especially the insufficient attraction [ o f  the 
note wa s ]  a proof of the [Soviet] sincerity . " 1 4 7  
I n  any case negotiations would have been necessary to 
determine the exact content of the numerous provisions and 
terms in the document which were open to different 
interpretations. For example , what did the Kremlin mean when 
it stated that a united Germany was to develop into an 
" independent democratic peace- loving state" ? 1 4 8  Usually the 
Soviet government termed only communist peop le ' s  democracies 
as democratic peace-loving states . 
What had the authors of the note in mind when they 
demanded that the "exi stence o f  organizations inimical to 
democracy and the maintenance of peace must not be permitted 
on the territory of Germany " ? 1 4 9  A Western politician probably 
would have used these words in order to advocate the 
prohibition of extremist parties on the right or left end of 
the political spectrum . Moscow, on the other hand, was usua lly 
• 
1 4 6  . Ibid . I p .  2 7 .  
1 4 7  Wil fr ied Loth , Die Teilung der Welt 1 9 4 5-1 9 5 5 ,  
(Munich: n . p . , 1 98 3 ) , p .  2 8 7 ,  quoted in Steininger , p .  2 7 .  
1 4 8  "Note From the Soviet Union, March 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  i n :  
Documents On Germany, p. 3 6 3 .  
1 4 9  Ibid. 
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targeting Western parties when employing these or similar 
terms . 
Although talks with the Soviets on the March note seemed 
necessary, the bad record Moscow had with the West in respect 
to negotiations indicated that a meeting in spring of 1 9 5 2  
might b e  counterproductive t o  western interest s .  The 
diplomatic e f forts for the creation of the EDC were at a 
crucial stage and talks with the Soviets might have 
j eopardized the progress made so far without achieving any 
substantial re sult s .  
Graml refers t o  the Soviet habit o f  de laying or blocking 
achievements in diplomatic talks in order to exploit a failure 
for Moscow ' s  propaganda .  By the time the Soviet note arrived 
in the Western capitals this had j ust recently happened in the 
negotiations on an armistice in Korea and a peace treaty with 
Austria. 1 5 0  
Graml i s  right insofar as the intended obstruction o f  
conferences indeed was a major element o f  Soviet diplomacy . 1 5 1  
1 50 Graml , "Nationalstaat oder Westdeutscher Teilstaat , "  
p .  84 3 .  
1 5 l  For example , the former Tito advisor , Yugoslav 
communi st and Ministe r ,  Milovan Dj i las describes this Soviet 
tactic in a book on his several meetings with Stalin between 
1 9 4 4  and 1 9 4 8 .  He reca l l s  that , at one occasion, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotow proposed a conference with the we st 
on the Marshall Plan only to render it a failure. D j i las 
state s :  "Regarding the Marshall Plan, Molotow wondered whether 
a conference should not be called in which the Eastern 
countries would also participate, but only for propaganda 
reasons, with the aim of exploiting the publicity and then 
walking out on the conference at a convenient moment . "  Milovan 
Dj ilas , Conversations With Sta lin,  ( New Yor k :  Harcourt ,  Brace 
7 8  
Neverthe less one might raise the question , whether the Western 
powers were really not able to accept the Sta lin Note as a 
basis for a conference without j eopardizing the European 
integration at the same time. This problem and the 
consequences that Germany ' s  neutra lity would have caused will 
be discussed in the fol lowing chapter .  The next section will 
also focuse at the diplomatic activities o f  the United State s ,  
Chancel lor Adenauer ,  and the German Social Democrat s .  
& World Inc . , 1 9 6 2 ) , p .  1 2 8 .  
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Chapter IV 
The American Reaction and the "Battle of Notes" 
1 .  American Diplomacy 
The Stalin Note did not completely surprise Washington . 
As a matter of fact American diplomats had to some extent 
anticipated the March note . The Council o f  Deputies to the 
North Atlantic Counci l ,  which was the executive body o f  NATO, 
had prepared a study of Soviet foreign policy . This paper was 
presented to the NATO governments on February 6 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  and was 
considered by the foreign ministers at their meeting in Lisbon 
on February 2 1 .  Except for " two relatively minor points , "  the 
report mirrored the U . S .  perception of Moscow ' s  foreign policy 
in early 1 9 5 2 . 1 5 2  
The authors of the study observed that Soviet policy was 
determined by the obj ective o f  avoiding excessive risk for 
the U. S . S . R . , and by the fear of encirclement and aggression . 
Hence ,  the Soviet Union would try to prevent the establi shment 
in Europe or Asia o f  forces capable o f  threatening the 
U .  s .  s .  R .  or its interest s .  Moscow would also obstruct the 
1 5 2  Report by the Council o f  Deputies to the North 
Atlantic Council , London , 6th February 1 9 5 2 ,  in: FRUS 1 9 5 2 -
1 9 5 4 ,  vol . v ,  pp . 2 8 0 - 2 8 8 .  
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growth of Western strength and unity . NATO analysts concluded 
that this policy would serve to expand the communist 
empire . 1 5 3  
Turning to Moscow ' s  goals i n  respect t o  Western Europe , 
the study held that it was a vital aim of Soviet policy to 
weaken Western Europe and to increase Soviet influence in thi s 
are a .  To that end , the u . s . S . R . would seek to divide western 
Europe from the United States and to prevent the successful 
execution of the NATO defense program , to hamper economic 
recovery and development , and , in the long run , to bring 
communist governments into power in west European countries . 
Because o f  its formidable industr ial and mil itary 
potential , Germany would be , in Soviet eyes , the key to 
control of a l l  Europe . Therefore , the Soviets would seek " to 
neutra lize the whole of Germany and to set up there , i f  
pos s ible , a government devoted to Moscow • • •  " 1 5 4  
Furthermore , the report indicated that the Kremlin 
leaders were equally conscious of Germany as a potential 
threat due to their wartime experienc e .  For that reason the 
Counc i l  of Deputies concluded that the immediate Soviet aim 
must be to prevent West Germany from being effectively 
integrated into Western Europe , and above a l l  in the military 
sphere .  To this end , they expected the Soviet policy "to 
1 5 3  . Ibid . , p .  2 8 1 .  
1 5 4  . Ibid . , p .  2 8 2 .  
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continue to exploit German fear o f  war and desire for 
unity . " 1 5 5  
There was no indication to the NATO analys t s ,  however , 
that the Kremlin was w i l l ing to sacrifice the GDR regime in 
order to secure either German unity or German neutra lity . The 
report also stated : 
Since the Soviet leaaers might well regard 
any prospect of a rearmed united [ italics 
in source] Germany , free to associate with 
the We st,  as intolerable , they are hardly 
l ikely to withdraw from the Eastern z�g� 
on any terms involving such a threat. 
In short , the Kremlin would do its utmost to prevent the 
integration of West Germany into Western Europe by means short 
of war .  That was why this undertaking would contain an element 
of calculated risk for the We st . 
As mentioned before , the State Department shared the 
views expressed in this study except for " two relatively minor 
points , "  one of which was concerning the U . S . S . R . ' s  policy in 
the Far Eas t .  The other divergence was that the U . S .  
government did not support the j udgment of other (unnamed) 
NATO countries which interpreted the Soviet policy toward 
Germany as one offering considerable concessions in order to 
secure a neutralized united Germany. A preparatory State 
Department paper for the Lisbon conference remarked that this 
1 5 5  Ibid. 
1 5 6  Ibid. 
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was "an interpretation which we strongly oppos e . " 1 5 7  
Because o f  this perception o f  Soviet foreign po licy , 
Washington received the March 1 9 5 2  Stalin Note relatively 
well-prepared but not with eas e .  Dean Acheson immediately 
informed President Truman about the document. He wrote Truman 
who was in Key We st,  Florida , that at first glance the note 
had " the usual hooks in i t ,  though shrewdly disguised to 
appeal to the Germans and to impress ionable opinion 
everywhere . "  According to Acheson , the State Department "had 
been expecting some move of thi s sort as a last-ditch effort 
to prevent German integration with the west a long the lines 
worked out at Lisbon . "  However , he concluded , to turn it down 
out of hand would be i l l  advised. 1 5 8  
Acheson and his staff did not lose any time. As soon as 
the Soviet note had arrived i n  Washington, the State 
Department gathered information about the effect o f  the 
Kremlin proposal in the other Western countries--especially 
in West Germany--and started to work on a draft of a reply 
note . 
On March 1 2 ,  John Mccloy reported to the State Department 
about the initial reactions in West Germany which he described 
as levelheaded . Yet the U . S .  High Commissioner in the FRG 
1 5 7  . Ibid . , p .  2 8 0 ,  footnote 1 .  
l 5 8  Dean Ache son , Present at the Creation: My Years in 
the State Department ,  (New York: W . W .  Norton & Company , Inc . , 
1 9 6 9 ) ' p .  6 3 0 .  
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warned his superiors that the note might become dangerou s .  
Feeling strongly about their country ' s  unity , many Germans 
might seek to delay the negotiations on the FRG ' s  integration 
into We stern Europe. If the Western reply note would be 
entirely negative and prevent reunification, the Western talks 
might be seriously hampered. Mccloy suggested that the We stern 
reply was to lay major emphasis on free elections as a first 
step toward German unity. 1 59 
One day earlier, the U . S .  embassy in the United Kingdom 
in formed the State Department of Great Britain ' s  reaction to 
the Stalin Note . Ambassador Walter s .  Gifford pointed out that 
the Foreign Office be lieved it essentia l that the Western 
reply would be guided by the over-riding consideration of 
preventing any delay in the negotiations on the Contractual 
Agreements and the EDC treaty . 
The best the We stern Al lies could hope to accomplish was 
a reply which would satisfy the German public opinion yet be 
rej ected out of hand by the Kreml in. However , it would appear 
impossible to the Foreign Office to devise such a reply . The 
worst that could happen would be to get involved at this time 
in a face-to-face conference with the Russians "which they 
c [ ou ] ld string out indefinitely . " 1 6 0  
1 5 9  Steininger, p .  6 8 .  
1 6 0  The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gi fford) to the 
Department of State , London , March 1 1 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in: FRUS 1 9 5 2 -
1 9 5 4 ,  vol . v i i ,  p .  1 7 2 .  
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I n  addition, Gifford learned from the Foreign Office that 
the British government believed that the reply had to 
associate the Western powers at least as strongly as the 
Soviet government with the necessity for the unification o f  
Germany and a peace treaty with i t .  To that end , the Western 
note would have to concentrate on unification and free 
elections . 1 6 1  
On March 1 3  or 1 4 ,  Acheson was in formed about Eden ' s  
opinion that the Soviet note " i n  both tone and substance 
marked considerable advance upon previous proposal s . " The 
British Foreign Secretary even thought it po ssible that the 
Kremlin might permit free elections in both German states in 
order to prevent West Germany ' s  association with the West . The 
Soviets might have the intention of stall ing on the peace 
treaty after the free German government was establi shed , as 
they did in Austria. 1 6 2  
The U . S .  embassy in Moscow wired its observations on the 
Stalin Note to Washington on March 1 6 ,  1 9 5 2 .  The American 
charge d ' affairs in the Soviet Union, H .  Cumming , criticized 
Eden ' s  opinion. Keeping c lose to the attitude U . S .  diplomacy 
had shown during the preparation of the Lisbon Conference , he 
questioned "any line o f  reasoning which would involve their 
1 6 1  Ibid . , p .  1 7 2  f .  
1 6 2  The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom , Washington, March 1 4 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  
vii , p .  1 7 6  f .  
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[ i . e . the Kremlin leaders ' ]  relinquishment of at least a part , 
and for at least a time , of Sov [ iet] control o f  East 
Ger [many] • 11 1 6 3  
Cumming bel ieved that the Soviet Union ' s  control over the 
GDR was essential for the Soviet objectives in Europe. Henc e ,  
Moscow would not allow free e lections which would j eopardize 
the very fabric of this control . Moreover , according to the 
charg� , the Soviet policy traditionally had been "to hold on 
to what they got rather than to engage in trade . " 1 6 4 
For these reason s ,  Cumming characterized the Kremlin ' s  
proposals as a " propaganda move designed to bolster up current 
Sov [ iet) objectives o f  delaying or preventing Western 
rearmament and West Ger [many ' s) participation in i t . " The 
Soviets would hope to lead the U . S .  government " into fruitless 
fourpower negotiations as part [of)  their delaying tactics . "  
Similar to his col leagues in Bonn and London , Cumming advised 
Washington that the Western reply should emphasize free all-
German elections as a necessary first step on the way to 
reunification . 1 6 5  
On March 1 6 ,  Mccloy reported new reactions to the Soviet 
note in Bonn. They varied from interpreting Moscow ' s  offer as 
l63 The Charg� in the Soviet Union ( Cumming) to the 
Department of State , Moscow, March 1 6 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in:  FRUS 1 9 5 2 -
1 95 4 ,  v o l .  vii ,  p .  1 7 9 .  
1 6 4  Ibid . 
1 6 5  . Ibid . ,  p .  1 7 8  f .  
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policy o f  obstruction t o  viewing i t  as a constructive 
approach. Like Eden, he would not exclude that the Soviet 
proposal indicated an important change in the Kreml in ' s  
foreign policy . 1 6 6  
While information from the embas sies in Europe was still 
coming i n ,  the State Department worked on the Western note in 
reply to the Soviet proposal . On March 1 2 ,  Eden had suggested 
that the Western Al lies should decide on separated but 
parallel answers . 1 6 7  The next day , however ,  Acheson won the 
other two governments over for the plan o f  identical reply 
notes in order to prevent the Soviets from exploiting s l ight 
differences in formulation . 1 6 8  
The State Department sent a first draft t o  London on 
March 1 4 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  where the respective d i scussions among the 
representatives of the three Western powers were to take 
place. In this outline, the U . S .  government concentrated very 
much on its refusal to enter into four-power negotiations on 
a peace treaty with Germany before a representative a ll-German 
government could be establi shed . The Soviet Union should 
create conditions for free e lections in its zone and permit 
• 
a United Nations commission to supervise these . 
1 6 6  Steininger , p .  6 9 .  
1 6 7  The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the 
Department of State, London , March 1 2 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in:  FRUS 1 9 5 2 -
1 9 5 4 ,  vol. vii , p .  1 7 3 ,  footnote 5 .  
1 6 8  Graml , "Die Legende , "  p .  3 2 6 �  see a l so Acheson , 
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I n  addition , Wa shington intended to remind the Soviet 
government of " the seven fruitless years o f  discussion with 
Sov [ iet ] representatives about an Austrian treaty . "  It pointed 
out that " i t  would be an encouraging augury for future 
discussions about a German treaty i f  the Sov [ iet] Gov [ ernmenJ t 
were to respond favorably to the new proposals for an Au strian 
treaty contained in the note of the U . S .  Gov [ernmen] t of March 
1 3 . " 1 6 9  
Acheson explained t o  Gifford that the re ference t o  the 
Austrian treaty discussions was to be a "helpful reminder in 
Ger [many ] " and support West German politicians who thought the 
Soviet note was insincere. Acheson a l so pointed out that the 
State Department had considered including in its outline 
references to specific proposals that were made in the past 
by the Western Allies and to demand a favorable Soviet 
reaction to one of them. Yet ,  the State Department had dropped 
this idea because it might have tied the West "too closely to 
some outmoded proposal s . "  Instead , the note had been designed 
to give the three powers the flexibility to discuss the German 
question on the basis o f  these past proposals while leaving 
them free to move away i f  they wished. In order to secure a 
positive attitude in the West German public to the Western 
reply note , Acheson proposed to consult fully Adenauer and 
1 6 9  The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, Washington, March 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  
vii,  pp.  1 7 7 - 1 7 9 .  
Berlin mayor Reuter , 
reached . " 1 7 0  
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"when tripartite agreement [wa s ]  
Al though the Secretary of State had succeeded in 
convincing his British and French colleagues of the importance 
o f  identical notes , he failed to win them over for the 
American-proposed dra ft . There was no di sagreement about the 
essential issues the Western note should emphas ize , but both 
Eden and Schuman insisted on a more comprehensive reply than 
Acheson had outlined. 
On March 1 7 ,  Acheson sought to stay on course and sent 
instructions to the new U . S .  Ambassador James C .  Dunn in 
Pari s .  In his talks with Eden and Schuma n ,  Dunn was to push 
for the U . S .  line and avoid a llowing the Allied note to "get 
into questions about the status of a united German 
government • • •  [or] get into arguments about the Russian 
proposal for a treaty with Germany . "  Both these questions , 
according to Acheson , were "ca lculated to bring about a 
conference or discussions about a conference , both of which 
would s l ow up the two matters we are so anxious to hasten" 
( i . e .  the Contractual Agreements and the EDC treaty ) . 1 7 1  
1 7 0  The Secretary o f  State to the Embassy i n  the United 
Kingdom, Washington, March 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  
vii . p .  1 7 7  f .  
1 7 1  The Secretary o f  State to the Embassy in France, 
Washington, March 1 7 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in:  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  vii,  p .  
1 8 3  f .  
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Acheson repeated this warning in a letter t o  Schuman the 
next day , suggesting that the reply be centered on the points 
o f  We stern agreement in order to speed up the reaction to the 
Stalin Note. The di sputed matters were to be left to a later 
stage in the correspondence with the Soviets, if such a 
correspondence were to deve lop . 1 7 2 
In their conversations with U . S .  ambassador Dunn on March 
1 9 ,  1 9 5 2 , however , Eden and Schuman firmly insisted on 
including statements in the Allied note on the status o f  an 
interim German government, the freedom of the a l l-German 
government to j oin associations of states compatible with the 
U . N .  Charter , and the issues o f  German frontiers and German 
national forces . 1 73 
Dunn reported to Washington that these matters were of 
vital concern to the British and the French and that there was 
no hope "to gain acceptance of our point o f  view . "  The French 
and British foreign minister s ,  however , agreed to give 
absolute priority to free elections and acceptance o f  the U . N .  
commission i n  the reply not e .  The points they had raised were 
to be made subsidiary to the election problem. 1 7 4  
1 7 2  The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman, 
Washington, March 1 8 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in : FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  v i i ,  p .  
1 8 5 .  
1 7 3  The Charg� in France (Bonsal) to the Department of 
State , Paris , March 2 0 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in:  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vol . v i i ,  
p .  1 8 6 .  
1 7 4  Ibid. 
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On the fol lowing day , Dunn , Schuman and Eden agreed upon 
a draft reply . This text was sent to Washington for President 
Truman ' s  approval .  After a few minor changes ,  the Western note 
finally was presented to the Soviet foreign ministry on March 
2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 .  
The Allied document demanded free elections in all parts 
of Germany ( " the Federal Republic , the Soviet zone o f  
occupation and Berl in" ) and the admission o f  the U . N .  
commis sion into the Soviet zone . These were the We stern 
preconditions for the creation of an a l l-German government and 
negotiations on a peace treaty with i t .  In respect to the 
Soviet proposal to neutra lize a united Germany , the Western 
governments held that "the a l l-German Government should be 
free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty 
to enter into associations compatible with the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations . " 1 75 
The March 2 5  note also emphasized that--contrary to 
Moscow ' s  claim--no definitive German frontiers had been laid 
down by the Potsdam Conferenc e ,  but that the final 
determination of territorial questions had to await the peace 
settlement .  The document rej ected the Soviet offer of German 
national forces arguing that combined with the Soviet-proposed 
neutrality of Germany thi s would be " a  step backwards and 
1 7  5 "Note From the United States to the Soviet Union 
Proposing Creation of a Freely-Elected All-German Government 
Prior to Negotiation o f  a Peace Treaty, March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  
Documents On Germany, p .  3 6 4  f .  
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might j eopardize the emergence in Europe o f  a new era in which 
international relations would be based on cooperation and not 
on rivalry and distrust . "  The western Allies underlined their 
commitment to integrate Germany into " a  purely defensive 
European community which wi l l  preserve freedom , prevent 
aggress ion , and preclude the revival of militarism. " 1 76 
On March 2 5 ,  the acting U . S .  ambassador in Moscow Cumming 
presented the American note to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey 
Y .  Vyshins ky . After Cumming had orally summarized the 
document, Vyshinsky made a few preliminary comments on its 
central point s .  
The Soviet Foreign Minister indicated that Moscow ' s  
negative attitude toward the U .  N .  commission would not be 
changed . By stressing his government ' s  view that the 
participation of countries in blocs like the NATO was not 
compatible with the U .  N .  Charter , he signaled that Moscow 
would not perrni t a united Germany to j oin the Western mi l itary 
a lliance . As to the frontier question , Vyshinsky remarked that 
it seemed to him that the Potsdam Conference had finally 
defined the Polish and German borders . According to the Soviet 
Foreign Mini ster one should not "confuse final decisions with 
putting seals on the document . "  In addition, he underlined the 
Kremlin ' s  position that Germany should have national armed 
forces for its defense similar to the ones Japan , Italy , 
1 7 6  Ibid . 
9 2  
Bulgaria and Finland had . 1 7 7  
Partly o n  the basis o f  Cumming ' s  cable about his 
conversation with Vyshinsky , the State Department ,  in late 
March , tried to anticipate the next Soviet move. I t  assumed 
that the Kremlin would rej ect the points made in the Western 
note by a detailed argumentation against them, ending , 
however , with a renewed demand for an early meeting. 1 7 8 
The State Department foresaw that Moscow would reject the 
U . N .  Commission and considered it likely that the Soviets 
would counter with the proposal to hol d  free a l l -German 
elections under four-power supervision or even under control 
by the Germans themselve s .  In additio n ,  the analysts on 
Acheson ' s  staff believed that the Soviet government would 
claim the Western position of free elections ( a s  a 
precondition for negotiations) to be a delaying tactic. 1 7 9  
However ,  they felt that the Kremlin would probably not 
dwel l  on its stand on the Poli sh-German border question 
"because o f  [ the ] necessity [of a] tight rope act between 
Pol [ ish] and Ger [man] opinion . "  Also , the Soviets were 
expected to "react strongly" to the Western position that a 
1 7 7  The Charge in the soviet Union ( Cumming) to the 
Department of State . Moscow , March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  in:  FRUS 1 9 5 2 -
1 9 5 4 ,  vol . vi i ,  p .  1 9 1  f .  
1 7 8  The Secretary o f  State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, Washington, March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 95 4 ,  vo l .  
vi i ,  p .  1 9 2  f .  
1 7 9  Ibid . 
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united Germany had t o  be free to enter into association with 
other countries and to the Western commitment to include it 
into a " defensive Eur [opean] cornrnunity . " 1 8 0  
On Apri l  1 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  a number of State Department officials 
came together for a discussion of the political situation 
regarding the Soviet initiative . It is remarkable how 
seriously the State Department now took the Soviet initiative . 
It seemed to be the first time the U . S .  administration 
realized the possibility that the Stalin Note was a sincere 
offer , i . e . , that the U . S . S . R .  might be ready to liquidate 
" the entire East German investment" in exchange for German 
neutra lity . How confused the officials at the State Department 
were about this thought was indicated by the fact that this 
April 1 meeting started out on the question "whether we really 
want German unification . " 1 8 1  
Paul Ni tz e ,  Director o f  the Policy Planning Sta f f ,  
stressed that the United States had put itse l f  o n  record in 
favor of free elections leading to a unified Germany and that 
the U . S .  government would be unable to withdraw from this 
position . Nitze was in agreement with Charles E. Bohlen , a 
member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council , 
that the preferred solution of the German situation would be 
1 8 0  Ibid . 
1 8 1  Memorandum by Louis Pollak o f  the Office of the 
Ambassador at Large to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup} , 
Washington , April 2 ,  1 9 5 2 , i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2- 1 9 5 4 , vol . vii , p .  
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a unified Germany within the European Defense Community . 
Jeffrey w. Lewis , Deputy Director of the Bureau of German 
Affa i r s ,  considered such a settlement of the German question 
desirable , but not feasibl e .  Hence , he thought it "better to 
have western Germany in the EDC than to gamble on a unified 
Germany which would be free to stay out of or to quit the 
EDC . "  This was also the opinion o f  the majority of h i s  
as sembled col leagues . Louis H .  Pollak , Legal Advisor i n  the 
Office of the Ambassador at Large, noticed in his memorandum 
at this point , the "di scussion of the abstract desirabil ity 
of German unification produced less rather than more 
conviction that a unified Germany was a des irable goal . " 1 8 2  
As to the reasons for this negative attitude toward 
German unity the assembled experts stressed the danger o f  
German domination of the European continent o r  a possible 
German rapprochement with the Soviet Union . Paul Nitze was the 
single person during this discussion who favored what he 
called a more "aggressive" approach to the German problem . 
According to him, the United States should support the 
unification of Germany as thi s would tend to accelerate the 
unification of Europe as a whole . 1 8 3  
I n  respect t o  the future tactics regarding Germany , the 
group agreed to go "ahead on integration . "  I f  the Soviet Union 
1 8 2  Ibid . , p .  1 9 5 .  
1 8 3  Ibid . 
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would be genuinely prepared to permit free e l ections and the 
consequent establi shment of a unified Germany , Washington 
would be ready "to let the ultimate a l l-German government 
decide whether it wishes to continue its adherence to the 
integration program . "  1 84 This meant the State Department would 
not accept the Soviet demand for a neutra liz ation o f  Germany 
but leave this decision to a freely elected--most likely 
Western-oriented--government . 
The State Department officials decided that talks with 
the U . S . S . R .  about Germany should generally be avoided. I f  
the Western powers were unable to escape negotiations , then 
they should take place " on as low a level a s  possibl e . " A 
meeting of the Deputy High Commissioners was considered in 
this context . 1 8 5  
In addition, the foreign policy experts agreed that the 
United States should intensify its propaganda in Germany. 
Washington was to point out to the Germans that further 
progress on integration was the key to further Soviet 
concess ions which would make unity a reality. Thus the idea 
was to be emphasized that integration was in no way 
incompatible with German unification. 1 8 6  
1 8 4  . Ibid . ,  p .  1 9 7 .  
1 8 5  Ibid . 
1 8 6  . Ibid . ,  p .  1 9 8 .  
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The conclusion that thi s scheme really was nothing but 
a propaganda maneuver to secure West German loyalty was 
underlined by the fact that even the State Department 
officials themselves did not be lieve in i t ,  and hence doubted 
the Germans would. The Pollak memorandum notes at this point , 
that " [Deputy Director o f  the Policy Planning Staff John H . ] 
Ferguson thinks it i s  very d i f ficult for us to make effective 
propaganda on the basis of a position about which we are not 
ourselves convinced . " 1 8 7  
The April 1 meeting at the State Department also revealed 
how narrow the political margin for the West German government 
was between the goals o f  integration and reunification. One 
participant pointed out that i f  the west Germans would stop 
supporting the EDC and the Contractual Agreements simply 
because the Western powers had exploratory talks with the 
Soviet Union, then the United States was bui lding " the German 
integration on shifting sands • • •  " 1 8 8  In other word s ,  a West 
German Schaukelpolitik [ see-saw policy] between integration 
and reunification would have destroyed the trust which the 
U . S .  government had put into Adenauer . I t  would j eopardized 
the basis for further cooperation. 
Little more than a week after this discussion o f  the 
s ituation at the State Department, the Soviet Union reacted 
1 8 7  Ibid. 
1 8 8  Ibid.  
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to the Western note o f  March 2 5  by sending a new document to 
the Allied government s .  With one major exception, the text of 
this new Russian note corresponded very much to the l ine 
sketched by Vyshinsky and to the move the State Department 
anticipated . 
As expected , the Kremlin rej ected the U . N .  commi ssion for 
the supervis ion of free all-German election s .  It did so on the 
ground that the U . N .  control was in contradiction with the 
U . N .  Charte r .  Instead , Moscow proposed that such a commission 
should be formed by the four powers . Furthermore , the Kremlin 
leaders insi sted on their previous positions regarding the 
neutrality o f  united Germany , its national armed forces and 
its frontiers . 1 8 9  
The sole substantial change--compared t o  the Soviet March 
1 0  note--was that now the Kremlin offered to talk about "the 
question of conducting free a l l-German elections . "  1 9 0  This was 
a remarkable step because none o f  the Eastern reunification 
initiatives since 1 9 4 9  had signaled Soviet acceptance of free 
elections . 
Like the March 1 0  note thi s Soviet document was moderate 
in tone (except for the accusation that the Western powers 
would " create in West Germany hireling troops of revanchistes 
1 8 9  "Note from the Soviet Union to the United States 
Proposing Four-Power Rather Than United Nations Investigation 
o f  Conditions for Free All-German Election s ,  April 9 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  
i n :  Documents On Germany ,  pp . 3 6 5 -3 6 7 .  
1 9 0  Ibid . , p .  3 6 6 .  
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headed by Fascist-Hitlerite generals ready to engulf Europe 
in a third world war" ) .  Even the passages blaming the United 
State s ,  Great Britain and France for delaying four-power talks 
and the Soviet insi stence on the Oder-Neisse line were 
formulated guardedly . 1 9 1  
Neither the moderate tone o f  the note nor the Soviet 
preparedness to talk about free a l l-German elections convinced 
the Western governments that the U . S .  S .  R. was seriously 
interested in the settlement o f  the German question. To them, 
Moscow had not even s l ightly adapted its position to the 
Western counter proposals of March 2 5 ,  but merely repeated its 
earlier attitude. The three powers quickly concurred that the 
Soviets did not intend to advance toward any possible 
agreement with the West but for the time being were satisfied 
with a reiterative exchange of note s .  From thi s they followed 
that the Soviet Union did not plan to relinquish its control 
over East Germany . 1 9 2  
The State Department felt that all speculations about 
possible Soviet concessions were dispersed by the Kremlin ' s  
Apr i l  note . That was why the U . S .  government now pushed for 
a hasty signing of the EDC treaty and the Contractual 
Agreement s .  In a letter to Eden, Acheson urged his British 
col league to keep to May 9 ,  1 9 5 2  as the date of the signing 
1 9 1  . Ibid . , pp . 3 6 5 - 3 6 7 .  
1 9 2  Gram! , "Die Legende , "  p .  3 3 1  f .  
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in order to secure the rati fication by the U . S .  Senate prior 
to the upcoming congressional election s . 1 9 3  
On Apr i l  1 6 ,  the State Department prepared a strategy 
paper on how to deal with the new Soviet note in American 
propaganda .  According to this memorandum, Washington was to 
enl ighten the Germans regarding the dangers o f  what the 
Soviets cal led a neutral Germany. Either the Soviet zone o f  
occupation would remain under Moscow ' s  military control--where 
there would be neither independence , nor liberty nor 
neutrality for Gerrnany--or a l l  foreign troops would be 
evacuated from German territory , thus creating a mi litary 
vacuum from which the U . S . S . R .  could profit because o f  its 
proximity . 
Since under the given c ircumstances neutrality was too 
dangerous for the Germans , they were to be advised to j oin the 
We st , for this association would provide national integrity 
and security for Germany . The integration with Western Europe 
would be compatible with the objective o f  achieving Germany ' s  
unity under acceptable circumstances such as liberty , strength 
and security . It was the State Department ' s  aim to prevent 
the Germans from getting the impression that they had to 
choose between integration or reunification. 1 9 4  
1 9 3  Steininger , p .  7 5 .  
1 9 4  Steininger , p .  8 2 .  
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By the end of April of 1 9 5 2 , the U . S .  government was no 
longer convinced that propaganda alone was sufficient to 
secure a German public opinion favorable to Western 
integration . The Adenauer government was under increased 
attack by the opposition which called for a four-power 
conference on the German question . Washington also expected 
that the Soviet Union would increase its diplomatic efforts 
when the Western treaties were signed, after which they would 
have to be submitted for rati fication to the respective 
parliaments .  Henc e ,  the State Department decided to take over 
the initiative from the Russians and to propose a meeting of 
the four High Commis sioners for Germany or the Deputy High 
Commi ssioner s .  
Acheson thought i t  necessary to d i scover the true 
intentions o f  the Kremlin regarding such a meeting , i . e .  to 
find out whether the Soviets wanted a deal with the West or 
whether their diplomatic efforts were but obstruction 
maneuver s .  I n  a telegram to Mccloy , Acheson stated that "many 
Germans tend to feel we are forcing Germany down [the] path 
of our choos i ng . "  He continued , 
• 
Since talks of some sort are probably 
necessary, it is therefore des irable to 
take the initiative in proposing them in 
order to convince [the] Germans we mean 
business and are not afraid to talk , and 
to control leve l ,  substance and timing of 
talks.  [The State] Department has come 
increasingly to [the] conclusion in this 
regard that we have much to gain and 
nothing to lose by making specific 
proposal in this reply for talks • • •  I f  
[ the] Soviets are really prepared to open 
1 0 1  
[the] Eastern Zone , we should force their 
hand. We can not al low our plans to be 
thwarted merely by [the] speculation that 
[t�e ]  !�siets may be ready to pay a high 
price. 
Regarding the ratification process of the western 
treaties it was Acheson ' s  aim "to expose Soviet insincerity 
at [the] earliest possible date and in any event before 
legislation debates are concluded . " l96 
When the Secretary o f  State had submitted his proposal 
to London and Pari s ,  the initial reaction of Eden and Schuman 
was positive . Two days late r ,  however , before the State 
Department learned about Adenauer ' s  attitude toward this idea , 
the U . S .  proposal was dropped because the French and the 
British then opposed i t .  
Thus , the Allied note of May 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  t o  a large extent 
reiterated the Western position on free elections , freedom o f  
choice for a n  al l-German government, the territorial 
provisions of the Potsdam Protocol and the issue of German 
national forces. In respect to the Soviet al legation of 
delaying negotiations, Washington , London and Paris pointed 
out that it was their obj ective "to avoid the fruitless 
negotiations of the past . "  For that purpose it would be 
necessary to " first reach a clear understanding upon the scope 
1 9 5  The Secretary o f  State to the United States High 
Commi ssioner for Germany (Mccloy ) , April 3 0 ,  1 9 5 2 , in:  Moscow 
Mission Fi les , box 1 3 8 9 ,  quoted after Graml "Die Legende , "  p .  
3 3 3  f .  
1 9 6  Ibid . 
1 0 2  
o f  the negotiations and upon the fundamental problems to be 
examined . "  Proper preparations would be "essential to success 
and to avoid long delays . " 1 9 7  
The Allies did not accept the Soviet plan that a 
commission o f  representatives of the four powers should 
supervise the elections . They doubted that such a body would 
be able to reach "useful decisions . " 1 9 8  
A l  though the three powers rej ected the Kremlin ' s  position 
that the proposed U . N .  co�ission was incompatible with the 
U . N .  Charter ,  they agreed 
to consider any other practical and 
precise proposal for an impartial 
c ommi ssion o f  investigation which the 
Soviet Government may wish to put forward , 
on the one condition that they are likely 
to promote the early holdi1]_�
9 
of free 
e lections throughout Germany . 
After the report of such a commiss ion would be available , 
the Western powers were to meet with the Soviet Union in order 
to accord on the early holding o f  free elections throughout 
Germany " including the creation where necessary o f  the 
appropriate condition s . " At the end o f  their May 1 3  note , 
Washington, Paris and London repeated their demand that the 
all-German government ,  formed as the result o f  these free 
1 9  7 "Note From the United States to the Soviet Union 
Reasserting the Authority of the United Nations To Investigate 
Conditions for Free All-German Election s ,  May 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  in:  
Documents On Germany, pp . 3 6 8-3 7 1 .  
1 9 8  . Ibid . ,  p .  3 7 0 . 
1 9 9  . Ibid . , p .  3 7 1 .  
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elections , must have the " necessary freedom of action during 
the period before the peace treaty comes into effect . " 2 0 0  
This demand was to prevent the Kremlin from blocking the 
integration process by agreeing to free elections . Once more , 
the Allies made it clear to the Soviet Union that the only way 
for it to make German unity a reality was to relinquish its 
control over Germany in exchange for practically nothing. 
By accepting the Allied terms and permitting free 
election s ,  the only ( s light) chance for the Kremlin to prevent 
west Germany ' s  integration with the west would have been to 
gamble on an SPD victory at the pol l s .  Such a victory might 
have brought upon an a l l-German parliament and government 
opposed to the Western treaties . 
From the Soviet perspective , however , the risk involved 
in such a move would have been tremendou s :  i f  Adenauer ' s  
Christian Democratic Party (CDU) would have defeated the SPD 
at the pol l s ,  the Kremlin would have had to face the 
association of the entirety o f  Germany with the Western bloc . 
The Soviet government decided not to gambl e .  Its third 
note , which was presented to the Allies on May 2 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , 
indicated that Moscow had given up on trying to arrange a 
four-power conference.  About three-fourths o f  the text 
consisted of propaganda-like accusations directed against the 
western governments. The Soviet Union claimed that by 
2 0 0  Ibid. 
1 0 4  
introducing i n  their note of May 1 3  " a  whole new series o f  
questions for prolongation o f  the exchange o f  notes" 
Washington, Paris and London were "continuing to delay the 
conclusion o f  a treaty of peace with Germany , a decision on 
the question of unification, and also the establi shment of an 
a l l-German Governrnent . " 2 0 1  
I n  addition , the Kremlin a l leged that by means o f  a 
European community and the EDC , the United State s ,  France and 
Great Britain sought "not only to legalize the 
remi litarization of West Germany • • •  but also to include West 
Germany in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc . n 2 02 By re-
establishing the German army "headed by Hitlerite general s "  
the three powers would "open the way t o  the re-establi shment 
of aggressive West German militarism . " 2 0 3  
More pro forma than with real intention, Moscow renewed 
its call for direct negotiations with the Allies.  The Soviets 
made no further ,  clarifying statement on free all -German 
elections . Instead they pointed out that an a ll-German 
government had to be guided by the Potsdam provisions , a point 
which could be interpreted as a Soviet demand to return to 
2 0 1  "Note From the Soviet Union to the United States 
Proposing Simultaneous Four-Power Discussion of a German Peace 
Treaty , German Reunification , and Formation of an All-German 
Government ,  May 2 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany, pp. 374-
3 7 8 . 
2 0 2  Ibid . ,  p .  3 7 7 .  
2 0 3  Ibid . 
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four-power control of Germany until a peace treaty was signed . 
The Kremlin a l so underlined its insi stence on the Oder-Ne isse 
line as the final Eastern frontier of Germany . 2 0 4  
Western diplomats viewed the Soviet note as a " feeble 
e ffort" which had been s loppily formulated by subordinate 
official s .  Mccloy also drew three more differentiated 
conclusions from the Soviet May 2 4  note: one , that the Soviets 
had decided to intensify their control over the GDR and to 
turn it c ompletely into a satellite state; two, that the 
Kremlin was anxiou s ,  however , not to make four-power talks 
absolutely impossible in the future; three , that the latest 
Soviet note was more than propaganda ,  since Moscow had wanted 
to demonstrate its commitment to a settlement o f  the German 
question. In their reply note , the western governments should 
therefore prevent the impression that they did not want 
negotiations and emphasize that it was the Western side which 
was committed to German unity . 2 0 5  
On May 2 9 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  Acheson , Eden and Schuman conferred in 
Pari s on how to react to the latest Soviet missive. Acheson 
proposed to formulate the reply note in such a way as to bring 
• 
an end to the fruitless exchange of notes .  His British and 
French colleagues expressed no disagreement to such a step, 
and , on June 4 ,  the State Department presented a draft 
2 0 4  Ibid . ,  p .  3 7 8 .  
2 0 5  Steininger, p .  9 6 .  
1 0 6  
reply . 2 0 6  
Hence, Washington was quite surprised t o  learn that the 
French foreign ministry on June 8 suggested inviting the 
u .  S . S .  R .  to a four-power conference first on the level of 
ambassadors , and later , o f  the foreign minister s .  In such a 
conference ,  the French government wanted to discuss the 
reunification of Germany , and a peace treaty with it as we l l  
as the status of a n  a ll-German government . France wanted 
Moscow to agree that such a government would have freedom o f  
choice unti l a peace treaty was signed . 2 0 7  Free elections were 
only to play a subordinate role in the talk s .  Thus this French 
proposal came very close to the Soviet procedure as presented 
on March 1 0 . 2 0 8  
According to the U . S .  ambassador i n  Par i s ,  the French 
government undertook this move because--fearing west German 
rearmament--they wanted to achieve an understanding with the 
Soviets.  Also , Schuman was convinced that the Western side had 
gained strength from the recent signing o f  the western 
treaties in May. In addition he thought , a failure o f  four­
power talks would ease the rati fication of these treaties in 
the French parliament . 2 0 9  
2 0 6  Graml , "Die Legende , " p .  3 3 5 .  
2 0 7  Steininge r ,  p .  9 7 .  
2 0 8  Graml "Die Legende , " p .  3 3 6 .  
2 0 9  Ibid . ;  see also Steininger, p .  9 7 .  
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Dean Acheson had little sympathy for the French 
init iative which was supported by the British. He ins tructed 
the U . S .  ambassadors in London and Paris to in form Eden and 
Schuman about his di sapprova l :  
I have been frankly astonished to receive 
word that Mr.  Schuman and Mr . Eden are 
now proposing that we should reverse the 
line upon which we reached agreement in 
our consultations in Paris two weeks ago 
and that we should now propose an 
immediate meeting with the Soviet s .  We 
discussed this question fully at Paris 
among ourselves and we reached a decision 
which stiif seems to me to be the right 
decision. O 
Acheson directed the ambassador to Great Britain to tell 
Eden that he was "baffled that this sudden reversal of [the] 
UK position on [a] matter o f  maj or sign i ficance has occurred 
without a word o f  explanation to me . "  He urged Eden to go 
ahead along the lines o f  the agreement reached at Paris and 
warned that the western powers should not show " any sign o f  
wavering . 11 2 1 1  
After weeks o f  intense discussions among the Allies 
during which Acheson had asked Adenauer for his support o f  the 
State Department ' s  position, the three governments settled the 
dif ferences .in a compromise . At the end o f  June , the Secretary 
o f  State had several meetings with Eden and Schuman in London 
2 1 0  The Secretary o f  State to the U . S .  embassies in 
London and Pari s ,  in Moscow Mission Files , box 1 3 8 9 ,  quoted 
after Gram! "Die Legende , "  p .  3 3 7 .  
2 l l  Ibid . 
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and finally agreed upon the French proposal i n  a modified 
form. 2 1 2  
Thus in their note o f  July 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  the Western Al l ies 
offered Moscow a four-power conference provided the u . s . s . R . 
accepted the Western demand for free all-German elections and 
agreed to the participation of a free German government in the 
negotiation of a peace treaty . The conference was to deal with 
the composition , function s ,  and authority of the commi ss ion 
which should determine whether the conditions necessary for 
free elections existed . The second point on the agenda o f  
four-power talks would be " the program for the formation o f  
an a l l-German Government • • •  " 2 1 3  
As to free elections and the freedom o f  action of an all-
German government the Western powers upheld their positions 
as stated in their May 1 3  note. They explicitly rej ected the 
Soviet May 2 4  demand that the al l-German government had to be 
guided by the Potsdam dec isions : 
This would mean the reestabli shment o f  
the quadripartite system of control which 
was originally designed to cover only "the 
initial control period . "  An arrangement 
o f  this kind would revive a system o f  
control which proved t o  b e  impracticable 
and would, moreover ,  ignore the whole 
evolution of events in Germany in recent 
year s .  A German Government subjected to 
2 1 2  . Ibid . , pp . 3 3 7 - 3 3 9 .  
2 1 3  "Note from the United States to the Soviet Union 
Reasserting the Need To Investigate Conditions for Holding 
Free A l l-German Elections As a First Step Toward German 
Reun ification, July 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany ,  p .  
3 8 7 .  
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such control would i n  practice enjoy no 
freedom in its relations with the four 
Powers and would not be in a position to 
participate freely with the four above­
mentioned Governme�I� in the negotiation o f  a peace treaty. 
The Western initiative for a four-power conference did 
not impress Moscow . In its fourth and final note on that 
matter , the Soviet government on August 2 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  rej ected the 
agenda for such talks as proposed by the Western Allies as too 
limited. Returning to its old line , the Kremlin repeated its 
call for a conference on which the four powers were first to 
negotiate on the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany 
and the formation of an a l l-German government before they were 
to turn to the issue of free elections. 2 1 5  
By late August, Moscow had also changed its attitude 
toward an international commission investigating in the 
preconditions for free e lection s .  I t  now called any 
international inspection in Germany "an insult to the German 
nation . "  Such a proposal ,  the Soviet authors of the note 
stated, could be brought forward only by those who would 
forget that Germany , in the course o f  more than 1 0 0  years , had 
lived under conditions of a parliamentary regime with general 
elections and organized political parties and that, therefore , 
2 1 4  . Ibid . , p .  3 8 6 .  
2 1 5  "Note From the Soviet Union to the United States 
Proposing a Four-Power Meeting To Discuss a Germany Peace 
Treaty , Formation o f  an A l l-German Government ,  and the Holding 
of Al l-German Election s ,  August 2 3 ,  1 9 5 2 , "  i n :  Documents On 
Germany, p .  3 9 3 .  
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it would be impossible to put before Germany such requirements 
which ordinarily were "put before backward countries . " 2 1 6  
Instead of an international inspection o f  the 
preconditions for free elections , the Soviet note proposed a 
commission " composed of Germans representing • • •  the People ' s  
Chamber of the GDR and the Bundestag of We stern Germany . " 2 1 7  
With this r enewed Deutsche an einen Tisch plan the Kremlin 
returned to its attitude of 1 9 5 1 . 2 1 8  
The Allies replied to the Soviet August note on September 
2 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  once more rej ecting the Soviet a l legations and 
repeating their proposal s . 2 1 9  With thi s last rej ection of 
Moscow ' s  scheme for a conference the diplomatic correspondence 
on that matter petered out for the remainder of 1 9 5 2 . 
The United States '  policy toward German reunification in 
1 9 5 2  was dominated by the American interest in the creation 
of the EDC and West Germany ' s  participation in it . German 
unity was only desirable for Washington i f  an a l l-German 
government would be permitted to j o in the Western bloc . The 
U . S .  government opposed the plan of a united and neutra lized 
• 
2 1 6  . Ibid. , p .  3 9 2 • 
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2 1 9  "Note From the United States to the Soviet Union 
Urging 'a S ingle-Minded Effort • • •  To Corne to Grips With the 
Problem of Free Elections in Germany , ' September 2 3 ,  1 9 5 2 "  in : 
Documents On German,  pp. 3 9 5 - 3 9 7 .  
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Germany for i t  saw "no advantages in replacing a tolerable and 
stable status quo in Europe with the uncertainties and 
ambiguities that would have fol lowed if Moscow ' s  proposals had 
been implemented . " 2 2 0  
The State Department first considered the Stalin Note a 
mere propaganda maneuver .  By late March and early April 1 9 5 2 ,  
State Department officials for the first time took the 
possibility into account that the Soviet Union was prepared 
to relinquish its control over East Germany in exchange for 
Germany ' s  abstinence from the EDC .  
Yet ,  i t  remained the objective (with one brief exception) 
of Washington not to enter into negotiations over the Soviet 
proposa l .  The United States pursued this negative policy for 
two reason s :  one ,  recent experience with Soviet tactics o f  
negotiations indicated that the Kremlin might offer 
negotiations merely for the purpose of paralyzing the Western 
defense efforts; two , the U . S .  government was not interested 
in the deal proposed by the Soviet s .  The U . S .  admini stration 
was prepared to start talks with the u . s . s . R . only in order 
to display the insincerity of the Russian offer (and this only 
for a brief time in late April and early May) or to arrange 
the deta ils for Germany ' s  reunification on western terms . 
The Western proposals for the reunification o f  Germany 
were not acceptable to the Soviet Union , and , as an 
2 2 0  Hanrieder , "The Foreign Policies of the Federal 
Republic of Germany , 1 9 4 9-1 9 8 9 , "  p .  3 1 8 .  
1 1 2  
examination o f  the documents proves ,  Washington knew thi s .  The 
Allied side demanded the Soviet surrender of East Germany 
"without even touching the question of compensation" for the 
2 2 1  u . s . s . R . Had German unity been a priority for the U . S .  
government, Washington would have had to be prepared to make 
conces sions on the question of the future status of Germany . 
The United States was ready to let an all-German 
government decide whether it wished to continue its adherence 
to the integration program. This constituted the single 
concession American foreign policy was willing to offer to the 
Soviet Union .• As discussed , the possibility existed that the 
Social Democrats would win a ll-German e lections . A SPD 
government could then refuse Germany ' s  association with the 
west as outlined in the EDC treaty and the Contractual 
Agreement s .  
Yet, since this Western concession involved the risk for 
the Soviet Union to lose the entirety o f  Germany to the 
Western bloc {namely in case o f  a CDU victory in free a l l-
German elections ) ,  the Kremlin did not accept this "gambling , "  
or--as Dean Acheson put it--" it was plain from the first 
response that Moscow was not prepared to wager high stakes in 
order to stop the Lisbon program . " 2 2 2  
2 2 1  Be s son, p .  1 1 8 .  
2 2 2  Acheson, Present at the Creation, p .  6 3 1 .  
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2 .  Reactions t o  the Sta lin Note by the American Press 
The American print media took the Stalin Note quite 
seriously .  Most articles laid major emphas i s  on the possible 
dangers rather than on the potential opportunities in store 
with the March proposal . The common line among reports then 
was that the Soviet Union intended to block the creation o f  
a West European a l liance system. 
In the Christian Science Monitor o f  March 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 , 
Joseph c .  Harsch v iewed the note as a plan to prevent the 
military integration of West Germany with the Western 
a lliance . The Soviet document would propose four things which 
would undoubtedly appeal to any German: consultation about the 
terms of a peace treaty , reun i fication , national armed forces , 
and a national arms industry. Harsch concluded , 
thi s i s  Rapa l lo a l l  over again--a Russian 
of fer to Germany of apparently far better 
peace terms that the West ever had been 
prepared to offer. This i s  the great 
Soviet bid to seff.fate Germany from a 
western a l l iance.  
In a comment for the New York Times on March 1 5 ,  Anne 
O ' Hare McCormick took the Stalin Note as "the first sequel to 
the Lisbon decisions to tighten up the Atlantic defense 
system . " With its proposal to unify and rearm Germany , Moscow 
had played its " trump card . "  This meant that the Soviet Union 
2 2 3  Christian Science Monitor , March 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p. 1 .  
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was convinced that NATO was not "merely a paper plan or a 
shadow army " but represented " a  real and growing will to 
resist aggression . "  To McCormick the note ' s  text did not 
constitute the most important feature of Moscow ' s  move for "no 
one imagines that they mean what they say . "  The important 
message was that with their note, the Soviets had signaled 
that NATO was becoming " a  ponderable factor in power 
balance . " 2 2 4  
Time magazine concluded that the Soviet March note " l ike 
so many diplomatic notes these days • • •  was des igned to ruffle 
and embarras s the countries it was submitted to . "  The document 
"had been artfully cons tructed to attract the onlooking 
German s . "  Yet, according to Time , the proposal to rearm not 
only 50 mil lion West Germans but 70 million East and West 
Germans was " a  propaganda godsend in France . "  The French, who 
were fearful of any German military, had therefore condemned 
Russ ia ' s  reversal of its former hostility to German rearmament 
as "another Hitler-Stalin pact . "  Western diplomats hoped , so 
reported Time , that this Soviet move would make the Frenchmen 
more wi l ling to accept " carefully controlled West German 
rearmament within NATO ' s  European Arrny . " 2 2 5  
This analysis contrasted with Newswee k ' s  j udgment which 
foresaw that the prospect o f  a four-power agreement "might 
2 2 4  New York Time s ,  March 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  1 2 .  
2 2 5  Time , March 2 4 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  3 7 .  
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dampen what little enthusiasm the French now have for 
rearmament and fortify such anti-rearmament factions in other 
countries as Britain ' s  Bevanites . " 2 2 6  
Newsweek characterized the note as "the latest in a long 
series o f  [Moscow ' s ] German unity proposals that began on a 
December a fternoon in 1 9 5 0  when a secret courier from the 
Soviet zone arrived in Bonn with a sugge stion for all-German 
talk s . "  Each had offered " a  s lightly more tempting deal than 
the last . • •  " Newsweek a lso reported that the Kremlin was 
"genuinely anxious to negotiate to achieve by conference what 
it [had] failed to achieve by threat . "  The chief objectives 
of the Soviets would be to prevent European and German 
rearmament and to forestall a Franco-German entente. 2 2 7  
Referring to the East-West talks for an armistice i n  
Korea , Time warned the three powers o n  March 3 1 ,  not t o  accept 
negotiations with the U . S . S . R . : 
I f  it hadn ' t  learned before , the U . S .  had 
learned at Panmunj om the folly o f  trying 
to sit friendly-like around a table with 
the Russian s ,  as i f  little dif ferences in 
wording are only a matter o f  semantics 
and easily stra ightened out .  Many 
European s ,  hungry for easy solutions , 
seeme�
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unwil ling to acknowledge this 
fac t .  
2 2 6  Newsweek , March 2 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , p .  5 6 .  
2 2 7  Newsweek , March 3 1 ,  1 9 5 2 , pp . 4 1 - 4 2 .  
2 2 8  Time , March 3 1 ,  1 9 5 2 , p .  2 9 .  
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Later in July , Hanson W .  Baldwin o f  the New York Times 
went one step further , arguing that already the diplomatic 
correspondence between the Soviet Union and the West, " though 
politically and psychologically necessary , "  would inevitably 
act as deterrent to the building of e ffective military 
strength in Western Europe . Baldwin held that the west ' s  
agreement to a four-power meeting on a limited agenda as 
proposed in the Allies ' July note represented " from the 
military point of view another obstacle in the Fabian campaign 
of delay the Soviet Union had been waging . " 2 2 9  
I n  addition t o  condemning the Soviet March note a s  " a  
lethal delayed-action bomb" 2 3 0  and respective warnings not to 
agree to a four-power conferenc e ,  the examined articles 
unanimously rej ected the idea of Germany ' s  reunification on 
Moscow ' s  term s .  Harsch wrote for the Christian Science Monitor 
that the result would be at best a neutral Germany. The 
Western all iance would have to be rebuild "on the original and 
much narrower base of France and the Low Countries . "  
Washington therefore could not accept such a concept "without 
abandoning a l l  of the purposes evolved since the Korean war 
began in respect to European policy . " 2 3 1  
2 29 New York Time s ,  July 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 , p .  4 .  
2 3 0  Newsweek , March 3 1 ,  1 95 2 , p .  4 1 .  
2 3 1  Christian Science Monitor , March 1 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  1 .  
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On March 2 4 ,  the New York Times stated that the Soviets 
sought to perpetuate the divis ion , and therewith the 
rivalrie s ,  of Europe ' s  national states by separating Germany 
from the West and re-establishing it as a divisive force . At 
bes t ,  this would merely set the clock back to the days o f  
inter-European power politics , and at worst it would leave a 
divided Europe open to Soviet penetration and conquest. As the 
New York Times reported, even the Soviet satellites would 
begin to shy away from some of the implications of the Soviet 
proposa l ,  and the Western powers could not possibly agree to 
it "without setting down conditions to sa feguard their own 
surviva l . " 2 3 2  
Another New York Times comment that was published three 
days later had only harsh criticism for the Kremlin ' s  
reun i fication offe r :  
Nobody needs to b e  told that Russia does 
not desire order and organization 
a nywhere. But a proposal to revive the 
old Germany and undo the plans , Germany ' s  
as well as the Allies ' , to incorporate it 
into a peaceful Europe is more than a 
shrewd diplomatic effort . It i s  a 
dangerous and reckless move to whip up 
the ambitions Qf Germany and the fears of 
her neighbors . 23 3 
The newspaper and magazine articles consulted a lso paid 
intense attention to the West Germans '  attitude toward the 
Stalin Note. Since Chance llor Adenauer pursued a negative 
2 3 2  New York Times , March 2 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , p .  2 4 .  
2 3 3  New York Times , March 2 7 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  2 8 .  
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policy in re spect to the Kremlin ' s  proposal and sought to 
continue the integration of the FRG with Western Europe , he 
naturally found a positive echo in the U . S .  pre s s .  On March 
3 1 ,  1 95 2 ,  Time hailed him as an " unswerving friend of the 
West . "  Referring to the domestic obstacles he had to overcome 
on his Western course,  it pointed out that , 
luckily for the we st , the key man in the 
play--7 6-year-old Chancellor Adenauer-­
wa s not taken in [by the Soviet proposal) . 
He stuck to his determination to align his 
people with the West even though the 
uni fication o f  his country must be 
postponed. The �est could be grateful for 
him last week . 2 4 
The pr int media covered not only Adenauer ' s  adroit 
maneuvers in the Bundestag2 3 5  and the breakthrough i n  the 
negotiations on the Western treaties2 3 6  but a lso focused on 
the domestic opposition to the Chance l lor ' s  policy. They 
reported on some West German ministers ' moderately positive 
opinion of the Soviet March note2 3 7  and stressed the impact 
of the note on communists in Europe. 
Newsweek held that the Kremlin ' s  offer of a reunified and 
rearmed Germany "gave Communist parties abroad their most 
embarrassed moment since the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact o f  1 9 3 9 . "  
Up to the very day o f  the not e ,  " foreign Reds had been 
2 3 4  Time, March 3 1 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  2 9 .  
2 3 5  Time, April 1 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , p .  3 2 .  
2 3 6  Time, May 2 6 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  pp . 3 1 - 3 2 .  
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proclaiming Russia a s  the sole guarantor against German 
militarism . " 2 3 8  Similar remarks could be found in Time 
magazin e . 239 
A major concern to the American pre s s ,  however , was the 
policy of the We st German Social Democrat s .  Already on March 
3 1 ,  Time observed that Schumacher ' s  party , together with the 
British and French socialist s ,  favored a consideration o f  
Moscow ' s  propos a l .  I n  addition, the magazine pointed out that 
these parties opposed West Germany ' s  rearmament within the 
Western a l lianc e . 2 4 0  
In late June, Anne O ' Hare McCormick implied that the 
British and French urge for a Western conference proposal to 
the Soviets was caused mainly by this socialist opposition. 
She stated in the New York Times that the western policy as 
a whole would be subject to the danger of becoming the 
" footba l l  of domestic politics" in Europe . 2 4 1  
Earlier that month, Time even run a cover story on Kurt 
Schumacher .  Praising the recent s igning o f  the Western 
treaties , the magazine described west German opposition to it 
as " a  fever o f  doubt s ,  fears , misgivings and unsatisfied 
yearnings . "  I t  considered Schumacher the " symbo l "  and 
2 3 8  Newsweek, March 2 4 ,  1 95 2 ,  p. 5 5 .  
2 3 9  Time , March 3 1 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  2 9 .  
2 4 0  Ibid. 
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" spokesman "  o f  this " il lness [ sic] . " 2 4 2  
Although largely a biographical essay, the Time article 
sketched Schumache r ' s  strategy for reuni fication. According 
to this publication , the SPD chairman believed that the 
Russians would be wil ling to relinquish their control over the 
GDR in return for a united , neutral Germany whose Ruhr 
industries would sell impartially to the East and West. 
Germany also would have to give up its participation in the 
EDC. Time reported that Schumacher would have been willing to 
make the deal since America ' s  atomic bomb would be threatening 
enough to hold off the Rus sians. Not without cynicism, the 
magazine commented on that policy of the SPD : "This line or 
argument i s  highly persuasive--to Germans :  a l l  gain and no 
sacrifice . " 2 4 3  
I n  1 9 5 2 ,  the general attitude o f  the American press 
toward the Sta lin Note was a negative one . All or most 
articles and comments rej ected Moscow ' s  initiative either 
because they considered it a diplomatic trap and because they 
opposed the idea of a neutral and unified Germany . The latter 
• 
reason seemed to be the more important one to the foreign 
policy-observing j ournalists.  This indicated that in the 
United States strong resentments against an independent and 
2 4 2  Time , June 9 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p. 3 0 .  
243  . Ibid . , p .  3 5 .  
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(compared t o  other European nations ) relatively powerful 
Germany were still prevailing seven years after World War II. 
These resentments were fostered by fears that united 
Germany might come under Soviet dominance or willingly 
cooperate with the U . S . S . R . This so-called " Rapallo-complex , "  
and the threat of having to reorganize the Western alliance 
on a much smaller basi s ,  further deepened the antipathy 
against a change of the status quo in Europe . The dragging on 
of the Korean truce talks also reduced the preparedness of the 
American public to engage in additional negotiations with the 
Soviet governmen t .  
Since in 1 9 5 2  the presidential campaign was under way, 
it would have been a risky undertaking for the ruling 
Democratic administration to agree to sincere negotiations 
with the Soviets on their proposal--let alone to accept it . 
Such a step would not have met with support by the U . S .  pre s s .  
Moreover , it would have tremendously increased the criticism 
of the government by the print media and by such opposition 
politicians as Senators Robert Taft and Joe McCarthy. A 
s incere dialogue with the Soviets on German unity might well 
have dramatically weakened what was left of the Democratic 
Party ' s  chances to defend its control of the White House. 
1 2 2  
3 .  Adenauer ' s  Maneuvers 
When the text of the Stalin Note arrived in Bonn, 
Adenauer ' s  instant reaction to it was negat ive. On March 1 1  
during a cabinet meeting , he stated that West Germany had to 
stay on the course of European integration to avoid mistrust 
o f  the Western countrie s . 2 4 4  
However , Adenauer ' s  negative attitude was not unopposed 
within his own government. Jakob Kaiser , Minister for All­
German Affair s ,  clashed with the Chancellor in this meeting . 
Being a native o f  East Germany , Kaiser ' s  political aim was to 
establish a reunified Germany as political mediator between 
East and West in Central Europe.  That was why on March 1 1 ,  he 
advocated a moderate, positive reaction to the Soviet note . 
Kaiser argued that a national German army as provided in the 
Soviet of fer would be o f  greater value for Germany than a West 
European army . Adenauer harshly countered his minister ' s  
viewpoint. The European countries alone , he replied , were not 
able to de fend themselve s . 2 45 
Temporarily Kaiser gave in and the cabinet agreed upon 
a first public statement on Moscow ' s  note. In a press release 
that same day the West German government criticized the Soviet 
2 4 4  Schwarz , p .  9 1 0 .  
2 4 5  Ib i d .  
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offer a s  a means to prevent the West European integration in 
order to gain influence over the whole of Germany . I t  also 
argued that the U . S . S . R . would demand that Germany renounce 
the territories east o f  the Oder and Neisse River s .  He 
furthermore stated that Germany would not possess the 
financial and technical resources to defend itself as the note 
suggested. At last the statement blamed the Soviet Union for 
not having included any provisions for free elections in 
Germany . This neglect would correspond to the Kreml in ' s  
rej ection o f  the U .  N .  commission which was to check the 
preconditions for free elections in the GDR. 2 4 6  
In a meeting with the Allied High Commissioners , Adenauer 
briefed them on his government ' s  attitude to the Stalin Note . 
His bottom line was :  The note would not change the FRG ' s 
policy of integration into the European Defense Cornrnuni ty 
system. The Chancel lor , however ,  asked the western powers for 
a quick reply to the Soviet initiative. He also proposed that 
the Western governments should avoid a simple "no" to the 
proposals s o  as not to give the German population the 
impression that Washington , London , and Paris were not 
interested i n  Germany ' s  reunification . 2 4 7  
Adenauer was pleased to learn from the High Commiss ioners 
that their governments would continue the EDC negotiations "as 
2 4 6  Ibid . 
2 4 7  Ibid . , p .  9 1 1 .  
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if the note did not exi s t . " 2 4 8  Walter Hallstein, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs , who was in Washington for talks on 
the EDC and the Contractual Agreements , in formed the 
Chancel lor on March 1 1  that the U . S .  government did not 
consider the Stalin Note a constructive proposal . 2 4 9  
Knowing the Western Al lies were on h i s  side , Adenauer 
again turned to his two most important issues at this time: 
the signing of the Western treaties and securing the 
acceptance of his We stpolitik by the West German population . 
To achieve the latte r ,  the Chancellor had to make sure that 
the Western reply note would emphasize German reunification 
as a major goa l .  The Allied reply , however , should impose 
maximum demands on the Soviet Union. I f  Moscow rej ected the 
Allied demand s ,  the West could blame the Kremlin for 
perpetuating the division of the country . 
Adenaue r ' s  negative response towards the Soviet March 
1 9 5 2  proposals was rooted in his perception o f  the U . S . S . R . 
The Chancellor v iewed the Soviet Union as a country that 
sought to become the strongest power on earth. In hi s memoirs 
he gives a comprehensive account of his analysis of Moscow ' s  
foreign po licy: According to Adenaue r ,  Russia would not start 
a war in Europe but would try to make the United States 
withdraw from the continent in order finally to contro l it . 
2 4 8  Konrad Adenauer , Erinnerungen 1 9 53-1 9 5 5 ,  (Stuttgart : 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GrnbH, 1 9 6 6 ) , p .  7 0 .  
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To that end , the Soviet Union was attempting t o  prevent the 
West European integration . 
In Adenauer ' s  eyes , the Kremlin calculated that 
continuous European disunity would frustrate Washington ' s  
engagement in Europe and thus lead to the desired withdrawal . 
In order to perpetuate West European disunity Moscow would 
target We st Germany and try to prevent it from j oining the 
emerging a l liance.  Once Germany was separated , the remainder 
of Western Europe in the long run would be too weak to resist 
the Soviet Union. 2 5 0  
Adenauer ,  therefore , concluded that " the answer to Soviet 
Russian policy must be firm [West] European integration . "  
Moscow would enter into sincere negotiations not before it 
faced a strong Western a l liance and realized that it could not 
achieve its goals by "means o f  the Cold War . " 2 5 1  
Yet during the first week after the Stalin Note had been 
published , Adenauer still had to struggle with opposition 
within his cabinet. On March 1 4 ,  it came to a second clash 
between him and Kaiser who still favored a more positive 
approach to the Soviet move. Being in an i solated position 
within the cabinet , Kaiser had to surrender a second time. 2 5 2  
2 5 0  . Ibid . , pp. 6 4- 6 5 .  
2 5 1  . Ibid . ,  p .  6 5 .  
2 5 2  Schwarz , p .  9 1 2 .  
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Two days later , Adenauer gave his first public address 
on the March note and his policy regarding it.  In a speech 
before Protestant members of his Christian Democratic Party 
(CDU) the Chancellor pointed at the Soviet threat . He 
explicitly stated, 
let us be aware , that there [ i . e .  in 
Eastern Europe] i s  the enemy o f  
Christianity . These are not only political 
but also intellectual threats [geistige 
Gefahren] • . •  Germany has three options: 
integration into the West,  integration 
into the Eas t ,  and neutra lity. For us , 
however , neutrality means the declaration 
that our country is no-man ' s  land . To do 
so would make us an obj e�\� We would cease to be a political sel f .  
Adenauer then emphasized that the integration o f  the FRG 
with the West was not to put "pressure on the East" but to 
prepare " a  peaceful reorganization o f  the relation to the 
Soviet Unio n ,  for Germany ' s  reunification and for the 
reorganization of Eastern Europe . " 2 5 4  
The Stalin Note would indicate but little change in 
Soviet foreign policy . Adenauer claimed that "despite a strong 
nationa li stic tendency the note aims at the neutraliz ation of 
Germany and the prevention of progress on the creation o f  the 
European Defense Community and European integration . " 2 5 5  
The Chancellor repeated h i s  rejection o f  German national 
2 5 3  Adenauer Speech Before the Protestant Party Group in 
Siegen, March 1 6 ,  1 9 5 2 , quoted after Steininger, p .  3 3 .  
2 5 4  Ibid . 
2 5 5  Ibid . 
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forces as proposed by the Kremlin , telling his audience that 
these would be unaffordable for Germany . The respective Soviet 
proposa l ,  therefore , would be worthles s . 2 5 6  
Adenaue r ' s  foreign policy was based on 'negotiating from 
strength . '  The Chancellor be l ieved that the defense efforts 
of the West had created a relative position of strength which 
had affected the Soviet Union ' s  foreign policy and caused it 
to submit the March 1 9 5 2  proposa l .  For this reaso n ,  
according to Adenauer, the West had t o  stay on course : 
we want the West to become so strong that 
it can start a reasonable talk with the 
Soviet government and I am firmly 
convinced that this recent Soviet Ru ssian 
note is a proof for this [ i . e .  the success 
of this strategy ] .  I f  we continue thi s 
way , i f  the We st , including the United 
State s ,  is so strong as it has to be , i f  
i t  i s  stronger than the Soviet government , 
then the time wi l l  come when the Soviet 
government will open its ear s .  The 
obj ective of a reasonable East-West talk , 
however , will  be : the preservation o f  
peace in Europe , a n  end t o  sense less 
a rmaments,  Germany ' s  reunification �9 
liberty and a new order in the East . " 2 
Outlining his strategy in Siegen the Chancellor avoided 
stating when his policy would be successful and result in 
German unity on acceptable terms . In a policy statement before 
the CDU parliamentary group nine days later , Adenauer 
presented only a vague idea when the western policy would 
2 5 6  Ibid.  
2 5 7  . Ibid . , p.  3 4 .  
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achieve the objectives he had outline d :  
When will the time for the deciding talks 
come? It will not take many years . With 
General Eisenhower as U . S .  President , this 
[deve lopment] will  progres s  faster , 
because this [policy] is his concept, too. 
He also warned the CDU deputies not to accept the recent 
Soviet offe r :  
We have t o  accept it that our nerves will 
be under stress for the time being. 
Negotiations with the Soviets in the 
pres7nt stage '2�'-hld s imply be damaging to 
our interests. 
On March 1 7 ,  1 9 5 2 , Adenauer met with the Western High 
Commissioners in Bonn for a thorough exchange of views on the 
Stalin Note . Adenauer underlined his negative attitude toward 
a four-power conference at the present time and suggested that 
the Allied reply note should be designed to shed light on the 
real intentions of the Soviet Union. To that end , the Allies 
were to address the Soviet government with precise questions 
about the preconditions for free elections in East Germany and 
about the Soviet proposed prohibition against German entry 
into any coalition. 
The A l lied High Commissioners and the Chancellor 
concurred that the western note should emphasize the Western 
refusal to recognize the Oder-Ne isse line as the permanent 
Polish-German frontier . An agreement also was achieved that 
"whatever happened it was essential that work here on [the] 
2 5 8  Adenauer Speech Before the CDU Parliamentary Group , 
March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  quoted after Steininger , p .  3 4 .  
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contracts and in Paris on [the] EDC sh [ou ] ld not be slowed 
down in any way but on 
expedited . " 2 5 9  
[the] contrary sh [ ou ] ld be 
On the same day Adenauer called Mccloy who was in Paris 
for discussions with General Eisenhower over participation o f  
the FRG in the Western defense system. According t o  Mccloy , 
the Chancellor asked him to arrange for an exchange o f  
" thoughts with those who were composing [the ] reply before any 
crystallization of drafts . " 2 6 0  
This request mirrored Adenauer ' s  anxiety to have as much 
influence as possible on the Western response to the Soviet 
initiative. He knew that--as in any negotiations--he would be 
more likely to have his wishes accepted in a preparatory 
exchange of views rather than by criticizing a draft already 
agreed upon by the three Western government s .  
Yet ,  Washington and London were already discussing drafts 
of a reply note at this point of time. 2 6 1  Secretary of State 
Acheson did not plan to include Adenauer in these inter-All ied 
talk s ,  but advised the U . S .  embassy in London to consult 
2 5 9  The Acting United States High Commi ssioner for 
Germany ( Hays)  to the Department o f  State , Bonn, March 1 7 ,  
1 9 5 2 , in : FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vol.  v i i ,  p .  1 8 2  f .  
2 6 0  The Charge in France (Bonsal) to the Department of 
State, Paris ,  March 1 7 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vol . vii , 
p .  1 8 1 .  
2 6 1  The Secretary o f  State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, Washington, March 1 4 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  
vii,  pp . 1 7 3 - 1 7 5 .  
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Adenauer and West Berlin mayor Reuter on the note only "when 
tripartite agreement [was] reached . " 2 6 2  
On March 2 0  and 2 1 ,  Adenauer conferred with Schuman , 
Eden , and American Ambassador to France Dunn in Pari s .  Agai n ,  
Adenauer was given the opportunity to state h i s  government ' s  
views on the Soviet note and his desires concerning the Allied 
answer to i t .  Soon it became clear that Adenauer and the 
Allies concurred on all points regarding Moscow ' s  
initiative . 2 6 3  In his memoirs the Chance llor remarked about 
this meeting that "the representatives o f  the Allied Powers 
clearly sought to take my wishes into account . " 2 6 4  
As a supporting gesture for the western reply note o f  
March 2 5 ,  the government coalition i n  the Bundestag passed a 
declaration stating that "reunification of Germany was the 
most important objective o f  the Federal Republic . "  The 
deputies of the existing coalition renewed their call for free 
all-German elections based on the electoral law adopted by the 
parliament on February 6 ,  1 9 5 2 . 2 6 5  
• 
2 6 2  The Secretary o f  State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, Washington, March 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2- 1 9 5 4 ,  vo l .  
vi i ,  p .  1 7 8 .  
2 6 3  The Charge in France (Bonsal) to the Department of 
State , Paris , March 2 0 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  i n :  FRUS 1 9 5 2- 1 9 5 4 ,  vol .  v i i ,  
p p .  1 8 6-1 8 8 .  
2 6 4  Adenaue r ,  Erinnerungen 1953-1 9 5 5 ,  p .  7 6 .  
2 6 5  . Ibid . ,  p .  7 8  f .  
1 3 1  
The West German Chance l lor saw no reason to change his 
course when the second Soviet note arrived at the Western 
governments on April 9 .  Again he j udged that Moscow ' s  document 
showed no indication that direct four-power talks on the 
German question would likely be successfu l . 2 6 6  
Adenauer ,  however ,  now faced a growing opposition within 
the Bunde stag to his policy . Since the Soviet Union seemed to 
accept the Western call for free-elections in its April not e ,  
the Social Democrats urged the government o f  the FRG to pursue 
a more moderate policy toward the Soviet initiative. At the 
same time , the SPD increased its campaign efforts against the 
Contractual Agreements and the EDC . This counter movement 
reached a c l imax in May when Schumacher stated in an interview 
with United Press that everyone who agreed to the Contractual 
Agreements ceased to be a good German . 2 6 7  
This accusation by Schumacher hit Adenauer hard , and even 
one and a half decades later in his memoirs,  he took 
considerable time to defend his policy against these attack s .  
The SPD posi tion indicated t o  him, as he wrote i n  1 9 6 7 ,  " a  
totally wrong perception o f  the political situation . "  
Schumacher and his successor Ol lenhauer would believe that 
the Soviet Union would reward us with 
reunification in liberty, i f  we would 
po stpone the signing o f  the Contractual 
Agreements and the EDC treaty for the 
Russians ' sake . My opinion was : we would 
2 6 6  . Ibid. I p .  8 3 .  
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lose the Western powers '  trust without 
gaining reunification in liberty from the 
Russians if we would postpone the signing 
o f  both treaties . We would become the 
object o f  East-West negotiations and , 
finally , eid up under Russian 
domination. 2 6  
The Chancellor did not miss the chance i n  the next 
meeting with the High Commiss ioners to describe the SPD ' s 
policy as moving closer to the Soviets ' l ine . 2 6 9  
During that same meeting Adenauer took up the neutrality 
provision in the Soviet note of April 9 .  He said that it had 
to be made c lear to the public that the U . S . S . R .  aimed at the 
prevention o f  Germany ' s  participation in the Schuman Plan and 
the EDC . Furthermore , he suggested that the Allies ask the 
Soviet government whether it would be prepared to create the 
preconditions necessary for free elections in East Germany in 
case any electoral commiss ion found the situation there 
unsati s factory . 2 7 0  
At the end o f  the discussion , the Allied High 
Commissioners and Adenauer again found themselves in general 
agreement regarding the line the new Western note should 
follow. Adenauer wa s ,  however ,  quite surprised when he learned 
on May 2 ,  that Dean Acheson wanted to enter into low- level 
negotiations with the Kremlin.  As discussed above , the 
2 6 8  . Ibid . , p .  9 0  f .  
2 6 9  . Ibid . ,  p .  9 3 .  
2 7 0  . Ibid . , pp . 9 1 - 9 2 . 
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Secretary o f  State thought i t  necessary t o  prove that the 
Soviet offer was insincere , while it was essential that the 
EDC and Contractual Agreements negotiations should continue 
without delay . Negotiations with Moscow which would probably 
have been unsuccessful were to display the real interests o f  
the Soviet Union thereby securing the German population ' s  
support for the integration policy. 2 7 1  
In formed about Acheson ' s  plan , Adenauer first had no 
objections to i t .  Re suggested that these four-power talks 
should be limited to the issue of the preconditions for free 
elections . Ye· t ,  overnight Adenauer reconsidered this problem. 
He told Mccloy on May 3 ,  that he would not support Acheson ' s  
idea . Once talks would have begun, according to Adenauer , 
there would have been no majority in his cabinet authorizing 
him to sign the Contractual Agreements and the EDC treaty. 2 7 2  
Before Mccloy could in form the State Department about the 
Chancellor ' s  attitude, the U . S .  proposal was dropped . The 
western note which was presented to the Soviets on May 1 3 ,  
therefore , met with Adenauer ' s  " full acclaim . " 2 7 3  
Rolf Steininger states that Adenauer ' s  rej ection of four-
power talks on May 3 ,  1 9 5 2  was " a  historical decision , by 
which he heavily incriminated his policy . " Steininger holds 
2 7 1  Steininger , p .  85 f . ; see also Graml , "Die Legende , "  
p .  3 3 3  f . , and Schwarz , p .  9 2 0  f .  
2 7 2  Grarn l ,  "Die Legende , "  p .  3 3 4 .  
2 7 3  Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-1 9 5 5 ,  p .  9 3 .  
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that the West German Chancellor had the chance to push for 
close examination of the Soviet proposal through negotiation s .  
His acceptance of Acheson ' s  plan would not have j eopardized 
the We stern power s '  trust in the government of the FRG and the 
integration talk s .  Instead , the Chancellor ' s  support would 
have forced London and Paris to agree to a four-power 
conferenc e . 2 7 4 
Steininger presents his conclusion without answering the 
questions created by i t .  As Hermann Graml points out, the 
Western Al lies had dropped Acheson ' s  idea before Mccloy could 
in form the State Department of Adenauer ' s  negative attitude 
on four-power talk s .  Wa s ,  therefore , the Western government ' s  
decision to cancel Acheson ' s  plan made so quickly despite 
their knowledge that Acheson and (briefly) Adenauer supported 
it? 
If thi s was the case , it would indicate that the 
Secretary of State ' s  idea was indeed the mere result of a 
"poker mood " --as Adenauer biographer Schwarz holds--and not 
the outcome of the State Departmen t ' s realization that "talks 
were no longer , preventable " - -as Steininger suggests. 2 75 It 
would also mean that the Western governments decided on that 
issue regardless of Adenauer ' s  opinion . In any cas e ,  the 
Chancellor ' s  approval o f  Acheson ' s  plan would only have 
2 7 4 Steininger, pp . 8 6 - 8 8 .  
2 7 5  Schwarz , p .  9 2 1 :  Steininger , p .  8 5 .  
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equaled support for a mere " tactic a 1 maneuver " 2 7 6 by the 
Western Allies . That makes it hard to believe that Adenauer ' s  
negative attitude on May 3 was a "hi storical decision" as 
Steininger conclude s .  
Furthermore , it might be doubted that a fter May 2 ,  the 
West German Chancellor was in a position to make the Western 
Allies change their mind s .  At this point in time, the Allies 
kept him in too far removed a position for achieving such a 
change through direct intervention. Adenauer ' s  single 
diplomatic lever would have been to threaten suspension of his 
cooperation in the FRG ' s  integration process in order to force 
the Allies to the conference table. As the State Department 
papers revea l ,  it i s  very unlikely that such a maneuver would 
have been possible without causing frictions among the Western 
states and thereby j eopardizing the fragi le integration talks . 
Even if the West had started negotiations at this point , 
its positions would have been weak from the beginning. Once 
four-power talks would have started , Stalin could have 
profited from any serious deterioration of the EDC talks and 
could have raised his price for German unity. I f  the EDC 
• 
negotiations would have collapsed during the conference, there 
would have been no immediate reason for Moscow to uphold its 
2 7 6  Jurgen c. Hess and Friso Wielenga , "Die Niederlande 
und die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands : Ein Beitrag zur 
Debatte urn die ... Verpassten Gelegenhei ten ' irn Jahr 1952 , "  
Vierteljahreshe fte fur Zeitgeschichte 3 5  (No . 3 ,  1987 ) : p .  
3 7 3 .  
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reunification offe r .  
In addition, the Western governments would have had to 
represent the German position (neutrality in exchange for 
unity ) --a position they themselves did not support. Therefore ,  
all Washington, Pari s ,  and London could hope for in four-power 
talks was to win increased public support for their claim that 
Stalin ' s  reunification proposal was insincere . 
Steininger ' s  conclusion that four-power talks were 
possible without hurting the integration process is thinkable 
only under one condition : the West would have had to confront 
the Soviet Union with a concrete time table for the conference 
in order to prevent a delaying tactic . A deadline , after which 
the Western Allies would have considered the conference a 
failure , would have put some pressure on the Soviets .  However , 
it is very questionable that the Soviets would have accepted 
thi s .  
On the other hand , one must agree with Steininger that 
the Chancellor at least had the chance " to make clear that the 
Federal Republic had not he s itated to make every e ffort , to 
realize every chance for Germany ' s  reunification and Europe ' s  
pacificatio n . "  2 77 Nonetheless , the Chancellor had a good 
reason to avoid thi s .  Had four-power talks on Germany ' s  unity 
taken place the West German Chancellor would have had great 
difficulties proceeding with the integration process.  These 
2 7 7  Steininger, p .  8 6 .  
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difficulties would have occurred either in his cabinet or in 
the Bundestag where his coalition held only a narrow maj ority . 
As mentioned above , Adenauer was satisfied with the 
content o f  the western note of May 1 3 .  The next Soviet note 
was sent to the Allied governments on May 2 4 ,  one day before 
the signing of EDC treaty and Contractual Agreements was 
scheduled . Since most Western diplomats viewed the note as a 
hal f-hearted last minute e f fort ,  Adenauer was a larmed when he 
received word about the statement made on June 8 in Paris 
favoring a conferenc e . 2 7 8  
In separate discussions with the High Commiss ioners the 
Chancellor tried to counter the French move . His general l ine 
o f  argumentation being the same as befor e ,  he pointed out that 
an East-West meeting would j eopardize the ratification o f  the 
recently signed treaties , while there was "not the s lightest 
indication for a positive outcome" of such a conference . 2 7 9  
O n  June 2 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  the Deputy High Commiss ioners briefed 
Adenauer on the outline for a Western reply note . He learned 
that France , Great Britain and the United States considered 
offering Moscow negot iations on the preconditions for free 
election s .  
2 7 0 Adenauer , Erinnerungen 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 5 5 ,  p .  1 0 3 .  
2 7 9  . Ibid . , p .  1 0 7 . 
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The Chancellor explained that he would support the 
conference idea only i f  there would be at least a minimal 
chance for success which he did not see at this time . In 
addition, he urged the Western governments not to surrender 
any Western position as stated in the Al l ied note of May 
1 3 . 2 8 0  
When Adenauer finally received the draft of the new 
Western reply note , he had " strong misgivings . "  In a note to 
the governments in London, Pari s ,  and Washington , the 
Chancel lor complained about the peace treaty provisions in the 
draft. Referring to the Versailles peace conference o f  
1 9 1 8 / 1 9 ,  the Chancel lor expressed his fear that the Western 
powers planned to confront united Germany with a peace treaty 
previously agreed upon with the Soviet Union. He argued that 
this would contradict respective articles of the recently 
signed Contractual Agreements under which Great Britain , 
Franc e ,  the United States and West Germany were obliged to 
pursue a common policy in respect to German unity . 2 8 1  
This West German note sparked o f f  a clash between 
Adenauer on the one side and British Deputy High Commissioner 
Ward and French High Commissioner Andre Fransois-Poncet on the 
other side . Finally, the Western powers '  representatives 
agreed to change some of the di sputed parts of the note. But 
2 8 0  Ibid . , p .  1 1 0  f .  
2 8 1  Ibid . , p .  1 1 5 .  
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the Chancel lor was unable t o  prevent the proposal for 
negotiations from being submitted to the Soviet Union on July 
1 0 .  The Kremlin, however, did not take up this initiative in 
its note of August 2 3 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  and the exchange of notes ended 
with the fourth Western note sent to Moscow on September 2 3  
without having any further signi ficant impact on West Germany . 
In retrospect it becomes clear that Adenauer rej ected the 
Stalin Note for two reason s :  one , he thought the Soviet offer 
was insincere and a diplomatic maneuver to de lay the creation 
of the EDC and the signing of the Contractual Agreements ;  two , 
he opposed Germany ' s  reunification on terms o f  neutrality and 
the German acceptance o f  the Oder-Ne isse line. The Chancellor 
was convinced that a neutral Germany sooner or later would 
fall victim to Soviet power in Central Europe . 
Pursuing his inflexible policy , Adenauer indeed missed 
a chance to do everything possible to examine Stalin ' s  offer . 
But the chance for reun i fication was not as near and as 
promising as Steininger implies . Moreover , it involved 
considerably more risk than this historian admits by stating 
that , 
a fter viewing the documents there can be 
no doubt at a l l  that negotiations with 
the Soviets would have been possible 
without j eopardizing the [FRG ' s ]  
integration int� �he West i f  Adenauer had 
j ust wanted it . 8 
2 8 2  Steininger, p .  1 0 7 .  
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Wolfram Hanrieder correctly observes that during the 
1 9 5 0 s  it was "an essential aim o f  the Allied and particularly 
the American policy towards Germany • • •  [ to restrict the FRG ' s  
freedom] • • •  to formulate and implement an independent foreign 
policy . " 2 8 3  It was also the Allies ' aim to prevent the 
reemergence ·Of a united Germany they were unable to contro l .  
Therefore , even i f  Adenauer had pushed for a four-power 
conference , such a maneuver would inevitably have been 
obstructed by the Al lies . In addition, Adenauer would have 
raised Al lied fears o f  a German Schaukelpol i  tik , thereby 
" j eopard [ i z i ng ]  the entire treaty structure that was to 
restore sovereignty to the Federal Repub l ic . " 2 8 4  A public west 
German proposal o f  four-power negotiations would also have 
undermined the government ' s  maj ority for the Western 
integration in the Bundestag .  
Furthermore ,  four-power negotiations i n  1 9 5 2  would at 
best have been a face-saving e f fort by the western powers , in 
order to prove Moscow ' s  ins incerity . Even had he wanted, the 
West German Chance l lor ' s  influence on Allied policy was too 
little to make them adopt a policy which aimed at German unity 
• 
in exchange for neutrality because such a policy was 
contradictory to the Al lies ' genuine security interests. 
2 8 3  Wol fram F .  Hanriede r ,  "The German-American Alliance 
at Forty , "  Aussenpolitik,  English edition 4 0  (No . 2 ,  1 9 8 9 ) : 
p . 1 5 0  f .  
2 8 4  Hanrieder, "Foreign Policies o f  the Federal Republic 
of Germany 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 8 9 , "  p .  3 1 8 .  
1 4 1  
Adenauer sought to build a We st German "political power 
base" in the West from which he planned to deal with the 
Soviet Union at some future date . 2 8 5  A persistent demand on 
his part for a four-power conference in 1 9 5 2  would have 
undermined Bonn ' s policy at its earliest stage . This would 
have called " into question the central premi ses o f  
[Adenauer ' s ] reunification policy . " 2 8 6  
4 .  The Nationalistic Attitude o f  the German Social Democrats 
The Social Democrats ' initial reaction to the Stalin Note 
was--though corresponding to their policy advocated since the 
second half o f  1 9 5 1--one o f  caution. 2 8 7  On March 1 2 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  the 
SPD ' s  par liamentary group in the Bundestag demanded a sincere 
examination of the o f fe r .  It asked the Adenauer government to 
push for four-power talks in order to reach an accord on free 
elections for a constituent assembly under international 
superv ision . 2 8 8  In an open letter on March 4 ,  Kurt Schumacher 
had already urged the Chance l lor not to insist on the U . N .  
commi ssion a s  the single possible body for thi s international 
2 8 5  Ibid . 
2 8 6  Ibid . 
2 8 7  Maxwe l l ,  p .  3 3 9 .  
2 8 8  Buczylowski , p .  1 6 1 .  
1 4 2  
supervi sion . 2 8 9  
Adenauer ' s  negative attitude toward the Soviet proposa l ,  
shared by the maj ority of his cabinet, soon a larmed the SPD . 
When State Secretary Ha llstein publicly remarked on March 1 1  
in Washington that the note was "not important" , he was 
criticized by the Social Democrats ' parliamentary group. On 
the other hand , the SPD expressed their support of Minister 
Kaiser ' s  plea for a careful analysis of the note. 2 9 0  
I t  was not before the first Western reply note had been 
sent to Moscow that the SPD increased its criticism of the 
Allies ' and Adenaue r ' s  negative cours e .  A few days after the 
document was presented to the Soviets on March 2 5 ,  Erich 
O l lenhauer, the SPD ' s deputy chairman , de livered a radio 
addres s .  Pointing to the Western goals o f  integrating Germany 
into the emerging Western community , he held that this should 
not be made a precondition for reunification , but decided on 
by a free German government. Such a demand, he continued , 
would give the opponents of German unity the cheap argument 
that the Western powers were only interested in German unity 
i f  the Allies were guaranteed that the resulting state would 
2 8 9  Open letter Schumacher ' s  to Adenauer , March 4 ,  1 9 5 2 , 
in:  Kurt Schumache r ,  Reden-Schriften-Korrespondenzen, 1 9 4 5 -
1 9 5 2 ,  ed . Willy Albrecht (Berlin , Bonn: Verlag J . H . W. Dietz 
Nachf. GmbH , 1 9 8 5 ) , p .  9 6 0 .  (hereafter quoted as Reden­
Schriften-Korrespondenzen . )  
2 9 0  Maxwe l l , p .  4 0 6  f .  
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be bound to them in a relationship of dependency. 2 9 1  
Carlo Schmid, a member o f  the SPD ' s  national board and 
one of its leading Bundestag deputies wrote an article in 
Foreign Affairs that dealt with the Western March note in 
reply to Stalin ' s  initiative . The SPD regretted , Schmid 
stated, that this Western document implied that the Soviets 
should agree to Germany ' s  political and mi litary integration 
with the Wes t .  This would mean asking the Russians to renounce 
their control over the East German potential in order that 
this potential might be fitted into a political and mi litary 
pact "which the Russians must feel is directed against them . "  
He then cone luded , " i f  it had been planned to prevent the 
Russians from agreeing to free all-German elections no better 
way could have been chosen . " 2 9 2  
After the Soviet note o f  April 9 had arrived in the West , 
Schumacher ,  whose declining health caused him to leave many 
o f  the chairman ' s  tasks to his lieutenant s ,  again participated 
in the debate .  In another open letter to the Chancellor he 
urged the FRG government to present " German demands" for 
reunification to the four occupation powers . This would be the 
more pressing for "one does not know whether there will be 
another chance for a peaceful and democratic reunification in 
2 9 1  . Ibi d .  p .  4 1 2 .  
2 9 2  Schmid , p .  5 43 f .  
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the foreseeable futur e . " 2 9 3  
Schumacher pointed out that everything had t o  be done to 
find out whether the Soviet note could open a path to 
reunification i n  freedom. The Adenauer government should 
convince the Western Allies that a continued correspondence 
with the Kremlin on details of their proposal would not result 
in the necessary clari fication . Hence , four-power negotiations 
should take place as soon as possibl e . 2 9 4  
The SPD leader also proposed that the occupation powers 
first talk about the conditions for free election s .  He advised 
Adenauer to submit the West German February draft o f  an 
e lectoral l aw as the German proposal for such election s .  
Furthermore , he argued , the Western side should adopt a 
flexible attitude in respect to what kind o f  international 
body was to control the e lection s .  Schumacher ' s  single 
prerequi site for it was that the commission would " secure free 
elections under equal conditions in a l l  parts of Germany . " 295 
The SPD chairman explicitly recognized the Soviet 
concessions on the question of control l ing the conditions for 
al l-German e lection s ,  as expressed in Moscow ' s  note of April 
9 .  He adv i sed the Chance llor to take advantage o f  this 
concession and "demand an inspection of the Soviet prisons 
2 9 3  Open letter from Schumacher to Adenauer , Reden­
Schriften-Korrespondenzen, p .  9 6 1 . 
2 9 4  . Ibid . , p .  9 6 1  f .  
2 9 5  . Ibid . , p .  9 6 2 . 
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once this [ control] commission i s  establi shed . 11 2 9 6  
With respect to the risk o f  failure involved in the 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, Schumacher urged Adenauer 
not to worry. The SPD leader wrote that i f  it became evident 
that the four powers would not agree on conditions for free 
elections then at least it would have been made clear "that 
the Federal Republic has avoided no pains to use every 
existing chance for Germany ' s  reuni fication and Europe ' s  
pacification . " 2 9 7  
At this time, Schumacher could only guess that Adenauer ' s  
objective in his talks with the Western governments was 
exactly the opposite of what Schumacher advised him to d o .  
Instead o f  seeking to bring the exchange o f  notes t o  an end 
in order to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union , 
Adenauer did everything to perpetuate the diplomatic 
correspondence in order to prevent those talks . 
The Social Democrats realized in the spring o f  1 9 5 2  that 
West Germany had arrived at a crossroads. The Adenauer 
government had to choose between the FRG ' s  integration with 
the West and the acceptance o f  Stalin ' s  propo sa l .  The SPD 
• 
vehemently advocated the latter. I t  did so not only because 
it saw too many disadvantages involved in the EDC treaty and 
the Contractual Agreements--such as di scrimination against 
2 9 6  Ibid . 
2 9 7  . Ibid . , p .  9 6 1 .  
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Germans ,  new armament efforts by the U . S . S . R .  and a growing 
danger for Germany to become the battlefield for the defense 
of other nation s ;  from the SPD ' s  viewpoin t ,  more than ever 
before , the fate of some eighteen million Germans in the GDR 
was at stake. 
Addressing the American public in a Newsweek article in 
June of 1 9 5  2 ,  Schumacher condemned the signature of the 
Western treaties which had taken place on May 26 and 27 . He 
foresaw that the Soviets would now seal the border o f  their 
occupation zone and turn them into national frontiers . Then 
the newly created nation would be quickly integrated into the 
system of satellite countries . 2 9 8  
In addition, Schumacher pointed out that 
In the last analysis , they [ i . e .  the 
treaties] have been signed on the backs 
o f  some 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  who are starving for 
freedom and who now see freedom vanish 
while terror is certain to increase • • •  The 
entire German people i s  now convinced that 
its highest goa l ,  reunification of the 
nation, is terribly j eopardized . The 
s ignatures solidified the split of 
Germany . 
Turning to the Soviet offer, Schumacher continued : 
To avoid that petrification , the Social 
Democratic Party and the whole German 
nation desire four-power negotiations as 
soon as possible as a first step on the 
right road. For only by an agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union can the worst be prevented . 
And he emphatically closed : 
2 9 8  Newsweek , June 3 0 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  p .  3 6 .  
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The unification o f  Germany remains more 
important to the peace o f  the world than 
any selfish policy of western integration . 
This idea can never be expunged from the 
minds of the German people until the goal 
of reunification had been achieved . 299 
Although the SPD was able to employ strong moral 
arguments for its position , it lacked a clear strategic 
outline of how it thought the West should constructively deal 
with the Kremlin. Demanding four-power negotiations on free 
elections was a first step but not enough to cause a massive 
outburst of public protest blocking Adenauer ' s  policy. 
As mentioned before, the SPD had a lways refused to accept 
the Oder-Ne isse line as the Poli sh-German border. The Social 
Democrat s '  policy also had been decisively pro-Western--though 
they rej ected Adenauer ' s  version of European integration--and 
hence had opposed any concepts for the neutra lization o f  
Germany . Yet,  the Stalin Note , which the SPD now was prepared 
to accept as a basis for negotiations , demanded both--German 
neutrality and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line--as price 
for Germany ' s  unity. 
That was why , once the SPD had signaled its positive 
attitude towards the Soviet offer for negotiations , Adenauer 
blamed the Social Democrats for advocating neutralization. 3 0 0  
In the above mentioned Foreign Affairs essay, Carlo Schmid 
sought to invalidate such charge s ,  stating that 
2 9 9  Ibid . 
3 0 0  Adenauer Erinnerungen 1 95 3 - 1 9 5 5 ,  p .  8 7 .  
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The S . P . D . stands against basic neutra lism 
and against the neutra lization of Germany . 
It does not believe in the possibi lity o f  
Germany ' s  being protected by neutrality 
even through a German national army , as 
the Russians propose . It simply does not 
believe in isolate� lecipes for squaring 
the German circ l e .  0 
As for the SPD ' s  a lternative , Schmid merely pointed out 
that " the German problem can be settled only as part o f  a 
general new order, and the basis for this has still to be 
found . " 3 0 2  
One can only speculate what the Social Democrats had in 
mind as compensation for Moscow ' s  surrender of East Germany . 
Was the West to engage in a bilateral trade of spheres of 
influence or military bases with the u . s . s . R . ? No hint that 
would support such a thesis could be found in the examined 
statements and articles by SPD politician s .  It seems , 
therefore , more likely that despite their contrary public 
statements and their plea for " freedom o f  action o f  the all­
German governrnent" 3 0 3  the leading Social Democrats were 
increasingly prepared to meet the Soviet demand of Germany ' s  
neutrality. 
A cautious move by Schumacher toward neutrality can be 
detected in one of his last speeches .  On July 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  little 
more than a month before his death, Schumacher delivered a 
30l Schmid , p. 5 4 4 . 
3 0 2  Ibid . 
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radio addres s .  Once more he advocated immediate talks with the 
u . s . s . R .  and criticized Adenauer ' s  and the Western 
government ' s  policy of negotiating from strength. 
With respect to the future position of united Germany , 
the SPD chairman explained that " I t  i s  not true that there i s  
only one alternative , t o  be a satellite 6f the Soviets o r  a 
vassal of the West. We Social Democrats let our policy be 
determined only by the necessities and the l i fe interests 
(Lebensinteressen) of the entire German people . " 304 
Kurt Schumacher died on August 2 0 ,  1 9 5 2 .  A few weeks 
later, his deputy as chairman , Erich Ollenhauer , assumed the 
party leadership. Ol lenhauer sought to keep the SPD on the 
course set by his predecessor. However , he too did not succeed 
in outlining a comprehensive program for the SPD ' s 
reuni fication policy . Explaining his party ' s  refusal to vote 
for the ratification of the Western treaties in the Bundestag 
on December 5 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  his spoke only very vaguely on the SPD ' s  
alternative to Adenauer ' s  integration policy . 3 0 5  
Although the German Social Democrats first had reacted 
to the Stalin Note with some caution , they moved " a  
3 o 4 Address by Schumacher on Radio I n  the American Sector 
(RIAS ) , July 1 5 ,  1 9 5 2 .  i n :  Reden-Schriften-Korrespondenz en , 
p .  96 8 .  
3 0 5  Speech by Erich Ollenhauer Before the Bundestag on 
December 5 ,  1 9 5 2 , i n :  Erich Ol lenhauer , Reden und Aufsatz e ,  
ed . Fritz Sange r ,  ( Hannove r :  J. H . W. Dietz Nachf. GrnbH , 1 9 6 4 ) , 
pp. 215-2 4 1 .  
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considerable di stance towards the Soviet position on German 
reunification . " 3 0 6  The primary goal of Schumacher and the SPD 
leadership was to reach a four-power agreement on free all-
German elections. Since the East German electorate included 
a high percentage of socialist voters the SPD politicians were 
probably convinced that their party would provide the first 
all-German government resulting from those elections . 307 
One must conclude that the SPD was quite optimi stic that 
major que stion s ,  such as the future status of Germany and its 
defens e ,  could be settled in negotiations between the 
occupation powers and an a ll-German government . This was 
indicated by the fact that the Social Democrats handled all 
these problems involved in the Stalin Note as issues secondary 
to four-power talks . 
Apparently the SPD would have been prepared to concede 
Germany ' s  neutrality i n  exchange for unity. Yet , as the 
historian Maxwell correctly points out , the term neutrality 
was " j udiciously avoided by the Social Democrats . "  It was " too 
emotionally charged in this early post-war era for an 
opposition party to openly embrace it . " 3 0 8  Though it i s  very 
• 
likely that the SPD would have accepted mil itary neutrality 
3 0 6  Maxwell , p. 4 2 5 .  
3 0 7  As a matter o f  fac t ,  one Social Democratic charge 
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for Germany , one must conclude that an a l l-German government 
led by Social Democrats would have sought to create economic 
and cultural ties to the West--as postwar Austria has done , 
for example.  
Despite the SPD ' s  moderate attitude on neutrality there 
was no evidence what soever that the party would have accepted 
the los ses o f  the territories East of the Oder-Ne isse line . 
The recognition o f  the status quo at the Polish-German 
frontie r ,  however, remained an " integral part" of the Soviet 
demand s . 3 0 9  It was , therefore, unclear how the SPD thought to 
settle this conflict of interests in peace negotiation s .  
The Social Democrats ' support o f  four-power talks on 
German unity was congruent with the party ' s  rejection o f  the 
Western treaties. Hence , an antagonism of objectives did not 
exist within the SPD ' s  foreign policy as it did exist in the 
policy o f  those who wanted German unity and mil itary 
integration at the same time. 
In 1 9 5 2 ,  the SPD a lways expressed its deep concern about 
the fate o f  the eighteen m i l lion Germans living under Soviet 
contro l .  The fact that the signing of the Western treaties and 
the rej ection o f  negotiations with the Kremlin would , for an 
unforeseeable time, leave those Germans at the mercy o f  the 
communist dictatorship was Schumacher ' s  strongest argument in 
the debate on the Stalin Note. It was not a tactical maneuver 
3 o 9  Ibid . ,  p .  4 1 8 .  
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in the struggle against Adenauer ' s  Western course but an 
indication of his sincere solidarity with the East Germans .  
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Chapter V 
West Germany' s Road To Full Sovereignty 
With the Western Treaties signed on May 26 and 2 7 ,  the 
Occupation Statute was to be replaced by a system of contracts 
that regulated the FRG ' s  relations with the United States , 
Great Britain and France . The Allied High Commi ssion was to 
be trans formed into embassies and the High Commissioners were 
to become ambas sadors .  
Except for a few limitations , West Germany thus was to 
gain sovereignty . The most important of these limitations was 
an article in the Contractual Agreements in which the western 
powers reserved the right to declare a state o f  emergency in 
Germany and resume military control over the country. 3 1 0  
After the signing, the Contractual Agreements and the EDC 
treaty were submitted to the parl iaments for ratification. 
Al though Adenauer had hoped for a quick approval by the 
Bundestag, it was not before March 1 9 ,  1 9 5 3 ,  that the 
government maj ority ratified them . At this time , however, it 
became evident that the treaties met with persistent 
resistance in the French National Assembly . A growing number 
of deputies opposed West Germany ' s  rearmament and the plan to 
3 1 0  Contractual Agreements [Excerpt] , in : Dokumentation 
zur Deutschlandfrage , p .  4 7 .  
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integrate the French Army into a European force. 
On May 5 ,  that same year , Joseph Stalin died. Sensing 
that the dictator ' s  death might open a new door for an general 
understanding with the Soviet union , Winston Churchi l l ,  on May 
1 1 ,  1 9 5 3 , proposed a four-power meeting. The West German 
Bundestag supported Church i l l ' s  initiative by an unanimously 
adopted resolution asking the United States , Great Britain and 
France "to do everything to achieve the peaceful reunification 
o f  the whole Germany . "  The deputies demanded that the four 
powers should reach an agreement on free a l l-German elections 
and the creation of a free government . 3 1 1  
In the United States Churchil l ' s  plan was approved , too . 
The new President, Dwight D .  Eisenhower , had won the elections 
on a platform advocating the liberation o f  the Soviet 
sate l lites . 3 l 2 Nonetheless the new administration decided 
after some considerations to find out whether the new Soviet 
leadership was ready to improve East-west relation s . 3 1 3  
The Western powers , therefore , took the uprising of East 
German workers against the communist regime of the GDR on June 
1 7 ,  1 9 5 3 , as an opportunity to invite the Soviet government 
3 l l  Resolution of the Bundestag ,  June 1 0 ,  1 9 5 3 ,  in : 
Dokurnentation zur Deutschland frage , p .  1 7 2  f .  
3 1 2  John L .  Gaddis , Strategies of Containment: A Critical 
Apprai sal of Postwar American National Security Policy , (New 
York , Oxford: Oxford University Press , 1 9 8 2 ) , p .  1 2 8 .  
3 l 3  J .  w .  Young , "Churchi l l ,  the Russians and the western 
Alliance: the three-power conference at Bermuda , December 
1 9 5 3 , "  English Historical Review 101 (No . 4 0 1 ,  1 9 8 6 ) : p .  8 9 1 . 
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to a conference on Germany . The goal o f  the meeting was " to 
discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a 
satisfactory solution o f  the German problem, name ly, the 
organization of free elections and the establishment of a free 
al l-German government . " 3 1 4  
The Allied proposal sparked a new wave of diplomatic 
correspondence between Moscow and the Western capita l s .  The 
Kremlin insi sted on a broader agenda for the conference 
including the discussion o f  international tensions and 
problems in the Far Ea s t .  Furthermore, Moscow aimed at a five 
power conference including the People ' s  Republic o f  China . 
Washington , London and Paris on the other hand sought to limit 
the talks to the issues of German elections , an a ll -German 
government and the Austrian peace treaty. After several months 
of exchanging notes the three powers decided at their Bermuda 
Conference in December 1 9 5 3  to accept a Soviet proposal for 
a foreign mini ster meeting in Berlin. 3 1 5  
The negotiations started on January 2 5 ,  1 9 5 4 .  Both sides , 
however , merely repeated their old positions . For the we st,  
Foreign Secretary Eden submitted to the conference a scheme 
• 
for Germany ' s  reunification on the line o f  the Allied 
proposals of 1 9 5 2 ;  i . e .  free and secret e lections were to 
3 1 4  "Communique by the western Foreign Ministers 
Proposing a Four-Power Meeting on German Reunification, Issued 
at Washington, July 1 4 ,  1 9 5 3 , "  in : Documents On Germany, p. 
4 0 1 .  
3 1 5  Young , p .  9 0 3 .  
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precede a l l  other step s .  Surpri singly , the British plan 
accepted an earlier Soviet demand for a four-power commission 
supervising the German e lections . Yet ,  the commission ' s  
decision were not to be taken unanimously according to the 
British p lan--which would have given the Soviets veto power­
-but "by majority vote . " 3 1 6  
During the discussions , the Allies again underlined their 
position that a united Germany should be free to j oin the 
We st . Again , the U . S . S . R .  tried to prevent thi s . 3 1 7  The Soviet 
delegation presented a draft o f  a peace treaty with Germany 
which was almost identical to the note of March 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 . 3 l 8  
I t  thus became c lear that Moscow still aimed at the 
neutralization o f  Germany , an objective that was still 
unacceptable to the Wes t .  
Unexpectedly , foreign minister Molotov, who headed the 
Kremlin ' s  delegation , presented a treaty on collective 
security in Europe. The parties to this pact were to refrain 
from aggression against one another and were to assist one 
another in case of an attack. The FRG and the GDR were to 
3 1 6  "British (Eden) Plan for German Reunification Through 
Free Elections, Submitted to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, 
Berlin , January, 2 9 ,  1 95 4 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany, pp. 4 0 8-
4 1 1 .  
3 1 7  Rol f  Steininge r ,  Deutsche Geschichte 1945- 1 9 6 1 : 
Darstel lung und Dokumente in zwei Banden , vol. 2 (Frankfurt 
am Main : Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag , 1 9 8 3 ) , p .  4 7 0 .  
3 1 8  " Soviet Draft o f  a Peace Treaty With Germany , 
Submitted to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin , February 
1 ,  1 9 5 4 "  in : Documents On Germany ,  pp. 4 1 1 - 4 1 3 .  
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participate equally i n  the treaty until the reunification of 
Germany was achieved . 3 l 9 Though the plan di splayed a new 
variation of Moscow ' s  foreign policy , it was not acceptable 
to the Western governments for it aimed at the dissolution of 
NATO and the prevention of the EDc. 3 2 0  
Thus , the four foreign ministers achieved nothing at the 
Berlin Conference. After the conclusion of the negotiation s ,  
both sides issued statements blaming each other for causing 
the failure of the talks3 2 1  but "it must be doubted that 
anybody i n  Berlin was still interested in [Germany ' s ] 
reuni fication . " 3 2 2  In consequence of the unsuccessful four-
power talk s ,  the Soviet Union proclaimed the GDR a sovereign 
state on March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 4 , thereby further solidifying the 
divis ion of Germany . 3 2 3  
3 1 9  "Soviet Proposal for a Treaty on Collective Security 
in Europe ( Including the Two Germanies) , With the United 
States and Chines People ' s  Republic As Observers in Organs of 
the Treaty , Submitted to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, 
Berlin, February 1 0 ,  1 95 4 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany, p. 4 1 5  
f .  
3 2 0  Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte , p .  4 7 0 .  
3 2 1  "Statement I s sued by the Three Western Foreign 
Ministers at the Conc lusion o f  the Foreign Ministers Meeting, 
Berlin , February 1 9 ,  1 95 4 , "  i n :  Documents On Germany, p.  4 1 7 ;  
" Statement by the Soviet Union Attributing Full Sovereignty 
to the Ge rman Democratic Republic,  March 2 5 ,  1 9 5 4 , "  in:  
Documents On Germany, p. 4 1 8  f .  
3 2 2  Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte , p .  4 7 0 .  
3 2 3  " Statement by the Soviet Union Attributing Full 
Sovereignty to the German Democratic Repub lic , March 2 5 ,  
1 9 5 4 , "  in : Documents On Germany ,  p .  4 1 8  f .  
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The Western countries sought t o  complete the creation of 
the West European al liance . Their efforts suffered a drastic 
setback on August 3 0 ,  1 9 5 4 , when a maj ority of the French 
National Assembly vetoed the EDC treaty (which had originally 
been a French proposa l )  and the Contractual Agreement s .  For 
a moment it seemed that a l l  the United States , its all ies and 
the West German government had worked for since fall of 1950  
was in vai n .  Especially Chancellor Adenauer , whose political 
fate was closely linked to the success of West Germany ' s  
integration with Western Europe , was shocked. He called August 
3 0 ,  1 95 4 ,  a "black day for Europe . " 3 2 4  
On an initiative by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden , 
however , the foreign ministers of the EDC countries plus the 
new U . S .  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles , the Canadian. 
Foreign Minister Lester B .  Pearson, and Eden himself conferred 
in September in London to work out plans for an EDC 
substitute.  A compromise establi shing a new West European 
Union (WEU) was found on the following line : one , the United 
and Great Britain obliged themselves to keep American and 
British forces stationed on the European continent; two , West 
Germany renounced the production o f  atomic ,  biological and 
chemical weapons and agreed to additional limitations of its 
conventional arms industry ; three , the FRG declared never to 
resort to force in order "to achieve the reunification o f  
3 2 4  Adenauer , Erinnerungen 1 953-1 9 5 5 ,  p .  2 8 9 .  
1 59 
Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the 
German Federal Republic . . . .. 3 2 5  
The new WEU was a modification o f  the consultative 
organization set up under the Brussels Treaty of March 1 7 ,  
1 9 4 8 ,  which had included Belgium, Franc e ,  Luxembourg, the 
Netherland s ,  and Great Britain. Now, West Germany and Italy 
were to accede to the WEU that was to be the framework for 
these two countrie s '  accession to the NATo. 3 2 6  
France , now convinced that the United States was 
determined to push energetically for German rearmament and 
"might we l l  pull its own ground troops out of Europe i f  that 
were not agreed to, " accepted the settlement proposed in 
London . 3 2 7  
After the London Conferenc� o f  September the nine foreign 
ministers met again in October in Paris for final discussions 
on the West European defense and West Germany ' s  contribution 
to it,  as we l l  as the signing of the agreements outlined in 
the British capital. With the issue of the FRG ' s  rearmament 
settled , the road to Bonn ' s  sovereignty was open . The 
respective Contractual Agreements o f  May 2 6 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  were 
amended to the Paris Treatie s .  The FRG, thus , received " the 
3 2 5  "Final Act of the Nine Power Conference , London , 
October 3 ,  1 9 5 4 , "  [Extract s ] , i n :  Documents On Germany, pp. 
4 1 9-4 2 4 .  
3 2 6  Jona s ,  p .  2 9 2 .  
3 2 7  Ibid. 
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full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and 
external affairs . "  The Western occupation powers retained "the 
rights and responsibi lities ,  heretofore exercised or held by 
them , relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole , including 
the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement . " 328  
On May 5 ,  1 9 5 5 ,  after a l l  participating countries had 
ratified the Paris Treaties , the Occupation Statute was 
revoked and the Allied High Commission dissolved. From this 
time on the Western Al lies were represented by ambassadors as 
was the FRG in Washington,  Paris and London . With the Paris 
Treaties enforced , the Federal Republic formally became a 
sovereign state and a member of the WEU and NATO. In May 1 9 5 5 ,  
U . S .  foreign policy and Adenauer had finally reached their 
foremost obj ectives • 
• 
3 2 8  " Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and 
the Federal Republic of Germany , May 2 6 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  As Amended by 
Schedule I of the Protocol on Termination of the Occupation 
Regime in Germany , Signed at Pari s ,  October 2 3 ,  1 9 5 4 "  i n :  
Documents On Germany ,  pp . 4 2 5 - 4 3 0 .  
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
In 1 9 5 2 , the United States was opposed to Germany ' s  
reunification on Soviet terms. Since 1 9 4 9  at the latest , 
Washington had developed a policy of cooperation with West 
Germany . Since fall of 1 9 5 0 ,  after the "Korea shock , "  the U . S .  
government sought to rearm the Federal Republic and to 
integrate it into a Western alliance system. 
The Stalin Note of March 1 0 ,  1 9 5 2 ,  tried to prevent thi s .  
By offering German unity in exchange for neutrality and 
acceptance o f  the Oder-Neisse line , the Kremlin maneuvered 
itse l f  into an excellent diplomatic positio n .  I f  the West 
accepte d ,  its military a l l iance would be considerably 
weakened . Due to its mil itary power and proximate position to 
Germany , Moscow then would be able to execute considerable 
influence on an all-German government.  In addition , once four­
power negotiations had started and the west European 
integration process was delayed, the Soviet government could 
raise its price for reunification or--after a failure o f  EDC­
-simply return to the status quo. I f  the Western Allies 
rej ected the S oviet proposal out of hand they could be blamed 
for the perpetuation o f  Germany ' s  division . 
National security interests and mil itary-strategic 
1 6 2  
considerations determined the negative American attitude 
toward German unity since the first Soviet note. Contrary to 
the Republican Hoover-Taft opposition , the Democratic 
government favored a global engagement by the United States 
in order to contain communist expans ion . Assisting the 
creation of a strong , defensive West European a lliance was a 
major element in this concept . Washington considered it 
paramount to include the West German military potential into 
this alliance in order to secure its necessary strength as 
wel l  as to reduce the extent to which U . S .  troops were needed 
in Europe. 
Without doubt the frustration Washington had experienced 
in negotiating with the Soviet government further decreased 
its preparedness to meet a Russian delegation at the 
conference table in 1 9 5 2 . There had been no maj or , successful 
Soviet-American talks since the Potsdam Conference of 1 9 4 5 .  
I t  was not before East and West agreed upon a n  armistice in 
Korea in mid- 1 9 5 3  that the climate for negotiations improved . 
During the exchange o f  notes in 1 9 5 2 , it was therefore 
the United States ' objective to demand free all-German 
elections as a first step toward reuni fication, without 
offering any substantial concession to the Soviet Union. The 
western governments succeeded in convincing the Western 
publics that Moscow ' s  rej ection o f  the Allied counter 
proposals equaled a rej ection of free e lections. Thus the West 
created the impression that Moscow would not a llow a free and 
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democratic all-German government to be established. Employing 
this tactic enabled the West to win " the battle o f  notes" 
despite Moscow ' s  origina l ,  excellent position . 
The negative U . S .  attitude toward 
reunification proposal for Germany received 
the Soviet 
the general 
support of the West European countries.  Their governments as 
well as large parts of their popu lation feared the reemergence 
of a strong and independent German state as envisaged in the 
Stalin Note . These countries were also seeking security from 
the Soviet threat. Therefor e ,  they favored an 
institutionalized cooperation with Bonn. 
In addition, the support of Chancellor Adenauer for the 
U . S .  policy facilitated Washington ' s  rejection of the Soviet 
initiative. It was Adenauer ' s  objective to align the FRG with 
the West in order to create an effective west European defense 
against the Soviet military potentia l .  Equally important , 
however , was his firm belief that a neutral Germany was too 
weak to resist Soviet power in the long run. In addition , he 
was convinced that Western strength would increase Soviet 
preparedness for sincere talks and retreat from the GDR, thus 
allowing East Germany ' s  accession to the FRG. 
Although Washington was quite sensitive about the West 
Germans ' reaction to its policy , it depended more on the echo 
its handling of German affairs found in the American pub l i c .  
The print media supported the Truman Administration ' s  course , 
vehemently opposing the idea of an armed and neutral Germany , 
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a s  well a s  respective negotiations with the Soviet Union. This 
fact further limited the U . S .  government ' s  flexibility on the 
German question in 1 9 5 2 .  
For a short period of time (Apri l/May 1 9 5 2 )  the State 
Department was inclined to discuss the Soviet initiative with 
the Kremlin.  Thi s ,  however ,  was to have been carried out only 
for the dual purpose of either exposing the Soviet s '  
insincerity ( i . e .  for propaganda reasons) or arranging the 
details of Moscow ' s  unconditional surrender o f  the GDR. The 
claim that these considerations o f  the State Department 
constituted a real chance for reunification i s  not convincing . 
Because the U . S .  proposal of talks was dropped so hastily 
after opposition had emerged among the Al lies , the chance for 
the West German government to push successfully for a 
conference was minima l .  
The German Social Democrat s '  position on the Stalin Note 
was compatible neither with Washington ' s  nor with Adenauer ' s  
policy. Kurt Schumacher ' s  concept of a united Germany was 
rej ected by Adenauer and met with little understanding by the 
United State s .  American officials and j ournalists had little 
sympathy for the SPD chairman , beyond respect for his 
impressive anti-Nazi record and his decisive anti-communi sm .  
In 1 9 5 2 , the SPD also lacked a clear answer to the question 
of how Germany should be defended . Schumacher ' s  plan to rely 
solely on the American atomic bomb , whi le not participating 
in the EDC provoked clear statements of d i sapproval among the 
1 6 5  
U . S .  pub lic and was unacceptable to Washington . 
The West ' s  policy o f  negotiating from a position of 
strength provided peace and security in Europe for forty 
years . Yet, it did not--as Adenauer had hoped--bring Germany ' s  
reunification.  On the contrary, it hardened the relations 
between the German states for a considerable time. The 
eighteen million East Germans had to pay the price for this 
policy . The government of the GDR justified its policy of 
repression by emphasizing the menace from the West .  Thus for 
forty years , East Germans were subj ects o f  a communist 
government that imposed severe limitations on the c ivil 
liberties o f  its citiz ens . Today the consequences can still 
be seen in the new mass exodus of East Germans from the GDR 
and massive demonstrations against the communist regime . The 
resulting opening of the Berlin Wall and the German-German 
border indicates that the humanitarian hardships of Germany ' s  
division can be overcome without reunification . Yet ,  the 
question o f  how quick the GDR ' s  development toward a 
democratic form of government and civi l liberties wi ll be 
remains the object o f  speculations--at least for the time 
being. 
• 
Accusations by some historians that Adenauer bears the 
full historical responsibi lity for the perpetuation o f  
Germany ' s  division i n  1 95 2 ,  however, must be questioned . 
Indeed, he could have pressed for an Allied examination of the 
Soviet offer through four-power talk s .  But this would have 
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increased fears o f  a German Schaukelpolitik and thus 
jeopardized cooperation with the West .  Furthermore , a four­
power meeting in 1 9 5 2  probably would have ended like the 
Berlin Conference in 1 9 5 4--in failure . 
1 6 7  
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